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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1953 as amended).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
See Addendum A for text of statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE8 AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the inaccurate transcript prepared by a nonlicensed

reporter adequate for appellate review of this capital homicide case?
This issue involves a question of law.
2.

Did the trial judge commit reversible error in failing

to remove five jurors for cause?
A decision on a challenge for cause is
reversed where the judge abused his discretion.
State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah
1989). The exercise of such discretion is
viewed, however, "in light of the fact that it is
a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias
simply by excusing the prospective juror and
selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d
533, 536 (Utah 1981). Despite the traditional
abuse of discretion review, as a matter of law,
jurors who will impose the death penalty without
weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances or who are otherwise tainted must

be excused. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992).
3.

Did the State violate due process and discovery rules

in failing to inform defense counsel that its key witness, who had
identified someone other than Appellant at the lineup, made a
post-lineup query to prosecutors that implicated Appellant?
Whether a discovery violation occurred is a
mixed question of law and fact. The trial
judge's underlying factual findings are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard whereas the
conclusion is reviewed for correctness. See
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991).
4.

Did the State violate due process and discovery rules

in failing to inform defense counsel prior to trial that its key
witness had initially been unable to select Menzies from a photo
spread?
The standard of review set forth in 3 above
applies to this issue.
5.

Did the trial judge commit reversible error in

admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of jail informant
Britton?
This issue involves a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
781.
6.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in quashing

Appellant's subpoena of the prosecutor?
Although the trial court has discretion to
refuse to allow a defendant to call a prosecutor
to testify, "a weather[ed] eye must be kept on
the constitutional rights of the defendant."
State v. Stiltner, 377 P.2d 252 (Wash. 1962).
Where "the result would be to prejudice the
defendant's case," quashing the subpoena is
improper. See State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450,
453 (Utah 1982).
-

2

-

7.

Is a new trial required as the result of the State's

lead investigator testifying that Menzies said he had gone to his
parole office the day Ms. Hunsaker disappeared?
This issue involves a mixed question of law
and fact and is reviewed for correctness. See
generally Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781.
8.

Was Mr. Menzies' right to a fair trial by an impartial

jury violated where unusual and prejudicial incidents, including the
fainting of a juror, occurred?
The standard of review set forth in 7 above
applies.
9.

Did the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction violate

due process and require a new trial?
This Court reviews conclusions of law for
correctness. Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp.. 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). "An appeal challenging
the refusal to give jury instruction presents a
question of law only. Therefore, [this Court]
grant[s] no particular deference to the trial
court's rulings." State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d
1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990).
10.

Did the trial court err in denying Appellants motion

to suppress evidence seized from Appellant's home?
This Court reviews "the findings of fact
supporting a trial court's decision on a motion
to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard."
State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App.
1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Legal conclusions
are reviewed for correctness. State v. Buford.
820 P.2d 1381, 1382 (Utah App. 1991).
11.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

admitting an enlarged smiling photograph of the deceased taken
several years before the homicide?

-

3 -

This issue involves a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
781.
12.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

admitting several items of real evidence?
This issue involves a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at
781.
13.

Did the trial judge commit reversible error in

admitting an unsigned, unauthenticated Social Security card?
This issue involves a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. Id.
14.

Did the trial judge err in admitting hearsay

statements of Maureen Hunsaker?
This issue involves a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. Id.
15.

Does cumulative error require a new trial?

This is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness. Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700
P.2d at 1070.
16.

Was there sufficient evidence to support a conviction

for capital homicide?
This Court reviews the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and reverses a
conviction where "the evidence and its inferences
are so inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted." State v.
Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
17.

Did the admission of Mr. Menzies' entire prison file

during the penalty phase violate the rules of evidence and
Mr. Menzies' rights to confrontation and due process?

-
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Whether this evidence was properly admitted
is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.
18.

Did the State's failure to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt unadjudicated criminal acts contained in hearsay reports in
the prison file violate due process and the eighth amendment?
This issue involves a question of law and is
subject to a correction of error standard of
review. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1259-60 (Utah 1988); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.
19.

Did the State's failure to provide Appellant with a

copy of the prison file which contained, among other things, police
reports, psychological evaluations, prison disciplinary information
and Board of Pardons actions violate discovery rules and due process?
The trial judge's underlying factual
determinations are given deference while the
ultimate conclusion is a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d
at 871.
20.

Were Mr. Menzies' fifth amendment rights against

self-incrimination violated by the inclusion in the prison file of
numerous statements attributed to Menzies, which were made while
Menzies was in custody, without being informed that they would be
used in criminal proceedings?
Any underlying factual determinations are
subject to a clearly erroneous standard whereas
the ultimate conclusion is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. See generally
State v. Miller. 829 P.2d 132 (Utah App. 1992);
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.
21.

Was due process violated by the inclusion of

unadjudicated acts in the prison file for which the statute of
limitations had run where the State relied on hearsay reports of the

-
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acts as its only evidence?
This issue raises a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at
781.
22.

Did the admission of Exhibit 1-D, 1976 and 1973

psychological evaluations which contained hearsay statements
referring to unadjudicated criminal conduct, violate Mr. Menzies'
right to confrontation, due process and the eighth amendment?
This issue involves a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. Id.
23.

Did the State violate due process and discovery rules

by changing its penalty phase witness list at the last minute to
include officers and others that it had been aware of as potential
witnesses throughout the proceedings?
This is a mixed question of law and fact
which is reviewed for correctness. Id.
24.

Were Appellant's due process and eighth amendment

rights violated by the State's failure to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that unadjudicated criminal conduct other than that which was
referred to in the prison file actually occurred?
This is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness. Id.
25.

Should this Court reconsider its holding in Lafferty

that the State can attempt to prove unadjudicated crimes during the
penalty phase?
The standard in issue 24 applies.
26.

Did the excessive repetition in the prison file and

exhibits of evidence of Appellant's five prior convictions violate

-
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due process and the eighth amendment?
The standard of review in issue 24 applies.
27.

Did application of the heinousness aggravating

circumstance (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(q)) violate due process
and the eighth amendment?
This is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness. Id.
28.

Did application of the "preventing a witness from

testifying" aggravating circumstance (Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202(1)(i)) violate due process and the eighth amendment?
This is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness. Id.
29.

Did application of the pecuniary gain aggravating

circumstance violate due process and the eighth amendment?
This is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness. Id.
30.

Did the Stated argument during the penalty phase that

two uncharged aggravating circumstances applied and the trial
court's reliance on those two uncharged aggravating circumstances
and sua sponte reliance on a third uncharged aggravating
circumstance violate due process and the eighth amendment?
This issue involves a question of law.
31.

Id.

Did the admission of juvenile and adult rap sheets

which contained unadjudicated criminal conduct which the State did
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt violate due process and the
eighth amendment?
This issue involves a mixed question of law
and fact. See generally Id.; State v. Taylor.
-
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818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 112
S.Ct. 1576.
32.

Did the trial court's erroneous admission of gruesome

photographs of the deceased require a new penalty phase?
This issue involves a mixed question of fact
and law which is reviewed for correctness. See
generally State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah
1988); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.
33.

Did the State's argument and the trial judge's

reliance on the possibility that Menzies would be paroled as a basis
for imposing the death penalty require a new penalty hearing?
This issue involves a question of law.
34.

Id.

Did imposition of the death penalty to prevent Menzies

from being paroled violate Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution
in light of the recent legislative change in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-207?
This issue involves a question of law.
35.

Id.

Did imposition of the death penalty based on the

possibility of escape violate Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207, due process
and the eighth amendment?
This issue involves a question of law.
36.

Id.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct requiring a new

penalty phase where, among other things, he argued that Appellant
was a psychopath and compared him to three notorious killers?
Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal
where "the actions or remarks of [prosecuting]
counsel call to the attention of the jury a
matter it would not be justified in considering
in determining its verdict and, if so, under the
circumstances of the particular case, whether the
error is substantial and prejudicial such that
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its
-
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absence, there would have been a more favorable
result . . . ." State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708,
712 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting State v. Gardner.
789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494
U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990)).
37.

Did the introduction of victim impact evidence violate

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 and Article I, § 9 of the Utah
constitution?
This issue involves a question of law.
38.

Id.

Did introduction of expert testimony regarding

characteristics of Appellant based on the reading of hearsay reports
violate due process and the eighth amendment?
This is a mixed question of law and fact
which is reviewed for correctness. Id.
39.

Does cumulative error in the two phases require a new

penalty hearing?
This issue involves a question of law.
40.

Id.

Did the trial judge improperly apply the two prongs of

the Wood/Holland standard?
This issue involves a question of law. Id.;
see generally State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 (Utah
1981); State v. Holland. 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1989) .
41.

Is the death sentence disproportionate in this case?
This issue involves a question of law.

42.

Id.

Does death qualification of the jury violate the Utah

constitution?
This issue involves a question of law.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781.
43.

See

Is Utah's death penalty scheme unconstitutional?

-
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This issue involves a question of law.
44.

Id.

Did the trial judge's failure to orally pronounce

sentence on the Aggravated Kidnapping charge require that such
sentence be stricken?
This issue involves a question of law.

Id.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A jury convicted Appellant of Capital Homicide, Murder in
the First Degree, with aggravating circumstances that the homicide
was committed in connection with a robbery and an aggravated
kidnapping; Robbery, a first degree felony; and Aggravated
Kidnapping, a first degree felony.
the death penalty.

R. 898. The trial judge imposed

T. 3270.

This is the direct appeal of Appellant's conviction and
death sentence.

This Court has previously remanded the case to the

trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's Motion for New
Trial based on the inadequacy of the transcript.

The transcript

issue has been briefed, and this Court issued its opinion on the
transcript issue in State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1992).

See Addendum B for copy of opinion.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 23, 1986, Maureen Hunsaker disappeared from the

Gas-A-Mat station where she worked which is located on a busy
intersection at 3995 West 4700 South in Kearns, Utah.
978-9.

T. 976,

She was last seen at the station between 8:30 p.m. and

9:45 p.m.

T. 2188, 2190, 2192. When police arrived at

approximately 9:55 p.m. (after receiving a call about a minute
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-

earlier), the booth at the gas station was empty (T. 1030-1);
several customers were waiting to pay for gas they had pumped, but
there was no way of ascertaining how many customers had pumped gas
and left without paying.

T. 1030-1.

Police found no signs of a struggle in the booth, nor did
they find fingerprints or any evidence that the booth had been wiped
clean of fingerprints.

T. 1041, 1159-64, 1887. The cash register

contained no bills; however, Ms. Hunsaker had emptied the cash
drawer into the more secure "drop safe" at 8:35 p.m.

T. 1032, 1138.

Gas-A-Mat employees stated various figures as to the amount
of cash missing~$70.00 (T. 1137), $106.65 or $116.65 (T. 1141-2),
or $114.15 (T. 1184).

The variance depended on which employee was

reviewing which report.

In addition, the station reported several

different figures for the number of packs of cigarettes which were
missing but later indicated no cigarettes were missing.

T. 1178,

1186.
Officers found several items in the booth—Ms. Hunsaker's
reading glasses which she used infrequently (T. 1016-7), a radio
(T. 983), cigarettes of unknown brand and style (T. 983), a
cigarette lighter of unknown color and type (T. 985), a cigarette of
unknown brand which was left to burn to a nub (T. 983, 2626), and
Ms. Hunsaker's coat (T. 1013-14).
A few days prior to her disappearance, Ms. Hunsaker had
indicated she was unhappy, that her husband was prohibiting her from
pursuing certain activities, that her marriage was a mistake, and
that she was "grasping" for something to make her happier.
- 11
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T. 2228-31.
At approximately 11:05 p.m. that night, Ms. Hunsaker phoned
her husband at home.

T. 1022, 1046.

The officer who was present at

the Hunsaker home testified that Mr. Hunsaker initially asked her
whether she had been robbed.

T. 1047. Mr. Hunsaker testified that

she told him she had been robbed but that she was fine and they
would let her go that night.

T. 986, 1023, 1025.

The officer then

took the phone and Ms. Hunsaker, in response to his leading
question, indicated that she had been robbed but was "okay."
T. 1056-7.

The officer asked her twice, in "clear" and "simple"

terms, whether she was being held against her will.

T. 1057-1059.

First, Ms. Hunsaker said she did not know what the officer meant.
1. 1058.

Her second answer ("no") was such that the officer

conceded that she could have been saying either (1) she was not
being detained or (2) she was not free to leave.

T. 1059.

Mr. Menzies filed a Motion to Suppress the statements based on their
hearsay nature and unfair prejudice.
134.

R. 364-6; R. 1163 at 129,

The trial court denied the motion.

R. 1163 at 142-5.

A woman positively identified a photograph of Maureen
Hunsaker as the woman she had seen in Denny's restaurant, sitting,
drinking coffee and conversing normally with a male companion
between 11:30 p.m. and midnight on February 23, 1986.

T. 2246-7.

The woman was unable to identify Mr. Menzies as Ms. Hunsaker's male
companion when shown his photograph as part of a photo array.
T. 2288.
Between 11:30 p.m. and midnight that same night,
- 12
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Mr. Menzies went to the home of Janet Franks looking for his
girlfriend, Nicole Arnold.1

T. 1478, 1481. He arrived alone, calm,

unhurried, without any cuts, scrapes or bruises on his hands or
face.

T. 1490, 1492.
Mr. Menzies had left the motor running, and Ms. Franks did

not hear the horn honk.

T. 1491. After discovering that Nicole was

not there, Menzies used the restroom, "checked in on" Nicole's baby
from a previous relationship, and left.

T. 1481, 1493.

Shortly

after midnight, Mr. Menzies telephoned his sister and Nicole's
grandmother, still looking for Nicole.

T. 2195, 2211.

The following morning, Monday, February 24, 1986, Tim
Larabee and Elizabeth Brown, two high school students, skipped
school and went to Storm Mountain picnic area.

T. 1193, 1213.

While at Storm Mountain, the students noted the presence of another
man and a woman.

Tim stated the couple appeared normal (T. 1221);

were not in any way physically linked to each other (T. 1222) ; were
not struggling (T. 1224); and were, in fact, engaged in normal
conversation (T. 1250-1251).
Tim never saw more than a profile of the man, and he was
never closer to him than ninety feet.

T. 1229.

On May 16, 1986,

during a lineup, Mr. Larabee positively identified a man other than
Menzies as the man he had seen at Storm Mountain.
1277-1278.

T. 1274,

At the preliminary hearing held the day after the

1. In November, 1986, Ms. Arnold married Jim Duffy and took her
husband's last name. Throughout this brief, she will be referred to
as Nicole Arnold.
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lineup, Tim was not asked to identify anybody in the courtroom as
the person he observed at Storm Mountain on February 24, 1986
(T. 1279), nor did Tim identify anyone in the courtroom as the
person he had seen at storm Mountain.

T. 1192-1296.

During trial, on redirect examination, prosecutor Ernie
Jones elicited testimony from Tim indicating that after the lineup,
on the way back to the prosecutor's office, Tim had asked Ernie
Jones whether number 6 was actually the person.

T. 1285.

Despite

the fact that the lineup occurred the day before the preliminary
hearing and many months before trial (T. 1285) and despite the
statutory procedures governing lineups as well as the constitutional
and statutory rules regarding discovery, the State did not divulge
this "post lineup query" from one of its key witnesses to the
defense and instead used it to surprise the defense in front of the
jury.

T. 1296.
In addition to his inability or difficulty in identifying

Mr. Menzies in a courtroom or in a lineup, Tim had difficulty
selecting Mr. Menzies' photo from a group of six photos.

On

February 28, 1986, Detective Judd showed Tim the photo array.
T. 1684, 1709.

When Tim could not make a selection, Detective Judd

took him to a parking lot to see whether there was a car similar to
the one he had seen at Storm Mountain.

After they returned to the

ninth floor administration office, Detective Judd left and Detective
Thompson showed Tim the photo array again.

At that time, Tim

apparently pointed to Menzies' photograph as looking most like the
man at Storm Mountain.

T. 1374, 1714, 1332.
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The State did not inform defense counsel of Tim's initial
inability to select a photo (T. 1714); defense counsel learned this
for the first time during the trial.

T. 1284, 1295-6.

Ms. Hunsaker's body was found at Storm Mountain on
February 25, 1986.

T. 1315. The cause of death was either

strangulation or stab wounds to the throat, both of which occurred
at about the same time.

T. 2080.

On February 24, 1986, Mr. Menzies was arrested on an
unrelated theft charge.

T. 1519. Various cards belonging to

Maureen Hunsaker were found in a laundry basket near the booking
area of the jail.

T. 1561. Although the officer who had arrested

Menzies initially reported that the booking was without incident and
Menzies was cooperative, after the cards were found, he changed his
story and claimed Menzies, who was cuffed at the time, had run down
the hall and disappeared into the room where the cards were found.
T. 1524-1526.
Defense counsel filed a motion in limine, which the trial
court granted, to suppress all evidence of Mr. Menzies' prior
convictions and parole status during the guilt or innocence phase of
the trial.

R. 780.2

Despite the trial court's order that Mr. Menzies' prior
criminal history be kept from the jury, Detective Thompson, one of
the State's lead detectives on this case, testified in violation of

2. The trial court also found subsection (h) of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202 unconstitutional because of its prejudicial effect to a
defendant and dismissed that aggravating circumstance. R. 542.
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a pretrial order that Mr. Menzies told him that the morning after
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared, he had gone to the parole office.
T. 1877; see footnote 27 supra at 71.

Defense counsel immediately

objected (T. 1877) and made several motions for mistrial (T. 1878,
1904, 2133).
Officers searched Mr. Menzies' apartment on February 28,
1986.

On October 24, 1986, Mr. Menzies filed a motion and

accompanying memorandum asking the court to suppress the evidence
taken in the search.

R. 335-59.

The trial court held an

evidentiary hearing on the motion on November 7, 1986.

R. 452-54;

see transcript of proceedings, R. 1163. Mr. Menzies filed an
amended motion on November 18, 1986.

R. 465-501.

Objections were

made therein to the initial search done after Nicole allegedly
consented and follow-up search pursuant to the warrant.
and 471-83.

R. 340-46

On November 21, 1986, the trial court heard argument on

the motion (see transcript dated November 21, 1986).
court denied the motion on February 12, 1987.

The trial

R. 538.

At trial,

defense counsel made continuing objection to the admission of any of
the evidence seized by detectives during the search.

T. 1680.

Walter Britton was an inmate on the same tier of the Salt
Lake County Jail as Menzies during the week of February 23, 1986.
T. 2080.

Britton was awaiting trial and/or sentencing on federal

bank robbery charges in several jurisdictions.

Britton testified at

the preliminary hearing that on Friday, February 28, and Saturday,
February 29, 1986, Menzies sought Britton out in order to discuss
Menzies' involvement in the Hunsaker homicide.
- 16
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T. 2081-2083.

Britton did not report this conversation to jail personnel until a
month later, approximately March 28, 1986.

The bulk of Britton's

preliminary hearing testimony was available from news reports and he
had no specific information that could have been attributable only
to Menzies.

T. 2110.

After Britton testified at the preliminary hearing, a
prosecutor in this case appeared in federal court on his behalf to
testify at a Rule 35 hearing for reduction of sentence.

T. 2316.

As part of his federal charges in Utah, the court had ordered, just
three months prior to this incident, that Britton undergo a
competency evaluation and sent him to Springfield, Missouri for
thirty days to undergo a battery of psychiatric examinations.
T. 2052-2053.
Although the preliminary hearing on this case occurred
before Britton had been convicted of all pending charges and when he
could still pursue Rule 35 hearings or lesser sentences, the trial
occurred after all of Britton's sentences had been imposed and when
he could no longer benefit at sentencing.

Britton changed his mind

several times as to whether he would testify at this trial.
T. 2293, 2301-3, 2294-5, 958.
The jury convicted Mr. Menzies of Capital Homicide with
Robbery and Aggravated Kidnapping as aggravated circumstances,
Aggravated Kidnapping (T. 2613), and not guilty of Aggravated
Robbery (R. 900). 3

3. According to transcript, the jury convicted him of this charge
as well. T. 2693. The parties have agreed this was erroneous
transcription.
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Mr. Menzies waived the jury for the penalty phase of his
trial.

T. 2697.

The trial court had ordered the State to file its

list of penalty phase witnesses no later than January 28, 1988 at
5:00 p.m.

R. 755.

On February 2, 1988, Defendant filed a

supplemental motion to obtain the witness list.
State filed its list the next day.

R. 774.

R. 772-3.

The

On March 24, 1988, the

Friday before the penalty phase began on a Tuesday, the State filcid
a substantially revised witness list which contained a number of
witnesses not previously disclosed.

R. 1013-4.

These witnesses

included a police officer who had worked on the 1976 robberies in
which Mr. Menzies was implicated, and two jailers who came in
contact with Mr. Menzies while he awaited trial on this case.

The

State did not supply Defendant with the officer's police report or
statements attributed to Mr. Menzies to which the officer testified
over Defendant's objections.

T. 2758.

During the penalty phase, the State introduced Mr. Menzies'
entire prison file, over Defendant's objections.
2885, 2886, 3135, 3132-4, 2892-3.

T. 2839-40, 2843,

The file contained numerous

hearsay reports, presentence investigations, rap sheets,
psychological evaluations, "C" notes, statements, and other
information which was undocumented, came from unidentified sources,
and was unreliable.
Addendum L.

See Index to Prison File contained in

The file contained many references to unadjudicated

criminal conduct which the State made no effort to prove.

The State

had not given Defendant a copy of the file nor stated that it
intended to introduce the file; nor did it call as witnesses any of
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the persons to which statements in the file had been attributed.
During the penalty phase, the State also introduced
Defendant's adult and juvenile rap sheets, both of which contained
unadjudicated conduct which the State made no effort to prove.
T. 2850, 2865, Exhibit 1-C.

The State also introduced as State's

Exhibit 1-D three psychological reports on Mr. Menzies done more
than ten years earlier, victim impact testimony (T. 975-82, 2795-6)
and testimony from Dr. Pat Smith (T. 3144-68), who had not
interviewed Mr. Menzies and who relied on material which Mr. Menzies
had previously objected to and which was otherwise unreliable in
forming her opinion.
The State, while acknowledging that two photographs would
not be appropriate for a jury, introduced gruesome autopsy
photographs of Ms. Hunsaker during the penalty phase.
2882.

T. 2833-8,

The State argued, among other things, that the death penalty

should be imposed because of the heinousness or brutality of the
homicide and because otherwise Mr. Menzies might escape or be
paroled.

The State relied on various hearsay documents throughout

its argument, claimed Mr. Menzies was a psychopath, and implied that
he was similar to "Son of Sam" and Charles Manson.
The trial judge, in a lengthy ruling in which he relied on
improper and uncharged aggravating factors and evidence, sentenced
Mr. Menzies to death.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I.

TRANSCRIPT
Appellant incorporates arguments raised in transcript issue
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brief and argument,
POINT II.

CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE

The trial judge committed reversible error in failing to
remove five jurors who were challenged for cause, thereby requiring
Appellant to use his peremptory challenges to remove the jurors.
Two of the jurors indicated they would always impose death on
someone convicted of an intentional or "premeditated" murder, one
juror indicated she would execute a defendant based solely on a
failure to show remorse, one juror had difficulty applying the
presumption of innocence, and the fifth juror would impose death to
prevent parole and thought the victim and defendant should suffer
equally.
POINT III.

POST-LINEUP QUERY

Reversible error occurred where the State failed to inform
the defense that the State's key witness, who had selected someone
other than Appellant at the lineup, had made a post-lineup query to
the prosecutor which implicated Appellant.

Defense counsel learned

this information for the first time during the redirect examination
of the State's key witness.
POINT IV.

INABILITY TO SELECT PHOTOGRAPH

The State's failure to inform defense counsel that the same
key witness was initially unable to make a selection from a photo
array requires a new trial.
POINT V.

PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY OF BRITTON
The trial judge erroneously concluded that jailhouse

informant Britton was unavailable for confrontation purposes where
- 20
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Britton was present and, although he claimed he would not testify,
actually answered every question asked of him.

The trial judge also

erroneously concluded that the former testimony was reliable where
Britton was a jailhouse informant who had access to the information
through the news media, and defense counsel did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine him on all relevant issues, especially
those affecting Britton's credibility, during the preliminary
hearing.
POINT VI.

QUASHING SUBPOENA OF PROSECUTOR

The trial judge committed reversible error in quashing
defendant's subpoena of the prosecutor where the prosecutor was a
witness who could provide important information which related to
Britton's expectations of benefit for testifying.
POINT VII.

PAROLE STATEMENT TO JURY

Reversible error occurred where an experienced lead
investigator for the State testified, in violation of a court order,
that Menzies had stated that he went to his parole office the day
after Ms. Hunsaker's disappearance.
POINT VIII.

TAINTED JURY

A number of irregular and prejudicial occurrences,
including the fainting of a juror, the emotional breakdown of
another juror, and the removal of a third juror who received a phone
call informing him of crimes Appellant had allegedly committed,
followed by sequestration of the jury, unduly prejudiced this jury,
precluding it from being fair.

- 21

-

POINT IX.

REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION

The erroneous reasonable doubt instruction which
incorrectly defined the concept, requires a new trial.
POINT X.

SEARCH OF APPELLANTS HOME
The trial judge erroneously admitted evidence seized from

Appellant's home, in violation of the fourth amendment to the United
States constitution.
POINT XI.

ENLARGED SMILING PHOTOGRAPH OF DECEASED

The trial judge committed reversible error in admitting an
enlarged photograph of Ms. Hunsaker taken several years before the
homicide, which depicted a smiling young woman with long hair.
POINT XII.

REAL EVIDENCE

The trial court committed reversible error in admitting
several items of evidence which had little or no probative value and
were prejudicial.
POINT XIII.

SOCIAL SECURITY CARD

The trial judge committed reversible error in admitting an
unsigned and unauthenticated Social Security card which Nicole
Arnold's husband claimed to have found among belongings which had
been searched and accessible to numerous people during the
intervening months.
POINT XIV.

HEARSAY STATEMENTS

The trial judge committed error in admitting the hearsay
statements of Maureen Hunsaker.
POINT XV.

CUMULATIVE ERROR
Cumulative error requires a new trial.
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POINT XVI.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

There was insufficient evidence to establish each of the
two statutory aggravating circumstances, and insufficient evidence
to connect Appellant to the homicide.
POINT XVII.

PRISON FILE—HEARSAY, CONFRONTATION. DUE PROCESS

The prison file is replete with hearsay.
were not admissible under any hearsay exception.

The statements
The State made no

showing that the witnesses were unavailable or that the information
was reliable, in violation of Mr. Menzies' right to confront the
witnesses against him.

Furthermore, due process was violated by the

inclusion of disciplinary results from prison hearings where lesser
standards of due process apply and where Mr. Menzies had been
informed in writing that the results and statements made by him
would not be used in criminal proceedings.
POINT XVIII. PRISON FILE—UNADJUDICATED ACTS NOT PROVEN BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT
Notations and reports in the prison file refer to numerous
incidents of unadjudicated criminal conduct.

The State made no

effort to prove that these incidents had in fact occurred.

Instead,

it relied only on the hearsay, double hearsay statements in the
file.

The introduction of these unsubstantiated statements, many of

which did not have an identified declarant, violated Mr. Menzies'
right to due process and the eighth amendment.
POINT XIX.

PRISON FILE—DISCOVERY VIOLATION

The State's failure to provide defense counsel with the
prison file prior to the penalty hearing deprived Appellant of due
process and his rights under the eighth amendment, and violated Rule
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16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
POINT XX.

PRISON FILE—SELF-INCRIMINATION

Admission of the prison file violated Appellant's fifth
amendment rights against self-incrimination.

The file contained

many statements made by Menzies while being questioned in custody
without being informed of his rights.

Some of the information

contained in the file had express statements attached to it
informing Menzies that his statements would not be used against him
in criminal proceedings.

Nevertheless, the trial judge admitted

this information and relied on it in sentencing.
POINT XXI.

PRISON FILE - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Admission of the prison file violated due process and the
statute of limitations since the file contained unadjudicated
conduct which dated back ten to fifteen years, and the State
introduced only the hearsay in the file to support such allegations;
the State did not call witnesses in an attempt to prove that such
conduct had occurred.
POINT XXII.

EXHIBIT 1-D--1976 AND 1973 PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS

Exhibit 1-D was inadmissible for many of the same reasons
that the prison file was inadmissible.

The exhibit consisted of

three very old hearsay examinations which themselves contained
multiple hearsay.

Unadjudicated acts referred to in the evaluations

were not proven by the State, and Appellant's rights to
confrontation and due process were violated by the admission of this
exhibit.
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POINT XXIII.

PENALTY PHASE DISCOVERY

The State failed to provide defense counsel with police
reports, and changed its penalty phase witness list at the last
minute to include police officers and others previously available,
despite a court order requiring the State to provide defense counsel
with the penalty phase witness list well before the guilt/innocence
phase began.

This last-minute change precluded defense counsel from

adequately preparing for the penalty phase, in violation of due
process and the eighth amendment.
POINT XXIV.

UNADJUDICATED ACTS NOT PROVEN

The State's exhibits, witnesses and cross-examination of
Appellant's sister referred to several unadjudicated acts which the
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of due
process and the eighth amendment.
POINT XXV.

RECONSIDER ALLOWING UNADJUDICATED ACTS

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider
its holding in Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1258-60, that the State can
introduce unadjudicated criminal acts during the penalty phase.
POINT XXVI.

EXCESSIVE REPETITION OF PAST CRIMES EVIDENCE

The State's introduction of at least four copies of the
judgments for the crimes of which Appellant has been convicted,
coupled with multiple references to such crimes throughout the
prison file, created the incorrect impression that Appellant's
criminal history was greater than it is, in violation of due process
and the eighth amendment.
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POINT XXVII.

HEINOUSNESS

The State and trial judge failed to apply the heinousness
aggravating circumstance in a narrow fashion as required by this
Court and the United States Supreme Court; the facts of this case do
not fall within that aggravating circumstance.
POINT XXVIII.

PREVENTING A WITNESS FROM TESTIFYING

This aggravating circumstance requires that the decedent be
a witness in a separate official proceeding or investigation.

There

was no separate proceeding in this case; the State merely speculated
that the homicide was committed to prevent the deceased from
testifying about the alleged robbery which was part of the capital
homicide charge.
POINT XXIX.

PECUNIARY GAIN

The trial judge improperly sua sponte applied this
aggravating circumstance where the only suggestion of pecuniary gain
was the robbery aggravating circumstance.

Application of pecuniary

gain duplicates an already existing aggravating circumstance, in
violation of due process and the eighth amendment.
POINT XXX.

UNCHARGED AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

The trial judge's reliance on three uncharged aggravating
circumstances, one of which the judge sua sponte brought up for the
first time while pronouncing sentence, violated due process and the*
eighth amendment.
POINT XXXI.

RAP SHEETS

Admission of juvenile and adult rap sheets which contained
unadjudicated crimes during the penalty phase where the State made
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no effort to prove that Appellant actually committed the crimes
violated due process and the eighth amendment.
POINT XXXII.

GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS

The trial court erroneously admitted gruesome photographs
of the corpse.
POINT XXXIII.

POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE ARGUMENT

The prosecutor argued and the trial judge erroneously
decided that the possibility of parole required imposition of the
death penalty.

Such an argument violated due process and the eighth

amendment and is not an aggravating circumstance under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-207.
POINT XXXIV.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGE

The recent legislative change in Utah's capital homicide
scheme precludes the possibility of parole argument from again being
used as a basis for imposition of the death penalty, and
demonstrates that the death penalty was imposed in this case in
violation of the Utah and United States constitutions.
POINT XXXV.

POSSIBILITY OF ESCAPE

The State argued and the trial improperly relied on the
possibility that Appellant would escape if given a life sentence as
a basis for imposing death.
POINT XXXVI.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

The prosecutor's argument that Appellant was a psychopath
without adequate evidentiary foundation, his reading from a book
about psychopaths during closing, and his comparison of Appellant to
three notorious killers requires a new penalty hearing.

- 27

-

POINT XXXVII.

VICTIM IMPACT

The admission of victim impact evidence violated the Utah
statute and Article 1, § 9 of the Utah constitution.
POINT XXXVIII.

DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY

The expert testimony of Dr. Smith, which was based on old
hearsay reports about Appellant and drew conclusions about him
without having interviewed him, was erroneously admitted.
POINT XXXIX.

CUMULATIVE ERROR

The cumulative impact of errors during the guilt and
penalty phases requires new penalty phase.
POINT XXXX.

WOOD STANDARD

The trial judge erroneously applied both prongs of the
Wood/Holland standard.
POINT XXXXI.

DISPROPORTIONATE

Imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate in
this case where Appellant has not been involved in other murders,
and under the circumstances of the case.
POINT XXXXII.

DEATH QUALIFICATION

Death qualification of the jury violates the Utah
constitution.
POINT XXXXIII.

UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The Utah death penalty scheme is unconstitutional.
POINT XXXXIV.

AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING SENTENCE

The trial judge's failure to orally pronounce sentence on
the Aggravated Kidnapping charge requires that such sentence be
stricken.
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GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRANSCRIPT IS INADEQUATE FOR
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THIS CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASE,
Although this Court has held that the transcript in this
case is adequate for appellate review (see Menzies, 182 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3, contained in Addendum B), Appellant continues to maintain
that use of this transcript violates various constitutional
provisions and statutes, and incorporates by this reference thereto
all arguments raised in his opening and reply briefs on the
transcript issue.4
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO REMOVE JURORS FOR CAUSE.
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
constitution and Article I, §§ 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution
guarantee an accused a fair trial by an impartial jury.

State v.

Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 n.l (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d
799, 801 (Utah 1977) ("Brooks I"); State v. Bailev. 605 P.2d 765
(Utah 1980) ; see also Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
former § 77-35-18 (1982).5
A party is entitled to use his or her peremptory challenges

4. Although it is unclear from the opinion whether the original or
"California" version is the official transcript, Appellant suggests
using the California version when reviewing issues raised in this
brief so that the inaccuracies of the transcript and their impact
are apparent.
5. Utah appellate courts have recognized the importance of a fair
trial by an impartial jury in contexts other than that which is
currently before the Court. See, e.g., State v. Woolleyr 810 P.2d
440 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah
1988); State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989).
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on impartial jurors.

Brooks I. 563 P.2d at 802-3; Crawford v.

Manning. 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d
878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks II").

Prejudicial error occurs where

a party is required to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror
who should have been excused for cause.

State v. Jones, 734 P.2d

473, 474 (Utah 1987); State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989).*
Juror impartiality is an attitude of appropriate
indifference.

Brooks I. 563 P.2d at 802.

Once there is a showing

of partiality or bias, the trial judge must either investigate
further to determine whether the bias exists or excuse the juror.
Woolley. 810 P.2d at 443; Bailey* 605 P.2d at 768.

Once a juror

expresses bias, the showing cannot be overcome by a mere expression
by the juror that he or she can be fair and impartial.

Jones, 734

P.2d at 475; Brooks II at 883-4; Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536.
In determining whether a trial judge erred in failing to
excuse a juror for cause, "some deference must be accorded the
decision of the trial court."
omitted).

Jenkins. 627 P.2d at 536 (citations

However, the discretion given the trial court must be

viewed "in light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate
any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and
selecting another."

Id.

In a capital case, a prospective juror must be excused if
that "juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or
substantially impair him or her from conscientiously taking the
juror's oath and performing his or her duties as a juror by
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following the Court's instructions on capital punishment . . . ."
State v, Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 589 (Utah 1983).
Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 508, held that a capital defendant
is entitled to challenge for cause a juror who would automatically
impose the death penalty.

The Court pointed out that

,f

[a]ny juror

who states that he or she will automatically vote for the death
penalty without regard to mitigating evidence is announcing an
intention not to follow the instructions . . . ."
In the present case, the trial judge failed to excuse for
cause five jurors challenged by defense counsel.

Reversible error

occurred where defense counsel was required to use his peremptories
to remove those jurors.
A.

JUROR CANNON6

Juror Cannon expressed her deeply held belief that an
individual convicted of murder should receive the death penalty by
stating, among other things:
JUROR: Well, if they took a life and are guilty,
I guess I would go along with that [the death
penalty].
THE COURT:

Okay and why?

JUROR: I don't think it's right for them to kill
somebody and get away with it.
T. 350.
Following these responses, the trial judge asked:

6. Juror Cannon's individual voir dire is found at T. 348-60 and
contained in Addendum C. It should be noted that Juror Cannon's
individual voir dire, pp. 338-70, is missing from the original
transcript but can be found in the California version.
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THE COURT: Now, are you at this point in a
position where you will not change your mind of
what penalty the punishment that a person
convicted of first degree murder should receive
that you won't change your mind as to that?
JUROR: No. If he was convicted, I think I would
go along with it [the death penalty], I mean, I
wouldn't change my mind on it.
T. 351.
The trial judge outlined the Wood/Holland standard for the
juror, then asked:
THE COURT: Now, if the Court instructs you in
that respect, do you feel that you can follow the
Court's instructions?
JUROR:

I think I could, yes.

THE COURT: Do you believe all persons convicted
of first degree murder should be put to death?
JUROR: Well, that is a hard decision, I guess.
If they just right out and killed somebody,
I think that thev should, yes.

THE COURT: If the jury should convict
Mr. Menzies of first degree murder, would you be
able to consider voting for a sentence less than
death?
JUROR:

I don't think so.

T. 353 (emphasis added).
Despite three explanations by the court that either death
or a life sentence is an appropriate penalty for first degree murder
(T. 350, 351-2), Juror Cannon continued to express her deep belief
that persons guilty of murder should be sentenced to death (T. 353,
357-8).

Although she stated that she thought she could follow the

court's instructions, her statements that she would automatically
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impose the death penalty indicate otherwise.
L.Ed.2d at 498-9.

See Morgan, 119

Her deep belief is evidenced by the following

dialogue:
MS. WELLS: Miss Cannon, I believe what you have
just said, and I am maybe rephrasing this and
perhaps you need to agree with me or disagree
with me if I have stated it wrong, that if
Mr. Menzies were to be found guilty of the first
degree murder, then you would impose the death
penalty; is that what you were saying?
A JUROR: Well, if he murdered someone, I would
say, yes.
MS. WELLS: If you were a part of a jury that,
let's say, was considering a life sentence, I
believe you stated it would still be your
position that he should receive the death
penalty; is that right?
A JUROR:

Uh-huh.

MS. WELLS: Even though others might have a
different opinion? I thought I heard you say you
would go along with the death penalty, and that
you would also feel that that should be imposed.
A JUROR:

I do have feelings that way, yes.

Defense counsel challenged Juror Cannon for cause.
T. 360.

The trial judge denied the challenge (T. 361) and Appellant

used a peremptory challenge to remove her.

T. 944.

The trial judge's failure to remove Juror Cannon for cause
requires a new trial.
B.

JUROR TAYLOR7

Juror Taylor indicated that she believed that "any person

7. The voir dire of Juror Taylor is found at T. 272-281 and
contained in Addendum D.
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who causes the death of another should suffer the death penalty."
She also indicated that she believed that the death penalty is
ordinarily the proper punishment for a first degree murder and a
defendant who is convicted of capital homicide must sustain the
burden of proving that the death penalty should not be imposed.

She

believed that under a life term, an individual "can get out on
parole" and that such a term might be "10, 15 years," and indicated
that she would impose the death penalty to assure that no release
ever occurred.

She pointed out that she was "one of the

old-fashioned people that believed an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth."

T. 272-5, 276, 277.
Although Ms. Taylor responded affirmatively to general

rehabilitating questions as to whether she would follow the court's
instructions and properly weigh and consider the penalty phase
evidence (T. 275), such general responses failed to negate her
strong feelings that death is the proper sentence in intentional
murders.

T. 279.

See Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 498-9.

Nor did her

response to the prosecutor's leading question that the death penalty
was appropriate in some murder cases but not all obviate her abiding
belief that the death penalty should be imposed for intentional
murders.
Following the trial court's rehabilitative question as to
whether Ms. Taylor would follow the court's instructions as to how
to assess penalty phase evidence and also after the prosecutor's
leading rehabilitative question, the following telling colloquoy
occurred:
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MS. WELLS: I think I have one question.
Miss Taylor, do—you indicated that you would
feel that the death penalty was appropriate in
those instances where a homicide was premeditated
or intentional. Would you in all the
circumstances if the facts were to show that a
killing was intentional, impose the death penalty
or follow what you have just stated? Would you
feel that in those instances that is when the
death penalty would be imposed?
A JUROR:
do.

I believe that is what I would have to

T. 279.
Ms. Taylor/s responses evidence an intent to automatically
impose the death penalty despite the court's instructions.

See

Morgan. 119 L.Ed.2d 492. Her overall responses indicated a deep
belief that any intentional "premeditated" murder required the death
penalty.

Nowhere in her responses did she indicate a willingness to

impose any penalty other than death on a person convicted of what
she termed premeditated murder.
Defense counsel challenged Juror Taylor for cause.
289.

T. 282,

The trial judge refused to remove Juror Taylor (T. 285, 289),

and Appellant was forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove
Juror Taylor.

R. 944.

Rather than investigating further or simply obviating the
problem caused by the juror's deeply held belief in "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth," the trial judge abused his discretion,
committing prejudicial error by requiring Appellant to use a
peremptory challenge to remove her.
C.

8.

JUROR PETERSON8

Juror Peterson's voir dire is found at T. 755-64.
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Juror Peterson repeatedly stated that she would vote to
execute a defendant who failed to show remorse.

T. 757, 758, 760,

762.
Defense counsel moved to excuse the juror for cause.
T. 764.

The trial court denied the motion.

was forced to perempt the juror.

T. 765.

The defense

R. 944.

The juror expressed a deep bias against a defendant who did
not meet a burden, either through his or someone else's testimony,
of presenting evidence of remorse.

Her statements suggested that

where a defendant was not remorseful, she would not weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances but would impose death.
Such automatic imposition of the death penalty required that she be
removed.

See Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 508.
The court failed to either excuse the juror for cause or

investigate her bias.

Further, even if it had, the record shows her

belief to be so deeply held that it could not be dismissed as either
a lightly held belief or a misinterpretation of the law.

The trial

court committed prejudicial error in forcing Appellant to perempt an
obviously biased juror.
D.

JUROR MORGAN9

The record showed Juror Morgan to be a thoughtful, educated
man who expressed a deep and abiding inability to presume the
accused innocent until proven guilty.

Despite his education as a

social worker (T. 542) and extensive instruction as to burdens and

9.

Mr. Morgan's individual voir dire is found at T. 535-48.
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presumptions by the trial court (T. 537-538), Mr. Morgan's bias
remained apparent.

T. 544, 546-7.

Although he understood the

importance of the presumption of innocence, he was unsure whether he
could apply such a presumption.

T. 546-7.

The court attempted to rehabilitate the juror by asking two
lengthy and leading questions that were suggestive of the correct
answer; the juror provided the expected one-word responses.
T. 547-48.
T. 548.

Defense counsel moved to excuse the juror for cause.

The trial court denied the motion.

forced to perempt the juror.

T. 549. Appellant was

R. 945.

The cornerstone of criminal justice is that the accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty.

All other burdens and

presumptions flow logically therefrom.

Despite his claimed ability

to follow the trial court's instructions regarding the secondary
burdens and presumptions, Juror Morgan never stated with any
certainty that he could apply the primary presumption of innocence.
The trial court committed prejudicial error in forcing Appellant to
perempt the biased juror.
E.

JUROR HARSH10

Juror Harsh believed the death penalty should be imposed
for planned murders (T. 745, 747) and indicated that he would impose
the death penalty in order to keep a convicted murderer from ever
being released from prison.

T. 746-8. He thought a person who

killed should suffer equally with what the deceased suffered.

10. Juror Harsh's voir dire is found at T. 742-50 and is contained
in Addendum E.
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T. 474.1]T. 750.

Defense counsel moved to exclude Juror Harsh for cause.

The trial court denied the motion.

forced to perempt the juror.

T. 751. Appellant was

R. 946.

A jury that has found a defendant guilty of capital murder
must then determine whether the penalty is life imprisonment or
execution.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2).

Only the Board of

Pardons is empowered to determine the length of incarceration for a
person sentenced to life.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1)(a).

Mr. Harsh desired to go beyond a juror's responsibility and intrude
upon the Board of Pardons' responsibility.

His desire was borne

from his bias towards capital punishment and away from either life
imprisonment or parole.

See discussion in Points 33 and 34 infra at

176-9 regarding impropriety of arguing that Appellant might be
released on parole as basis for imposition of death penalty.

The

trial court failed to investigate the facial bias or exclude the
juror for cause.

This forced appellant to spend a peremptory

challenge on a presumptively biased juror.

In doing so, the trial

court committed prejudicial error.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE DEFENSE
THE POST-LINEUP QUERY OF ITS KEY WITNESS.
The Stated key witness, Tim Larabee, was at Storm Mountain
with his girlfriend on the morning of February 24, 1986.

Tim twice

saw a man and woman more than ninety feet away, walking away with

11. There are serious transcription discrepancies in this juror's
voir dire. See Addendum E.
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their backs to Tim and Beth.

T. 1229, 1193, 1198-9, 1200, 1208.

Tim heard a scream, which he thought occurred when rocks fell or the
woman slipped, and later saw the man walking alone toward a bridge.
T. 1201-3, 1209-10. The man never looked towards Tim and Beth.
T. 1203.
The State conducted a lineup in which neither Tim nor Beth
selected Mr. Menzies as the man they had seen on Storm Mountain.
T. 2257, 1274, 1277-8. Tim selected someone else in the lineup
(T. 1274, 1277-8) and did not indicate any uncertainty in that
selection while at the lineup proceeding, despite explicit
instructions as to how to proceed in the event he had any
uncertainty as to his selection.

Transcript Lineup Proceeding 6,

12-13; T. 1276-7.
During direct examination, the prosecutor did not ask Tim
to identify Mr. Menzies as the man he had seen at Storm Mountain and
did not ask Tim any questions about the lineup in which he had
positively identified someone other than Mr. Menzies.

T. 1191-1214.

On cross-examination, as any competent attorney would do
under the circumstances, defense counsel asked Tim about his
positive identification of someone other than Mr. Menzies at the
lineup and about Tim's failure to indicate any hesitation or inform
the prosecutors that he had been mistaken.

T. 1278.

On redirect examination, in response to questions from
prosecutor Ernie Jones, Tim testified that while walking back to the
prosecutor's office, he asked prosecutor Ernie Jones if the person
was Number 6.

T. 1285.

Number 6 was Mr. Menzies.
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T. 1285. The

impact of this testimony was to "identify" Mr. Menzies as the person
at Storm Mountain, without the usual controls and foundational
requirements necessary to allow the jurors to hear identification
testimony.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1 (1953 as amended).

Despite the fact that the preliminary hearing was the day
after the lineup and Appellant made discovery requests to which the
State complied, the State did not convey this information to defense
counsel.

T. 1296-7; see discovery motions in Addendum G.
The trial judge granted defense counsel's motion to strike

the testimony.12

T. 1299, 1300, 1301-2.

The court then made a confusing admonishment to the jurors,
which defense counsel attempted to clarify.

T. 1304; see Addendum F

containing relevant testimony and judge's admonishment.

Thereafter,

defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based on the failure of
the State to provide as part of discovery the query allegedly made
by Mr. Larabee following the lineup.
motion.

The trial court denied that

T. 1313-4.
A. THE STATE VIOLATED RULE 16, UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN FAILING TO INFORM APPELLANT
OF THIS INFORMATION.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in

pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information of
which he has knowledge:

12. The State argued that the evidence was not exculpatory and that
defense counsel had opened the door by asking Tim whether he had
equivocated in his lineup identification, even though defense
counsel was unaware of this information. T. 1297-8.
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(1) Relevant written or recorded
statements of the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the
defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the
defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which
the court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the defendant in
order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16 (1982 ed.).
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 916 (Utah 1987), this Court
determined that where the state voluntarily provides discovery of
material which fits within subsection (a)(5) of Rule 16 without
requiring a court order, "considerations of fairness require that
the prosecution respond to the request in a manner that will not be
misleading."

Id. at 916.

This Court set forth two duties of the

State where it voluntarily responded to a request for discovery.
First, the prosecution must either produce all of
the material requested or must identify
explicitly those portions of the request with
respect to which no responsible material will be
provided. Second, when the prosecution agrees to
produce any of the material requested, it must
continue to disclose such material on an ongoing
basis to the defense. Therefore, if the
prosecution agrees to produce certain specified
material and it later comes into possession of
additional material that falls within the same
specification, it has to produce the
later-acquired material. [footnote omitted]
Id. at 917.
In explaining the rationale for the first requirement, this
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Court relied on United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105
S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), which noted that a "prosecutor's
failure to respond fully to a Brady request may impair the adversary
process" by causing defense counsel to rely on the misleading
representation that such evidence does not exist and plan the
defense based on such incorrect reliance.

See Knight, 734 P.2d at

917, citing Baglev, 473 U.S. 682.
In explaining the rationale for the second prosecutorial
duty set forth in Knight, this Court relied on its prior decision in
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).
To meet basic standards of fairness and to insure
that a trial is a real quest for truth and not
simply a contest between the parties to win, a
defendant's request for information which has
been voluntarily complied with, or a court order
of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing
request. And even though there is no
court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory
information which falls with[in] the ambit of
§ 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made a
voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead
defendant as to cause prejudicial error.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 662) (emphasis
added) .
In Knight, this Court held that the State had violated its
discovery duties in failing to provide the defendant with
inculpatory evidence regarding the location and testimony of two
government witnesses.

The Court reversed Knight's conviction,

determining that there was "a reasonable likelihood that the outcome
of Knight's trial would have been more favorable to him had the
prosecution revealed the requested material."
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Knight, 734 P.2d at

920.

This Court pointed out that while such a determination is

usually based on a review of the record,
When, as here, the error consists of the
prosecution's failure to provide a defendant with
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide
much assistance in discovering the nature or
magnitude of the resulting prejudice to the
defense. The record cannot reveal how knowledge
of this evidence would have affected the actions
of defense counsel, either in preparing for trial
or in presenting the case to the jury. To a
large extent, this leaves the reviewing court to
speculate whether, absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the defense would have
adduced other evidence which, when considered in
light of the evidence actually presented, would
have produced a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt.
Id. at 920-1.

In light of this difficulty, this Court determined

that where "the defendant can make a credible argument that the
prosecutor's error impaired the defense" (Id. at 921), the State has
the burden of proving that absent the error, there is no reasonable
likelihood the outcome would have been different.
In Carter, 707 P.2d at 662, this Court emphasized that "a
trial is a real quest for truth and not simply a contest between the
parties to win."

To facilitate this quest for truth and "meet basic

standards of fairness," a request is considered a continuing request
and
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly
discovered inculpatory information which falls
within the ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after the
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of
evidence might so mislead the defendant as to
cause prejudicial error.
In the present case, the undisclosed evidence fell within
the provision of subsection (a)(5) of Rule 16 as well as the State's
- 43

-

continuing obligation to provide evidence under subsection (a)(4).13
Under subsection (a)(5), Appellant had requested all police
reports and investigations regarding the case.
Addendum G.

R. 27; see

The State had voluntarily complied with this request,

supplying defense counsel with numerous police reports# including
information regarding Tim Larabee's testimony and the attempts by
the officer to obtain an identification of Appellant from him.

At

the time of the preliminary hearing, all parties were aware that
Mr. Larabee was having difficulty identifying Mr. Menzies as the
person he had seen at Storm Mountain.

The lineup had been held the

day before the preliminary hearing, and Mr. Larabee had positively
identified a person other than Appellant; he made no in-court
identification at the preliminary hearing.
Hence, the State had voluntarily provided defense counsel
with (a)(5) material regarding Mr. Larabee's testimony and his
inability to identify Mr. Menzies.14
This information also fell within subsection (a)(4).
Where, as here, the State has previously disclosed exculpatory
evidence, it is misleading not to disclose later acquired evidence
which lessens the exculpatory nature of that evidence.

In reliance

13. Although Knight dealt specifically with subsection (a)(5), the
continuing obligation to inform defense counsel so as not to be
misleading is equally applicable to subsection (a)(4).
14. Admission of Tim's query also violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1
et seq. (1982 ed), which outlines the proper procedure for
conducting a lineup. This procedure is designed to ensure that lack
of suggestibility in the procedure and other due process concerns
are met. The implication from the provisions is that where the
statutes are violated, identification evidence is not admissible.
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on apparently exculpatory evidence, defense counsel investigates the
case and prepares his or her defense and strategy.

Information that

the exculpatory evidence is not as strong as initially indicated is
critical to the investigation and preparation of a case.

Both due

process and Rule 16 require the State to have a continuing
obligation to disclose evidence relating to previously disclosed
exculpatory evidence.
In his ruling(s) granting Appellant's motion to strike, the
trial judge agreed that the prosecution had an obligation to convey
this information and that the information would have affected the
way in which counsel conducted her case.

T. 1300, 1301. This

ruling was correct, and the failure to disclose this information
requires a new trial.
B. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THIS EVIDENCE
VIOLATED FEDERAL DUE PROCESS.
In Bradv v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct.
1194 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process [fourteenth amendment] where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.
Id. at 87.
Since Brady, the United States Supreme Court has found a
federal due process violation in a number of contexts where the
prosecution failed to disclose evidence to the defendant.

See

Gialio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (nondisclosure of
evidence affecting the co-conspirator's credibility violated due
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process regardless of whether the attorney who actually tried the
case was aware immunity had been granted); Wardius v. Oregon, 412
U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973) (due process precludes
enforcement of state statute requiring defendant to give notice of
intent to rely on alibi but not requiring reciprocal discovery from
the government); United States v. Acrurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392,
49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (Court elaborated on limits on due process in
this context); United States v. Baaley. 473 U.S. at 676 (due process
requires disclosure of evidence which would impeach government
witnesses).
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d at 917, this Court favorably
quoted language in Bagley regarding the effect an incomplete
discovery response has on trial strategies:
The government notes that an incomplete response
to a specific request not only deprives the
defense of certain evidence but has the effect of
representing to the defense that the evidence
does not exist. In reliance on this misleading
representation, the defense might abandon lines
of independent investigation, defenses or trial
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Defense counsel develops his or her strategy based on the
evidence known.

If disclosed evidence is exculpatory in nature,

competent defense counsel will use it.

Allowing a prosecutor to set

up defense counsel to use the exculpatory evidence, then lie in wait
with inculpatory evidence which not only takes away the impact of
the previously disclosed exculpatory evidence but has the end result
of conveying extremely damaging evidence to the jury, would be
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fundamentally unfair.15
Although a prosecutor need not disclose to the defense
"every investigative move," a prosecutor nevertheless " . . . has a
high duty to act fairly in conducting a criminal prosecution."
State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988). 16

See also

State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Utah 1986) ("the prosecution
in a criminal case is bound by law and professional ethics to assure
that the defendant receives a fair trial [citation omitted].");
State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975) (acknowledging that
a deliberate suppression of evidence by the prosecution "constitutes
a denial of due process if the evidence is material to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant . . . . " ) .
Various courts have found error where the prosecutor
employed misleading discovery tactics.

See State v. Dickerson, 584

P.2d 787, 790 (Or. App. 1978) ("Criminal discovery statutes were
intended to minimize surprise and eliminate 'trial by ambush.'")17;

15. In Smith v. Estelle. 602 F.2d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1979), the
Court outlined the often devastating impact of surprise in a
criminal trial.
16. In Worthen, the absence of an adequate record precluded this
Court from determining whether a discovery violation had occurred.
17. In reaching its decision, the Dickerson Court quoted the
commentary to § 1.1. of the ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and
Procedures Before Trial, Approved Draft 31 (1970):
Generally, an attorney can be effective in a
trial only to the extent he has the information
necessary to plan effectively. Quick wits may be
the mark of the trial lawyer, but they are not
always sufficient for the orderly exposition and
testing of evidence, which is the purpose of a
trial. Where planning is foreclosed by lack of
(continued)
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Long v. State, 431 N.E.2d 875, 877 (Ind. App. 1982) (State's
misconduct in not disclosing defendant's statement then using for
impeachment requires new trial).
In the present case, although it is not definite how
defense counsel would have proceeded had she been provided the
information before trial, the trial judge was correct in determining
that this material information would have affected the conduct of
the defense.

While defense counsel certainly did not want to

explore for the first time in front of the jury in a capital
homicide case whether other persons were present for the
conversation, the prosecutor's behavior toward Tim after he selected
someone other than Menzies at the lineup, and what indications, if
any, the prosecutors had given Tim about the location of
Mr. Menzies, such information was critical to defense counsel in
planning her case and determining how to approach the post-lineup
evidence.
It is also reasonable to assume that defense counsel would

(footnote 17 continued)
information, as has long been the custom in much
of criminal litigation, surprise and gamesmanship
usually govern the conduct of the proceedings.
The result is too often a general obfuscation of
the issues. In spite of its obvious
entertainment qualities, trial gamesmanship by
way of obfuscatory tactics is generally offensive
to the dignity of the court as an institution and
destructive of respect for legal processes.
Where life, liberty and protection of communities
from crime are the stakes, gamesmanship is out of
place. This does not mean that the adversary
system is to be in any way discarded, except
perhaps in its excesses.
Id. at 790.
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have moved to suppress the testimony as a violation of the statutory
lineup procedure outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1 et seq.
Finally, the importance of Tim's query to the State's
circumstantial case precludes the State from establishing that the
outcome would not have been more favorable to Appellant absent the
statement.

Tim Larabee's post-lineup query was critical to the

State's case since it was the only "identification" of Appellant in
the company of Ms. Hunsaker.

Tim had not made an in-court

identification, had selected someone other than Mr. Menzies at the
lineup, and had evidenced considerable hesitation in selecting a
photo from the photospread.

Tying Mr. Menzies to the body at Storm

Mountain was critical to the State's case and was accomplished,
primarily, by this undisclosed information.
The trial judge's admonishment did not take away the
damaging nature of this testimony.

The confusing nature of

admonishment may well have led the jury to believe it could not
consider Tim's lineup identification of someone other than
Mr. Menzies.

See Addendum F.

The State's failure to provide the defense with pretrial
discovery of Tim's query requires a new trial.
POINT IV. THE STATE VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS AND DISCOVERY RULES IN FAILING TO
INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT ITS KEY WITNESS WAS
INITIALLY UNABLE TO SELECT APPELLANT FROM A PHOTO
ARRAY.
Prior to trial, defense counsel was aware that Tim Larabee
had indicated that a photo of Mr. Menzies looked most like the man
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at Storm Mountain of the photos in a photo array, but Tim had
selected someone else, without hesitation, from the lineup.

Defense

counsel learned for the first time during trial that Detective Judd
had initially shown the photospread to Tim, and Tim had been unable
to make a selection.

T. 1685, 1686-7.

to the parking lot to look at cars.

Detective Judd then took Tim

T. 1686-7. After looking at

cars, Detective Judd left Tim with Detective Thompson.

T. 1688.

Apparently, at this point, Tim again looked at the array and said
Menzies appeared to be most like the man he had seen.

T. 1332, 1213.

The way in which the State presented the photo array
evidence precluded defense counsel from becoming aware of Tim's
difficulty in selecting Menzies until the last of the three
witnesses involved in the array testified.
Tim testified first and made no mention of his initial
inability to select a photo.

T. 1213.

Detective Thompson testified next and did not mention Tim's
initial inability to make a selection.

T. 1332.

Detective Judd finally testified much later in the State's
case that he had put together a photospread and shown it to Tim, and
that Tim was unable to make any type of identification at first.
T. 1685.
The State failed to inform defense counsel of Mr. Larabee's
inability to identify anyone during the initial viewing of the
photospread.

T. 1332-5.

Defense counsel immediately objected

(T. 1332) and argued outside the presence of the jury that she had
not been provided with discovery as to Larabee's inability to
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initially identify Menzies.
the objection.

T. 1332-6.18

The trial court overruled

T. 1337-8.

Larabee's inability to initially identify Menzies was
material exculpatory evidence.
39-49; Addendum G.

See discovery discussion supra at

The State was required to provide this

information to defense counsel prior to trial, and its failure to do
so violates Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due
process.

See Norris v. Slayton. 540 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir. 1976)

(failure to disclose witness7 hesitation in identifying defendant in
showup violated due process); Mc Powell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th
Cir. 1988) (due process violated where State withheld information
that witness first claimed assailant was white, then changed to
claim he was black).
Had defense counsel been aware of the information before
trial, she could have used the information to develop her strategy
and impeach Tim's testimony.

Failure to provide this information to

Appellant and springing it on defense counsel during trial after the
relevant witness had testified violated due process and the
discovery procedure mandated under Rule 16.

See Knight, 734 P.2d at

917; Baaley. 473 U.S. at 682.
Furthermore, the prosecution's failure to disclose this
information coupled with the State's failure to inform defense

18. The State seems to argue that since Appellant knew about the
selection Tim made in the presence of Detective Thompson, the State
had complied with discovery requirements. T. 1334-5. The court
appears to have based its ruling on the fact that Appellant knew
about the ultimate selection and missed Appellant's argument
regarding the lack of discovery on the initial inability. T. 1335,
1337.
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counsel of Tim's post-lineup query severely hampered Appellant's
ability to prepare his case, in particular, his attack on Tim's
"identification" of Menzies,
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
TESTIMONY OF WALTER BRITTON TO BE READ TO THE
JURY.
Over the objections of defense counsel, the trial judge
allowed the preliminary hearing testimony of Walter Britton, a
federal inmate housed at the Salt Lake County Jail in February,
1986, to be read to the jury.
testimony read at 2079-2127.

T. 1104-1113, 1119-22, 1125-26;
Britton had first contacted

authorities on March 28, 1986, a full month after the conversation
he claimed occurred in which Ralph Menzies confessed to the crime in
this case.

T. 2080-4, 2100. After testifying at the preliminary

hearing, Britton vacillated several times as to whether he would
testify at trial.

T. 2293-4, 2300-2; R. 562.

A. ADMISSION OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
TESTIMONY VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION.
The right to confrontation as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment is one of "the core elements of the right to due process
of law.11

State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989).
In order to introduce Britton's preliminary hearing

testimony at trial without violating the confrontation clause, the
State had the burden of establishing that (1) the witness was
unavailable and (2) "the testimony [bore] sufficient indicia of
reliability."

State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981); Ohio v.
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Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980);
State v. Barela. 779 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Utah App. 1989).
1.

Britton Was Not Unavailable.

In Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113 (Utah 1989), this Court
recognized that its decisions and the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court have given a strict construction to the unavailability
requirement.
Our reading of Roberts and other United States
Supreme Court cases leads us to conclude that in
order for a witness to be constitutionally
unavailable, it must be practically impossible to
produce the witness in court. It is not enough
to show that the witness would be uncomfortable
on the stand or that testifying would be
stressful.

Our own precedent reflects this strict view of
the unavailability precondition. See State v.
White, 671 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1983) (the fact
that declarant's attorney had told defendant's
attorney that declarant would assert fifth
amendment privilege did not render declarant
unavailable as a witness, as declarant must claim
the privilege personally); State v. Chapman, 655
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982) (out-of-state witness
was not "unavailable" where prosecutor made no
effort to secure his attendance by use of Uniform
Act . . . because he knew witness would be
unwilling to testify); State v. Case. 752 P.2d
356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (out-of-state
declarant was not "unavailable" within meaning of
a hearsay exception where prosecutor made no
effort to secure her attendance . . . ) .
Webb. 779 P.2d at 1113; see also Barber v. Page. 390 U.S. 719, 88
S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (right to confrontation precludes
use of preliminary hearing transcript where witness incarcerated and
state made no attempt to secure attendance at trial).
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Rule 804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) defines
unavailability for hearsay purposes.

It provides in relevant part:

(a) Definition of unavailability.
"Unavailability of a witness" includes situations
in which the declarant:
(2) persists in refusing to testify
concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the court to
do so.
In State v. Barela. 779 P.2d 1140, the Utah Court of
Appeals analyzed the meaning of unavailability under Rule
804(a)(2).

It determined that "the operative term in Rule 804(a)(2)

is ,persists,H and concluded that the evidence did not establish
that the witness had persisted in refusing to answer where, in
response to a single question, the witness stated, "do I have to
answer these stupid-?" Id. at 1144.
Rule 804(a)(2) also requires that the witness "persist" in
refusing to answer after the court has ordered him to do so.

On

February 18 and 19, 1988, Britton appeared pursuant to court order
and testified outside the presence of the jury.

At the end of

Britton's first day of testimony, the trial judge ordered him to
testify and he refused.

T. 965. 19

On the second day, Britton

appeared, despite his general refusal to testify the day before.

He

19. The trial judge found Britton in contempt and sentenced him to
serve thirty days concurrently with his federal sentence. T. 967.
Although defense counsel asked the judge to impose a sentence with
some impact by imprisoning Britton until he testified, as permitted
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12, the trial judge instead imposed this
unenforceable and meaningless sentence, without written findings or
any "teeth" which might compel performance. See Salzeth v. Backman.
638 P.2d 543 (Utah 1981); State v. Barlow, 771 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah
1989) .
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answered defense counsel's questions and did not appear reluctant to
testify until asked:
[MS. WELLS]: Britton, did you undergo a court
ordered psychological evaluation?
T. 1080. At that point, Britton refused to answer.

However, when

the court ordered him to answer the specific question, he elaborated
on his decision not to testify—then answered the question
affirmatively.

T. 1081.

On redirect examination and

recross-examination, Britton answered all specific questions asked
including the prosecutor's question as to whether his prior
testimony had been truthful.

T. 1083-90.

This question was in

essence a question about the subject matter of Britton's testimony
and further demonstrated that he was not unavailable.
Furthermore, the statements of the prosecutor demonstrate
that the State was not making a good faith effort to encourage
Britton to testify at trial.
After Britton's general statement that he would not
testify, the State informed the court that it would use the
preliminary hearing transcript if Britton refused to testify.
T. 961. Also, before the court ordered Britton to testify, the
prosecutor interjected, "I would like to point out that we would
like to get Mr. Britton on his way back to Ashland as soon as
possible."

T. 964. The prosecutor also pointed out, in reference

to the authorities at Ashland, "They want to get him back as soon as
they can get him back."

T. 1090.

In addition, prior to the court's imposition of sentence,
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the prosecutor pointed out, again in front of the witness, that the
sentence would not have much impact and asked the court either to
find Britton not guilty of contempt or to not impose any penalty for
the contempt.

T. 966-7.

Finally, while arguing, over Appellant's objections, that
Britton should be released to Kentucky as soon as possible, the
prosecutor stated:
My suspicion is Mr. Britton is not going to be
willing to talk to anybody after this hearing is
concluded.
T. 1092. As defense counsel pointed out,

,f

[t]hat certainly is

suggesting to him that he shouldn't . . . ."

T. 1094.

Despite

Britton's vacillation as to whether he would testify (see
footnote 20) and his cooperation in answering specific questions
when propounded, the State did nothing to encourage him to testify;
in fact, the statements by the prosecutor encouraged Britton not to
testify.
The State has the burden of establishing that the witness
is unavailable to testify and that the prosecution made a good faith
effort to procure that testimony.
75-6.

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at

See also State v. Herrera. 594 P.2d 823, 827 (Or. 1979) (the

burden is on the prosecutor to produce evidence to show the trial
court what circumstances exist which make use of the prior recorded
testimony genuinely necessary).

Barber v. Page. 390 U.S. at 774-5

(witness is unavailable for confrontation purposes only if state
makes good faith effort to obtain his presence); see also State v.
Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 202 (Wash. 1984).
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Unavailability is usually based on the physical absence of
the witness.

See Ryan, 691 P.2d at 197. Where unavailability is

based on a persistent refusal to answer questions regarding the
subject matter of a statement, the trial court must take special
care in ascertaining that the witness was truly unavailable and
require the State to act in good faith.
In light of Britton7s repeated vacillation prior to trial
as to whether he would testify at trial,20 his willingness to answer
specific questions, his willingness to answer after the trial court
ordered that he answer a specific question, and the fact that the
State essentially discouraged Britton7s testimony and acted to
protect him from any repercussions of not testifying, the State
failed to sustain its burden of establishing that Britton was
unavailable.
2.

The Former Testimony Was Not Reliable.

Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees and
determines that Britton was unavailable, the second requirement for

20. In April 1987, defense counsel and an associate visited Britton
at the federal penitentiary in Ashland, Kentucky. T. 2300. During
their conversation, Britton indicated that he would testify in the
present case. T. 2301. The only threats Britton mentioned at that
time had occurred prior to the preliminary hearing. T. 2302. A
minute entry dated April 3, 1987 indicates that, at that time,
Britton was planning to testify. R. 562. An investigator for the
Salt Lake County Attorney's office had contact with prison
authorities or Britton on four separate occasions regarding whether
Britton would testify in the present case. T. 2293-4. First,
Britton was willing to testify. T. 2283. Britton was unwilling to
testify at the time of the second contact, which was made several
months after the first. T. 2294. About two weeks after indicating
his unwillingness, Britton again changed his mind and agreed to
testify. T. 2294. During the final contact, Britton again
expressed unwillingness to testify. T. 2294.
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admissibility of prior testimony "operates once a witness is shown
to be unavailable."

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 607.

In setting forth

this second requirement, the Roberts Court favorably quoted its
earlier decision in Mancusi v. Stubbs. 408 U.S. 204, 213, 92 S.Ct.
2308 (1972), 33 L.Ed.2d 293:
The focus of the Court's concern has been to
insure that there "are indicia of reliability
which have been widely viewed as determinative of
whether a statement may be placed before the jury
though there is not confrontation of the
declarant" [citation omitted] and to "afford the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement." [citation
omitted]
Id. at 65-6 (emphasis added).
In Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, this Court held that preliminary
hearing testimony had certain indicia of reliability which usually
made it admissible at trial, and that the defendants had an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing
so that the defendants' right to confrontation was not violated.
Id. at 542.
This Court acknowledged, however, that lack of opportunity
to cross-examine on a specific topic at the preliminary hearing may
preclude a defendant from adequate exercise of his right to
confrontation.

See Brooks, 638 P.2d at 542. Where there has been

"no cross-examination or a superficial or perfunctory
cross-examination," admission of a preliminary hearing transcript
might violate a defendant's right to confrontation.

Id.

The implication from Brooks and Roberts is that while, in
some cases, the preliminary hearing testimony will have sufficient
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indicia of reliability to make it admissible where the witness is
unavailable without any further showing, in others, where unusual
circumstances exist, the reliability of the preliminary hearing
testimony may be questioned.

In other words, while reliability may

be inferred from the fact that the testimony is admissible under the
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" for former testimony, such
inference does not necessarily make the evidence admissible for
confrontation purposes where unusual circumstances exist.
In State v. Bauer. 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Roberts Court held that
"[r]reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."
325 N.W.2d at 862, citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

Bauer,

The Bauer Court

pointed out, however, that
[w]hile this inference of reliability is strong,
evidence falling within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception is not admissible per se."
Id. at 862 (emphasis added).

The Bauer Court required that even if

the evidence fits within a hearsay exception, the trial court must
still examine the case for unusual circumstances and determine
whether "the trier of fact has a reasonable basis for evaluating the
truthfulness of the prior statement."

Id.

The important role of the demeanor of a witness to the
right to confrontation also supports the position that the Court
must look beyond the inference of reliability raised by the fact
that the testimony was obtained at the preliminary hearing to
determine whether the circumstances of the case preclude a finding
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that the former testimony is reliable.

See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408

U.S. at 211; Barber v. Page. 390 U.S. at 722; Herrera, 594 P.2d at
826; People v. Middleton. 611 P.2d 698, 701 n.4 (Or. App. 1980).
Several unusual circumstances existed in this case which
outweighed the inference of reliability and which show that the
State did not bear its burden of establishing the reliability of
Britton's testimony.

Those circumstances are (a) Britton was a

jailhouse informant whose testimony was inherently suspect since he
stood to benefit from the testimony, the source of his information
is questionable, and defense counsel did not have an opportunity to
examine him on these issues at the preliminary hearing;
(b) Britton's mental competence was at issue, and Appellant had no
access to this information regarding Britton's mental health prior
to the preliminary hearing; and (c) defense counsel did not have the
opportunity to examine Britton at the preliminary hearing regarding
his subsequent convictions and sentences or Britton's understanding
of the State's promise to file a favorable affidavit on his behalf.
a.

Jailhouse Informant

The testimony of jail-house informants, or
"snitches," is becoming an increasing problem in
this state, as well as throughout the American
criminal justice system. The present case is one
of many across the nation where the truthfulness
of the informant has been called into question.
Informants . . . are offering evidence against
fellow inmates in exchange for reduced
sentences. In the process of reaping their
benefit, they are manipulating the system by
helping to convict innocent citizens.
McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151, 157 (Miss. 1989), citing Curriden,
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"No Honor Among Thieves," ABA Journal, June 1989, at 51 (see
Addendum H ) .
The expectation or receipt of benefits in exchange for
testimony, coupled with the often questionable background of
jailhouse informants, makes the testimony of such informants
suspect.

See Curriden at 52-6. Just as a co-defendant's statements

are presumptively unreliable (see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106
S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)), the reliability of the testimony
of a jailhouse informant who has the possibility or expectation of a
plea bargain, better sentence, better treatment, or a myriad of
other "favors" is inherently suspect.
In light of the recent Leslie White "snitch" controversy,21
the Los Angeles District Attorney's office is reviewing 200 murder
cases and has instituted a checklist which it uses before deciding
whether to use the informant's testimony.

The checklist includes

exploring the following "red flag" questions:
How is it that the informant could have learned
this information without actually talking to the
person he says he talked to? Was the informant
ever housed in the county jail with the
defendant? Was he ever transported on a bus with
the defendant? Is it possible the informant
could have gotten police reports and got the
information from that? Is there any other way he
could have gotten that information?
Curriden at 52-6.

21. Los Angeles has recently experienced a highly publicized
"snitch" controversy involving Leslie White, an inmate who compiled
information by telephoning the district attorney's office and other
sources, then testified for the State in numerous cases, using the
gathered information to create a "confession." See Curriden at 52-6.
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In the present case, Britton had seen news reports
regarding the Hunsaker homicide both before and after he claimed to
have talked to Menzies.

R. 1150:166.22

details that were not on the news.23

His testimony contained no

The fact that Britton's

statement could have been concocted from news reports undermines it
reliability.
Although Britton made statements at the preliminary hearing
which were not consistent with his two statements to police, defense

22. The transcript of the preliminary hearing contained the
following:
Q. You may have already known on February the
28th that the person had been found, is that
correct?
A: Correct.
R. 1150 at 166. When Britton's statement was read to the jury over
defense counsel's objections, it was transcribed as follows:
Q: You may have heard none on February the 28th
that the person had been found, is that correct?
A: Correct.
T. 2097. In context, this suggests that Britton had not heard news
reports. This "slip" is critical to the jury's perception of
Britton's testimony since the impact of having or not having seen
news reports may have affected their assessment of Britton's
statement.
23. Written reports were made of two early police interviews of
Britton dated March 28, 1986 and April 7, 1986. Although these
reports were not entered into evidence, they show that Britton's
statement changed over time. For instance, the first statement does
not include a claim that Britton asked Menzies why he shot her.
That claim first arose in the second interview, after the officer
asked whether Menzies mentioned a gun. At the preliminary hearing,
this query became part of Britton's testimony. T. 2083. In both
statements, Britton claimed Menzies made comments indicating he had
sex with the decedent. There is no evidence of sexual intercourse
in this case, and Britton's statements regarding sex disappeared by
the time of the preliminary hearing. Britton also initially claimed
that he asked Menzies why he would kill someone for a few dollars
and a few packs of cigarettes. The reference to cigarettes was
generated by news reports which initially indicated cigarettes were
stolen. This later proved untrue. T. 1178, 1186.
- 62

-

counsel did not emphasize these statements in cross-examination at
the preliminary hearing.
While in some cases, the motives and opportunity to
cross-examine at the preliminary hearing are similar to those at
trial (see Brooks), in circumstances where an informant has made a
series of inconsistent and conflicting statements, the concerns and
strategies of an astute lawyer would be different at the preliminary
hearing than at trial.

At trial, defense counsel would have

immediately hammered Britton with his prior inconsistent statements
and let the jury view his composure as he attempted to explain.
However, emerging from the preliminary hearing with inconsistent
statements to use at trial is a better tactic than backing the
witness into a corner at the preliminary hearing without the
opportunity for the jurors to view the witness.

Cf. Barber v. Page,

390 U.S. at 725-6 ("A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less
searching exploration into the merits of the case . . . . " ) .
Although the State emphasized that it had not promised
anything to Britton, a firm promise is not necessary to undermine
the reliability of an informant's testimony.

An expectation of

better treatment, change in housing location, lesser sentence or any
other of a myriad of benefits which might occur in exchange for
testimony are sufficient to undermine the reliability of the
testimony and heighten the need for face-to-face confrontation.

See

generally McNeal. 551 So.2d at 151; D'Agostino v. State. 823 P.2d
283, 285 (Nev. 1992).
The facts in this case demonstrate that at the time of the
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preliminary hearing, Britton knew the State would file a favorable
affidavit for him.

T. 2038-9.

For a man who has just been

sentenced on a federal bank robbery and was awaiting the outcome of
two other armed bank robbery charges, such help from the State is
certainly a benefit which would not exist without the testimony.24
Finally, Britton's testimony was misleading in that it
suggested that he did not expect to benefit and might in fact be
hurt by his testimony.

T. 2102-3, 2119.

Although Britton stood to

benefit from his testimony in a myriad of ways and appears to have
had an expectation of benefit at the time of the preliminary
hearing, jurors who are not sophisticated about the way in which
prisons and the criminal justice system work may well have believed
that Britton's testimony was not spawned by an expectation of
benefit.

See generally DIAqostino, 823 P.2d at 284.

Nor is putting

on evidence of the Rule 35 hearing any substitute for face-to-face
confrontation, where the jury could watch Britton's demeanor as he
answered questions regarding his expectations and actual benefit
resulting from his testimony.
b.

Mental Incompetency

The record raises serious concerns about Britton's mental
health.

These concerns further undermine the reliability of his

24. Britton was sentenced to ten-year concurrent terms on the bank
robberies. T. 1085. His surprise at being sentenced to only ten
years on the Utah robbery (T. 2101) suggests that this slap on the
hand for the two succeeding robberies was a light sentence.
Although there is no way of knowing from the record in this case
whether Britton's testimony in the instant case affected his
sentence on the Nevada and Idaho cases, this information at least
raises a suggestion that Britton benefitted from his testimony.
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testimony.
In October 1985, six months before Britton testified at the
preliminary hearing, Britton's attorney filed an affidavit
reflecting his concerns and opinions regarding Britton's competency
to stand trial.

T. 2043.

The parties entered into a stipulation

that Britton be psychologically examined as part of the pending
federal armed robbery case.

T. 2208.25

Dr. Breck Lebegue interviewed Britton and apparently
determined either that Britton was mentally ill or that he was
feigning illness, and raised a question as to whether Britton was
manipulating the system.

T. 2009.26

Britton refused to speak to

Dr. Lebegue for more than half an hour, so the psychiatrist was
unable to reach an opinion about Britton's mental state.

Id.

However, Britton did report blackouts, seizures, a history of head
injuries, and hearing voices of spirits which were fallen Samurai
Warriors.

Id.

After talking with Dr. Lebegue, Britton was transferred to
a federal facility where further psychological evaluations were
conducted.

T. 2043, 2050.

Defense counsel did not have access to

the report of these evaluations.

T. 2054.

Britton's vacillation as to whether he would testify
coupled with his questionable mental state raise grave concerns as

25. Apparently, Britton had also asked for and received counseling
and evaluation and had been housed for a while in the mental health
tier of the jail. T. 2056, 1079.
26.

The trial judge refused to admit Dr. Lebegue's report.
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T. 2324.

to the reliability of his testimony.

The inability of defense

counsel to cross-examine Britton at the preliminary hearing about
his mental health undermines the reliability of the preliminary
hearing transcript, in violation of Appellant/s right to
confrontation•
c.

Inability to Cross-examine

Defense counsel was unable to fully cross-examine Britton
at the preliminary hearing regarding his expectations of benefits
and his mental health because Appellant did not have access to
information regarding these issues.
above.

See discussion in (a) and (b)

In addition, some of the events, including the Rule 35

hearing and the receipt of surprisingly light ten-year concurrent
sentences on two additional bank robbery charges (T. 1085), had not
yet occurred at the time of the preliminary hearing.

Nor did

defense counsel know of Britton's desire to be housed in Florida at
the time of the preliminary hearing.

T. 1100-1, 1116.

Housing

condition is a possible benefit for testifying.
Although some information was placed into evidence
regarding the Rule 35 hearing (see Addendum I) and Britton's
subsequent convictions, placing that information into evidence is no
substitute for cross-examining Britton on the issue of his
expectation of benefit.
The inability to cross-examine Britton at the preliminary
hearing regarding his expectation of benefits undermines the
reliability of his former testimony, in violation of Menzies' right
to confrontation.
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3. The Erroneous Admission of Britton's
Testimony Was Reversible Error.
Because Britton was not unavailable or, alternatively, the
preliminary hearing testimony was not sufficiently reliable,
Menzies' right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the
federal constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah constitution
were violated.

The appropriate standard for determining whether

these constitutional violations require reversal of the conviction
is whether the State can establish that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204

(Utah 1987).
The prosecutor emphasized Britton's testimony in closing,
claiming that it was "very significant direct evidence" and that
Britton indicated that while he was incarcerated at the Salt Lake
County Jail in the cell next to the cell of Menzies, Menzies stated
to him that he was being charged with a murder, the murder of a
woman who had been abducted from the service station.

He admitted

to Britton that he cut her throat, stating that it was one of the
biggest thrills that he, the defendant, had ever had.

T. 2616-7.

As previously outlined in Point XVI at 113, the case
against Menzies was built on bits and pieces of circumstantial
evidence.

Without the alleged confession directly linking Menzies

to the homicide and implying that a robbery and aggravated
kidnapping occurred, the jury may well have determined that there
was not enough evidence to convict Menzies of capital homicide.
B. ADMISSION OF MR. BRITTON'S TESTIMONY ALSO
VIOLATED RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
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In State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), this Court
held that portions of a letter from the defendant to the victim/s
father in which the defendant "display[ed] callousness toward the
killing . . . in profane and vulgar language" and which
"manifest[ed] his complete insensitivity to this tragedy" (Id. at
983) was so prejudicial that it was inadmissible under Rule 403.
This Court defined unfair prejudice as "an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one [citation omitted]."

Id. at 984.

In the present case, the statement allegedly made by
Menzies that killing Maureen Hunsaker was the greatest thrill of his
life (T. 2084) along with Britton's testimony that Menzies laughed
about the homicide (T. 2117) had an overwhelming prejudicial
impact.

The callousness of such a statement, coupled with the lack

of remorse and lack of respect for human life, parallels the
callousness of the letter in Mauer.
admitting the statement.

The trial judge erred in

The nature of the statement itself, along

with the prosecutor's emphasis on such statement in closing
(T. 2616-7), makes the error reversible.
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN QUASHING DEFENDANTS SUBPOENA OF THE
PROSECUTOR.
Despite Britton's indication in his preliminary hearing
testimony that he did not stand to benefit from his testimony (see
discussion supra at 61-4), shortly after the preliminary hearing,
one of the prosecutors in the present case testified on behalf of
Britton at a Rule 35 hearing in federal court.
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T. 2316.

Counsel

for Britton informed defense counsel in the instant case that this
had occurred.

T. 2051, 2037-8.

Defendant subpoenaed Rick McDougal as to the details of his
understanding with Britton and Britton's attorney as well as the
nature of his testimony in federal court.

T. 2277.

The trial court

quashed the subpoena and did not allow prosecutor McDougal to
testify.

T. 2278.

In so doing, the trial judge violated

Mr. Menzies' right to compulsory process as guaranteed by the sixth
and fourteenth amendments.

See generally Washington v. Texas, 388

U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19, the Court stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses,
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is
in plain terms the right to present a defense,
the right to present the defendant's version of
the facts as well as the prosecution's to the
jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just
as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of
challenging their testimony, he has the right to
present his own witnesses to establish a
defense. This right is a fundamental element of
due process of law.
Various courts have limited the defendant's ability to call
the prosecutor as a witness to a situation where there is a
"compelling need" for the testimony.

See, e.g., United States v.

Robinson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1098 (11th Cir. 1990).

This limitation

appears to be based on the concern that a lawyer who appears as a
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material witness must withdraw from the case.

See Rule 3.7, Utah

Rules of Professional Conduct; State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 653
(Utah 1985).
In determining whether a sixth amendment violation occurred
as the result of the trial judge quashing a defendant's subpoena of
the prosecutor, the focus is on "whether testimonial evidence to be
presented by the witness 'was relevant, material, and vital to the
defense, and whether the exclusion of that evidence was
arbitrary.'"

U.S. ex rel Ashford v. Dir. 111. Dept. of Corr., 871

F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1989).
Although the trial court has discretion to refuse to allow
a defendant to call a prosecutor to testify, "a weatherfed] eye must
be kept on the constitutional rights of the defendant."

Stiltner,

377 P.2d 252. Where "the result would be to prejudice the
defendant's case," quashing the subpoena is improper.

See State v.

Williams. 656 P.2d at 453.
In Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, this Court pointed out:
. . . a defendant's constitutional right to
compel witnesses to testify for him may not be
dispensed with because of some comparatively
minor inconvenience to the State or because of
defense counsel's truly inadvertent failure to
give prompt notice, when an attorney's testimony
may be important.
Id. at 849.
At the time of the preliminary hearing in the present case,
Defendant believed that the State was doing nothing to help
Britton.

Defendant later learned that this was not true—that prior
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to the preliminary hearing, the prosecutors had agreed to appear on
behalf of Britton, and that after the preliminary hearing,
prosecutor McDougal had appeared on Britton's behalf.
Prosecutor McDougal's testimony as to the details of the
understanding prior to the preliminary hearing, any statements or
information conveyed directly to Britton, and the specifics of the
testimony in federal court were critical for the Defendant's attack
on Britton's testimony.

The defense was prejudiced in its ability

to attack Britton's testimony; under these circumstances,
Defendant's right to compel witnesses as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the United States constitution was violated.
POINT VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DECLARE A MISTRIAL WHEN EVIDENCE OF MR. MENZIES'
PAROLE STATUS REACHED THE JURY THROUGH A STATE
WITNESS IN VIOLATION OF AN EXPRESS COURT ORDER.
Despite pretrial orders precluding the State from
introducing evidence of Mr. Menzies' criminal history,27 during

27. Before trial, the court ruled that evidence of Mr. Menzies'
unrelated past criminal history would unfairly prejudice him and
taint the jury. The trial court found subsection (h) of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (1953 as amended) unconstitutional because
subsection (h) evidence would require exposing the jury to evidence
of prior unrelated crimes. R. 540, 541-2. The trial court also
ordered that all previously argued motions in limine regarding
Mr. Menzies' prior criminal history and record be granted in
Mr. Menzies' favor (R. 780) and sanctioned the stipulation to
Appellant's motion to exclude all evidence of Appellant's
incarceration and parole status (R. 1803). During trial, the court
granted Appellant's motion to exclude the testimony of an officer
because any relevance of his testimony would be outweighed by
prejudice flowing from evidence of prior convictions and parole
status. T. 1589-90. Finally, the court admonished counsel to
sanitize the preliminary hearing transcript of any reference to
Mr. Menzies' prior criminal history before the transcript was read
to the jury. T. 2114 (see also Utah R. Evid. 403, 404.)
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direct examination by the State, veteran Detective Jerry Thompson
stated that Mr. Menzies had gone to his parole office the day after
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared.

T. 1877.28

Defense counsel immediately objected and several motions
for mistrial based on this testimony were heard throughout the
remainder of the guilt/innocence phase.

T. 1877, 1878, 1904, 2133.

During the course of argument, the prosecutor acknowledged the
prejudicial nature of the testimony at least twice.

T. 1922.

The trial judge's rulings and statements demonstrate that
he was concerned about the prejudice caused by this statement.
T. 1946-1948, 1956, 2142.
A. THE TESTIMONY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE.
This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that evidence of a
defendant's prior bad acts or criminal history can be unduly
prejudicial because of "the tendency of the fact finder to convict
the accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown
to be guilty of the offenses charged."

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d

738, 741 (Utah 1985); Bishop. 753 P.2d at 496 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring) (tracing history of this Court's "hostility to bad
character evidence"); State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 495 (Utah 1986)
(acknowledging the "unwarranted prejudice in informing the jury that
a defendant is a convicted felon"); State v. Gotfrey. 598 P.2d 1325,
1328 (Utah 1979) (fair trial denied where charges of rape and sodomy

28. The transcript incorrectly indicates that Detective Thompson
said "patrol" office. T. 1877. The parties have stipulated and the
California version states "parole" office. T. 1877.
- 72

-

arising at different times tried together); State v. McCumber, 622
P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980) (joint trial on sex charges arising out of
separate criminal episodes violates due process); State v. Tarafa,
720 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1986) (joint trial for theft charges
arising out of separate criminal episodes violates due process).
In State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Utah 1984), this
Court acknowledged the impropriety of the question, "Mr. Reid, are
you [the defendant's] parole officer?"
In State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989), this Court
held that information regarding the defendant's parole status did
not require a new trial because (1) the juror who had seen a
newspaper report on the case claimed not to have seen the word
"parole," and (2) the trial judge found that testimony that a
document was notarized and taken to the parole officer was "lost on
the jury" and did not necessarily refer to the defendant.
By contrast, in the present case, both parties and the
judge acknowledged the intelligence of the jury, their awareness of
the parole system and the meaning of "parole", and their attention
to details by taking notes. T. 1945, 1912, 1932.

In addition, the

statement was directly linked to Mr. Menzies.
The testimony violated Rules 401, 403 and 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1983).

In addition, the overwhelming prejudicial

effect of this testimony deprived Mr. Menzies of due process and a
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fair trial.29
In his concurrence in State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d at 747,
Justice Zimmerman pointed out:
Language in some of our cases, such as State v.
Saunders and State v. Tarafa. plainly states that
permitting the jury to consider otherwise
inadmissible bad character evidence for the sole
purpose of determining guilt denies a defendant
due process in violation of the state and federal
constitutions. See, e.g.. Tarafa, 720 P.2d at
1370; Saunders. 699 P.2d at 741-2; State v.
McCumber. 622 P.2d at 356.
Federal courts have also held that impugning an accused's character
with evidence of past unrelated bad acts can deprive an accused of
his right to a fair trial.

See, e.g.. Michelson v. United States.

335 U.S. 469, 475-476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 168 L.Ed. 168 (1948); United
States v. Daniels. 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United
States v. Foskev. 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Mevers. 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)). 30
B.

THE PROSECUTION TEAM COMMITTED MISCONDUCT.

29. The introduction of this testimony following pretrial rulings
which limited its introduction precluded Appellant from fully
cross-examining the detective, in violation of his right to
confrontation. The detective's mention of parole occurred at a
crucial time in the proceedings, while the detective was reciting
Mr. Menzies' statements regarding his whereabouts shortly after
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared. Appellant was prevented from
cross-examining the detective on this aspect of his statement due to
pretrial orders as well as a fear of opening the door to other
irrelevant evidence regarding his criminal past.
30. Although various members of this Court have clarified their
positions as to whether a due process violation occurs in other
contexts where evidence of other crimes reaches the jury (see
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 497-500, 489-90; State v. Gardner. 789
P.2d 273 at 289-90 (Utah 1989)), this Court has not dealt directly
with the issue of whether a due process violation occurs in the
present context.
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This Court has set forth a two-prong test for determining
whether prosecutorial misconduct has occurred:
The test of whether remarks made by counsel are
so objectionable as to merit a mistrial in a
criminal case is, did the remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they would
not be justified in considering in determining
the verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks.
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) fquoting State v.
Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)).
Although a police officer, not the prosecutor, injected the
improper testimony, the State should be accountable for the
misconduct of its lead investigator.

In various contexts, this

Court has charged the State with responsibility for the actions of
the persons who make up the prosecution team.

See State v. Shabata,

678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984) (prosecutor charged with knowledge of
police officers working on case); State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301,
1304-5 (Utah 1986) (medical examiner's actions in destroying body
attributed to State); State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d at 479 (Utah 1975)
(as members of the prosecution team, police officers' actions in
destroying evidence can violate due process).
Requiring the prosecution team, especially lead
investigators on a case, to follow the trial court's rulings makes
sense since without such a requirement, pretrial rulings would have
little force.

In State v. Nettleton, 400 P.2d 301, 303 n.4, the

Washington Supreme Court stated:
If we are persuaded that a prosecuting attorney
or a witness for the state is deliberately trying
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, we will
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assume that he succeeded in his purpose and grant
a new trial. It would seem that our frequent
discussions of this subject could, within the
near future, serve to prevent the reference to a
defendant as being on parole by all except the
willful or the congenitally ignorant.
Id. at 303 n.4 (emphasis added).
Detective Thompson had been a police officer for
twenty-three years at the time of this trial.

T. 1315.

He had been

admonished not to discuss Mr. Menzies' parole status or criminal
history and undoubtedly knew the potential effect of such
information without such an admonishment.

T. 1932.

Although the State argued that the statement was
"unsolicited and inadvertary," the detective's background and
experience and a review of his testimony in this case indicate
otherwise.31
The first prong of Troy was met where this inadmissible

31. The detective exaggerated the gruesomeness of injuries and the
scene and repeatedly disparaged Appellant's statement to officers,
despite admonishments from the court, by saying Appellant "claimed"
certain things. T. 1876-81. Detective Thompson testified, over
defense counsel's objections, that the victim's throat was cut "from
ear to ear. Her head was almost decapitated . . . She had a
ligature mark around the back of her neck, what was left of it."
T. 1320 (emphasis added). Dr. Sweeney, the medical examiner who
conducted the autopsy (which Detective Thompson attended), provided
a starkly contrasting and less graphic description of the victim's
injuries. He stated that she had two distinct knife wounds in the
neck, one of which started approximately four inches to the left of
midline and the other of which extended only one inch to the right.
T. 1612. He would not characterize the wounds as "cutting from ear
to ear." T. 1656). Detective Thompson also testified that the body
had a heavy amount of blood underneath it and that he found "a large
amount of [the victim's] hair in a nearby tree limb." T. 1321. He
later admitted that there was only a small amount of blood
splattered under the body and that just a few strands of hair may
have been on the tree limb. T. 1358, 1359.
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testimony which the trial judge had ordered suppressed reached the
jury.
The second prong of Troy requires a determination as to
whether the jury was "probably influenced by those remarks."

In

analyzing whether the jurors were probably influenced, this Court
noted:
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence
susceptible of differing interpretations, there
is a greater likelihood that they will be
improperly influenced through remarks of
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may
be searching for guidance in weighing and
interpreting the evidence. They may be
especially susceptible to influencer and a small
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect
the verdict.
Id. at 486.

See also State v. Bartlett. 631 P.2d 321, 325 (N.M.

App. 1981).
The nature of the testimony in that it dealt with
Mr. Menzies' criminal history and was therefore presumptively
prejudicial along with the confusing and circumstantial nature of
the evidence in this case establish that the jurors were probably
influenced.

Although no witness could directly link Mr. Menzies to

Ms. Hunsaker, the fact that he was a parolee almost certainly
influenced the jury in its decision that the circumstantial evidence
was enough to convict him of first degree murder.
C. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE TESTIMONY AND LACK OF
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL AND IMPARTIAL JURY.
The sixth amendment to the United States constitution as
applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment guarantees the
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accused an impartial jury.
The Utah constitution evidences even stronger intent to
afford a person accused of a capital crime a fair jury.

This Court

has held that a trial by a jury exposed to evidence potentially more
persuasive than reliable without a cautionary instruction may
violate an accused's due process rights under Article I, § 7 of the
Utah constitution.

Long, 721 P.2d at 492. The clear words in

history of Article I, § 10 evidenced the framers' conviction that a
man facing capital charges deserves nothing less than a unanimous
twelve-person jury to decide his fate.

See amendment.

Article I,

§ 7 of the Utah constitution, when coupled with Article I, § 9,
should afford the greatest possible guarantees of a fair trial to an
accused facing the most severe punishment of death.
The trial court's decision not to issue a jury instruction
warning the jury not to consider the evidence violated Mr. Menzies'
right to a fair trial.

See generally Long, 721 P.2d at 487-92.

POINT VIII. OCCURRENCES DURING THE COURSE OF THE
TRIAL TAINTED THE JURY, DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF A
FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.
A number of irregular and prejudicial incidents occurred
during the course of the trial which tainted the jurors and
precluded them from being fair and impartial.

On February 25, 1988,

juror number 12, Lillian Eaton, fainted in front of the other
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jurors32 during the testimony of the medical examiner.

T. 1621-2,

R. 814-5.
At about the same time, Tauni Lee, the court reporter,
became distraught.

T. 1633-4. Although Ms. Lee later claimed that

she started crying in her office, her obvious cessation in
transcription coupled with the awareness of both lawyers that she
had been crying would suggest that the jury may also have witnessed
the court reporter's emotional reaction to the testimony.
T. 1633-4, 1621-2.
On March 4, 1988, Juror Nathan Adams sent a note to the
trial judge which stated,
Last night an anonymous caller telephoned me
about Ralph Menzies' criminal record.
T. 2367.33

The trial judge denied Appellant's motion for mistrial,

then took a significant amount of time before reaching his ultimate
decision to sequester the jury.

T. 2369, 2387, 2392, 2394-5.

During the lengthy recess, Juror Helene Gass suffered an

32. Because of omissions in the transcript, it is impossible to
ascertain precisely what occurred or to fully explore the impact of
the incident or its immediate aftermath on the jurors. This Court
acknowledged in its opinion, State v. Menzies. 182 Utah Adv. Rep.
13, that portions of the proceedings were not transcribed at this
point. Although the participants remember the bailiff running
across the room and possibly saying something, the transcript
reflects only that the judge took a recess. T. 1622. Nothing
further regarding this incident is on the record until much later
when other events involving the jurors occur. However, a
nonsequitur appears two pages after this extraordinary incident when
the judge says, "Rick may be much more subtle or sophisicated."
T. 1624.
33. The caller had indicated that Appellant had killed and robbed a
taxicab driver. This information was incorrect; Mr. Menzies has no
other homicides.
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emotional breakdown in front of the jury*

T. 2398.

Both parties

and the judge acknowledged that Juror Gass was extremely upset
(T. 2395, 2398), with the prosecutor pointing out that if Ms. Gass
continued to serve, she might taint the other jurors.

T. 2398.

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the
cumulative effect in tainting the jury caused by excusing
Juror Adams followed immediately by the breakdown of Juror Gass.
T. 2398-9.

Although the trial judge denied the motion, he

acknowledged, "[b]ut I am real concerned with the effect on the
other jurors."

T. 2399.

The trial court excused Juror Gass.

T. 2402.

The trial

judge again expressed concern about the effect of Juror Gass7
breakdown on the rest of the jury.

T. 2403.34

After further discussion, the trial judge summoned the jury
to the courtroom and informed them:
But I think you are aware of some problems we
have had. We have decided at this time that we
are going to have you take an early lunch, and
you'll be escorted by jailers, and we are going
to designate a place for you to eat . . . ."
T. 2408.
Following the lunch break, the trial judge denied defense
counsel's motion for mistrial based on the cumulative effect of
events and that the jury could no longer be fair.

T. 2409-10.35

34. The transcription of the trial judge's statement at 2403
represents an example of possible transcription error.
35. Defense counsel pointed out various events, including
Detective. Thompson's "parole testimony," the unexplained removal of
(continued)
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The trial judge then individually voir dired each of the
remaining jurors.

T. 2428-73.

for mistrial, which was denied.

Defense counsel renewed her motion
T. 2473, 2475.

The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is
guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States and Article I, §§ 7, 10 and 12 of
the Constitution of Utah.

See Pike, 712 P.2d 277.

In Pike, this

Court noted that it has "long taken a strict approach in assuring
that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial not be compromised
by improper contacts between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or
court personnel."

Id. at 279.

This Court noted that a jury may be

prejudiced by improper contact "even though [prejudice] is not
provable and even though a person who has been tainted may not,
himself, be able to recognize that fact."

Id. at 280. In

recognition of this, the Pike Court established a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice whenever improper juror contact occurs.
The stringent approach to preserving the right to an
impartial jury taken in Pike is equally applicable in the
circumstances of this capital homicide case.

In addition to the

state constitutional language which gave rise to the Pike rule, the
provision of Article I, § 10 of the Utah constitution which requires
that a jury trial remain inviolate in a capital case requires that a

(footnote 35 continued)
Juror Adams, the breakdown of Juror Gass followed immediately by
sequestration, an abrupt change in lunch location, and increased
security. T. 2411.

- 81

-

stringent approach be taken in assessing claims that the right to an
impartial jury was violated in a death penalty case.
In Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985), a capital
homicide case, the victim's daughter sat throughout trial inside the
rail behind the prosecutor's table.

The court concluded that her

presence constituted "an inflammatory and prejudicial element" and
pointed out
There can be no graver proceeding than when a
human being is put on trial for his or her life.
The right to a fair trial includes the right to a
verdict based on the evidence and not extraneous
prejudicial happenings in and around the
courtroom.
Id. at 53.

See also Collum v. State, 107 So. 35 (Ala. App. 1926)

(reversal where mistrial not granted after victim witness fainted in
front of jury and victim's mother removed her from courtroom crying
and muttering).
As the court noted in State v. Reynolds, 466 P.2d 405# 408
(Ariz. App. 1970),
. . . both the State and the defendant are
entitled to a fair and impartial jury. When
events occur that cast an irrevocable cloud over
the jury's fairness and impartiality, it is
better to grant the motion for mistrial and start
over again.
In Canton Oil v. District Court, 731 P.2d 687, 696 (Colo.
1987), the court quoted its earlier decision in Butters v. DeWann,
363 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1961), outlining the appropriate standard in
Colorado for determining whether juror misconduct or irregular
influences require a new trial:
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It is well settled that the test for determining
whether a new trial will be granted because of
the misconduct of jurors or the intrusion of
irregular influences is whether such matters
could have a tendency to influence the jury in
arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent
with the legal proofs and the court's charge. If
the irregular matter has that tendency on the
face of it, a new trial should be granted without
further inquiry as to its actual effect. The
test if not whether the irregular matter actually
influenced the result, but whether it had the
capacity of doing so. [citations omitted].
In the present case, the sequence of events affecting the
jury resulted in a jury guided by emotions and fear.

Witnessing two

jurors break down—either by fainting or by becoming agitated and
weeping—raised passion for the victim and her family, thereby
prejudicing Mr. Menzies.

The added element of fear caused by the

removal of Juror Adams followed by information that the juror had
been contacted and problems involving the trial had occurred,
heightened jury security, sequestration, and clearing the courtroom
of spectators further prejudiced Mr. Menzies since, in all
likelihood, the jurors attributed these measures to something
Mr. Menzies had done.
The passion and emotions felt for Ms. Hunsaker, coupled
with the fear, irrevocably tainted this jury, thereby violating
Mr. Menzies7 right to an impartial jury.

The failure of the trial

court to grant Mr. Menzies7 motion for a mistrial violated his
rights to due process and a fair trial.
POINT IX. THE ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT
INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
The definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt contained
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in Instruction No. 12 in this case is substantially similar to the
reasonable doubt instruction which a majority of this Court
determined was erroneous in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147
(Utah 1989) (Justice Stewart concurring in resultf joined by
Justices Durham and Zimmerman); see also State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d
1375 (Utah 1989).
The reasonable doubt instruction, a copy of which is
contained in Addendum J, has two aspects which a majority of this
Court has concluded are improper.

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1147.

First, the instruction indicates that a reasonable doubt must be
real and substantial, and not a mere "possibility."

Second, it

instructs the jury that "if after such impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence vou can truthfully say that vou have
an abiding conviction of the defendants guilt such as you will be
willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters
relating to vour own affairs, vou have no reasonable doubt"
(emphasis added).

R. 857.

It is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is
not merely a possibility.
An instruction that a reasonable doubt must
be a "real, substantial doubt, and not one that
is merely possible or imaginary" has been held to
be erroneous because, in practical effect, it
tends to diminish the prosecution's burden of
proof by implying that the prosecution need not
obviate a real or substantial doubt. See, e.g.,
Dunn v. Perrin, [570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d
1141 (1978)]; United States v. Flannerv, 451 F.2d
880, 882-3 (1st Cir. 1971).
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1149.
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Furthermore, defining reasonable doubt in terms of the
weighty affairs in one's life "tends to diminish and trivialize the
constitutionally required burden-of-proof standard."
In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.

Id. at 1148.

, 111 S.Ct.

, 112

L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that an
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction which defined the concept as
requiring grave or substantial uncertainty as to guilt, and not just
a "mere possibility," but an "actual substantial doubt" and a "moral
certainty" violated due process.
The Court determined that a "reasonable juror" reading the
instruction as a whole could have interpreted it "to allow a finding
of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due
Process Clause," and reversed the case.

Cage, 112 L.Ed.2d at 342.

In the present case, the erroneous reasonable doubt
instruction allowed the jury to convict "based on a degree of proof
below that required by the Due Process Clause."

Accordingly, this

Court should reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new
trial.
POINT X. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM
MENZIES' HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE I. SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
At the request of Detective Couch, Nicole Arnold and Troy
Denter went from the jail, where they had picked up some of Menzie's
property, to the ninth floor jail administration offices.
R. 1163:11.
a murder.

Couch told Nicole that Menzies was the prime suspect in

R. 1163:12, 16-7.

Nicole was legally blind and educationally handicapped.
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R. 1163:13, 59. At the detective's request, Nicole signed an
unwitnessed consent form.

R. 1163:18, 185.

Nicole, Troy, Couch and Detective Beckstead then went to
Menzies' residence.

R. 1163:19.

Couch testified that on the way to

the apartment, the officers decided that they needed a search
warrant or Menzies' consent since the apartment was in Menzies' name
and he apparently paid the bills.

R. 1163:21.

Despite this

determination that Nicole's consent "was no good," the officers
entered the house without obtaining Menzies' consent or a search
warrant.

R. 1163:21, 68, 69.
When they arrived at the apartment, Troy took Beckstead to

Menzies' carport, which was located at the rear of the Menzies
duplex in the parking area.

R. 1163:63-5.

trash which was near the carport.

Troy pointed to a box of

R. 1163:40, 65.

The detective

took the box inside the Menzies residence and Couch began looking
through it.

R. 1163:67.

After Couch found a handcuff box, Nicole's mother, Janet
Franks, took Beckstead to a back bedroom and showed him a two-tone
parka and a pair of handcuffs.
75.

R. 1163:23, 49, 50, 60, 69-70, 72,

After the officers mentioned a knife, Janet Franks also showed

the detectives Menzies' knife.

R. 1163:23, 25, 72, 76.

The search started sometime after 6:00 p.m.

R. 1163:43.

At 6:30 p.m., Detective Thompson interrogated Menzies, who was being
held in the Salt Lake County Jail.

R. 1157:1875, 1163:78.

During

the interrogation, Menzies was asked to consent to a search of his
home.

R. 1163:79.

At 7:15 p.m., Menzies signed a consent form
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(R. 487); however, he wrote "forced to sign under duress" next to
his signature and crossed out the authorization to take evidence
seized during the search.

R. 487, 1163:80.

At 7:30 p.m., after Menzies spoke with Nicole and had
indicated that he would consent to a search only if the officers
promised that Nicole and her mother would leave during the search,
Menzies signed a new consent form.

R. 1163:82, 489.

In the meantime, Couch left the house to get a warrant,
while Beckstead and another officer remained at the house.
R. 1163:70. A little later, Nicole and Janet Franks left, leaving
the officers alone in the house.

R. 1163:71.

The second consent

was delivered much later, sometime after the warrant was obtained.
R. 1163:83.
At around 10:30 p.m., Couch obtained a search warrant.
R. 1163:9, 43.

In the affidavit supporting the request for a search

warrant, the officers failed to inform the magistrate that officers
were already inside the home, and that the coat and handcuffs
specified in the list of items sought had already been seen by
police officers inside the house.

R. 1163:32-4, 56.

On October 24, 1986, Menzies filed a motion to suppress the
items seized from his home and accompanying memorandum.

R. 335-59.

Following argument36 and the filing of supplemental memoranda, the
trial judge denied the motion.

Menzies made a continuing objection

36. The Third District Court file does not contain a minute entry
for the hearing held on November 21, 1986, in which the motion was
argued.
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to the admission of evidence seized from the home.

R. 787-8.37

A. CONSENT FROM NICOLE DID NOT VALIDATE THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
"[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed," and
warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment" unless they fall within a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions."

See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.

740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 929 (1967).38
Consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement.

See

State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478, 482 (Utah 1981); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973).
Where the State relies on consent to validate a warrantless
search, it has the burden of proving that a person with power to do
so voluntarily consented to the search.
880 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d

Consent must "not be coerced, by explicit or

37. Items seized from the home include, among other things, the
sheath knife (T. 1681, 1747), handcuffs (T. 1680, 1747), parka
(T. 1743), "ten-code" (T. 1744-5), handcuff box (T. 1734), gym shoes
(T. 1745), and purse (T. 989-90, 1744).
38. Although private parties helped the officers conduct the
initial search, the protections of the Fourth Amendment still
apply. See State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) (search
which is joint endeavor by private citizen and police officer is
protected by the fourth amendment); State v. Abdouch. 434 N.W.2d
317, 325 (Neb. 1989).
Mr. Denter helped and encouraged Janet Franks to rummage
through Menzies' things. These actions by police were "advancement
or inducement of the search" sufficient "to make out a joint
endeavor." State v. Sardison. 437 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 1989).
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implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.ff

Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228.
The State had the burden of proving that the area searched
was jointly controlled and that Nicole Arnold was a "joint occupant"
with equal access over the premises, and that she voluntarily
consented to the search.

May v. State, 780 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1989).

"Common authority" over the premises is based "on mutual
use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes."

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,

94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).
In addition, the State had the burden of proving that
Menzies was unavailable.

See Silva v. State, 344 So.2d 559, 562-3

(Fla. 1977).
Though a joint occupant should have authority to
consent to a search of jointly held premises if
the other party is unavailable, a present,
objecting party should not have his
constitutional rights ignored because of a
leasehold or other property interest shared by
another. This is particularly true where the
police are aware that the person objecting is the
one whose constitutional rights are at stake.
Menzies was not unavailable; he was in jail and was
available to the detectives, who could have initially asked for his
consent.

See Smith v. State. 465 So.2d 603, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1985), citing Silva, 344 So.2d at 562-3.

The fact that

detectives sought consent from Menzies after they had begun the
search demonstrates that he was available.
Furthermore, "where consent is refused by the party against
whom the search is directed, any subsequent consent by the other
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joint occupant is invalid.

[citation omitted].11

Smith v. State.

465 So.2d at 604.
In the present case, the officers acknowledged that they
believed Nicole's "consent" "was no good."

R. 1163:68-9.

In

addition, Menzies was available and initially refused consent, as
evidenced by his comments on the first consent form.

Menzies'

subsequent consent, given an hour or two after Nicole's consent,
regardless of whether valid, does not validate the earlier search.
See People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) ("subsequent
execution of a written consent . . . [does not] serve to validate
the seizure preced[ing] the written consent").
Menzies was the focus of the investigation and in police
custody.

His valid consent, not that of Nicole, was necessary to

search through his possessions in the duplex.

Furthermore, Nicole

was undereducated and legally blind; the State made no showing that
she voluntarily consented under such circumstances.
Assuming, arguendo, that Nicole validly consented to a
search of the duplex, the search of the carport area exceeded the
scope of her consent, and the handcuff box seized from a box of
"trash" must therefore be suppressed.
P.2d at 201.

See generally Thiret, 685

A consent to look around the house is not permission

to go through a box placed near the carport.

See State v. Pinder.

489 A.2d 653, 656 (N.M. 1985).
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that
there is no fourth amendment protection against warrantless searches
and seizures of garbage left at curbside for collection (see
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California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1002 Ed.2d 30
(1988)), the garbage in this case had not been placed at curbside
for collection; instead, it was boxed and placed next to a carport
in a private parking area.
Furthermore, the greater protection provided by Article I,
§ 14 of the Utah constitution (see State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990)) requires that this Court recognize an expectation of
privacy in boxed garbage kept on private property.

See State v.

Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Ha. 1985) (expectation of privacy in one's
trash under Hawaiian constitution). The handcuff box and any other
items taken from the boxed trash were seized in violation of
Article I, § 14 and the fourth amendment.
B. THE PREVIOUS SEARCH CANNOT BE VALIDATED BY
CONSENT OF MR. MENZIES.
Any subsequent "consent" by Menzies cannot validate the
earlier search.
An allegedly consensual seizure must stand or
fall on the basis of the consent pre-existing the
seizure.
Thiret, 685 P.2d at 201.
Furthermore, the State did not establish that under the
totality of circumstances, Menzies voluntarily consented to a search
of his home.

See Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887; Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228 (consent must "not be coerced by . . .
implied threat or covert force.").

Officers were already in the

home, and Menzies was concerned for Nicole.

He signed the first

form, then wrote on it that he had signed under duress and wanted to
limit the search.

Menzies signed the second form only after
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indicating that he did so only if certain conditions were met,
R. 1163:82. Menzies' signing of the second form under such
circumstances was not a voluntary consent to search.
C. THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT VALIDATE THE
SEARCH.
1. The Affidavit Did Not Establish Probable
Cause.
"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a 'fair
probability7 that the evidence sought actually exists and can be
found where the informant states."

Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Dronebura, 781
P.2d 1303, 1303 (Utah App. 1989).
In the present case, the magistrate issued the warrant
based on the fact that the place to be searched was the home of a
murder suspect.

See Affidavit contained in Addendum K.

The

affidavit did not offer any basis for believing items would be found
in the home and was based on a "hunch" that items implicating
Appellant would be found, rather than probable cause.

A review of

case law suggests that the fact that the place to be searched is the
home of a murder suspect is not enough in the absence of other
factors suggesting evidence will be found to establish probable
cause.

See State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) (suggesting

search warrant appropriately issued only when a reliable observation
of the items in a particular place has been made or other evidence
indicates items probably will be found); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d

- 92

-

715 (Utah 1983) (approving search warrant setting forth "sufficient
personal observations"); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah
1983) (approving warrant issued where reliable informant stated he
was positive of location of drug paraphernalia).
"Suspicion and mere personal belief that evidence of a
crime will be found on the premises to be searched" is insufficient
to establish probable cause.

State v. Rancritsch, 700 P.2d 382, 388

(Wash. App. 1985); accord State v. Anderson, 678 P.2d 1310 (Wash.
App. 1984) (mere suspicion, belief and guess that evidence of a
burglary was in defendants home not enough to justify issuing a
search warrant).
The affidavit did not establish probable cause to search
Menzies' home.

The affidavit does not suggest that Maureen Hunsaker

was ever in the Menzies residence or that anyone had seen Menzies at
his home on February 24, 1986.

Detective Couch testified that when

he first went to the apartment, he had no reason to believe
Ms. Hunsaker's possessions were in the house.

R. 1163:27. The

police offered no information in the affidavit as to the basis for
their belief that the items would be found in the home.
The lack of probable cause requires that the items seized
be suppressed.
2. Material Omissions and Misstatements
Invalidated the Warrant.
A warrant is fatally jeopardized where the affidavit
supporting issuance contains a material misrepresentation or
omission.

State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, deniedf
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107 S.Ct. 1565; Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57
L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); People v. Kurland. 618 P.2d 213, 217-18 (Cal.
1980); People v. Cook. 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978).
In Nielsen, the officer swore in the affidavit that a
confidential informant (C.I.) had given him certain information.
After the preliminary hearing, the State revealed that the affiant
did not know or have contact with the C.I. and had received the
information from another officer who had worked with the C.I.
Although material misrepresentation occurred in the affidavit, this
Court upheld the search warrant because the falsehood "was not
material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause."
727 P.2d at 191.

Nielsen.

This Court cautioned, however, that:

A law enforcement officer must be aware not only
of the need for accuracy in the information
provided to the magistrate in support of an
application for a search warrant, but also of the
absolute truthfulness of any statements made
under oath.
Id.
The affidavit in the present case fails to state that the
officers had already entered and gone through the duplex, sorted
through the trash, and observed the handcuffs and other items.
R. 1163:32.

Nor did the officers inform the magistrate that they

had attempted to obtain consent from Nicole.

R. 1163:33.

It also

misrepresents that Larabee and Brown had positively identified the
car when they had actually only noted that it was similar
(R. 1163:30), had earlier described two types of vehicles which were
different from the make of Denter's car, and based the selection on
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the fact that the car was dirty and beatup.

R. 1163:31.

The need for accuracy and the information known to the
officers demonstrates that the omissions/misrepresentations were
made intentionally, or at the very least, with a reckless disregard
for the truth.

Without the observation of the handcuffs or the

positive identification of the car, the affidavit failed to
establish probable cause.
Furthermore, Article I, § 14 of the Utah constitution
requires that where a material omission or misrepresentation is
intentionally or recklessly included in or omitted from the
affidavit, the search warrant is invalidated regardless of whether
probable cause exists given the remaining information.

See United

States v. Hunt. 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Malkin. 722
P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986); Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978);
State v. Caldwell. 384 So.2d 431 (La. 1980); People v. Cook, 583
P.2d at 140-1.

In some contexts, Article I, § 14 of the Utah

constitution provides greater protection against searches and
seizures than does the fourth amendment.

See Larocco, 794 P.2d at

465-70; State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991).

The

historical perspective in which Article I, § 14 was adopted
indicates that the drafters would have greatly valued a lack of
interference in their homes from federal or other officials.

See Id.

The rationale for invalidating the warrant is that where
the officer misrepresents or omits material information, a question
as to the overall reliability and veracity of the information is
raised.

Article I, § 14 and the fourth amendment require that the
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warrant be invalidated.
3. The Prior Confirmatory Search Invalidates the
Warrant.
The initial search of the duplex violated the fourth
amendment and turned up information which was included in the
affidavit in an attempt to establish probable cause.

The "fruit of

the poisonous tree" doctrine precludes use of this information to
establish probable cause.

See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S.

471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); United States v. Paroutian,
299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986); People v. Cook. 583 P.2d at 148-9.
If the officers were permitted to do an initial search and
use the evidence to establish probable cause, an officer could
achieve "certain cause by conducting an unlawful
confirmatory search, thus saving himself the time
and trouble of obtaining and executing a warrant
if he does not find the evidence . . . [T]his
prospect thus gives him strong incentive to
proceed with the warrantless entry . . . The
second "search" is therefore constitutionally
unreasonable because it significantly contributes
to increasing the risk of such invasions of
privacy.
Id.
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
EVIDENCE WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
In order to find a constitutional error harmless, the State
must establish that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17

L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah
1987); State v. Parmar, 437 N.W.2d 503, 511 (Neb. 1989).
The knife, parka, handcuffs, and handcuff box were
discovered during the initial search.
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bolster Tim Larabee's weak testimony regarding the man he had seen
at Storm Mountain and to attempt to establish that Menzies was that
man.

In the absence of direct evidence that Menzies was the killer,

the State used the knife, handcuffs and handcuff box in an attempt
to link Menzies to the homicide.

The tennis shoes, ten-code and

purse seized pursuant to the warrant were also used in an attempt to
link Menzies.

The admission of this evidence was not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.
POINT XI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING A
PHOTOGRAPH OF MS. HUNSAKER TAKEN SEVERAL YEARS
BEFORE THE HOMICIDE.
Over defense objection (T. 978, 1317), the trial court
admitted39 and permitted the demonstrative use of an enlarged 8x10
photograph of a smiling Maureen Hunsaker taken three or four years
before the homicide.

T. 975, 978, 1317; State's Exhibit l. 40

39. Although the trial judge had previously admitted the photograph
and allowed the prosecutor to publish it to the jury (T. 978), he
later took the issue under advisement. T. 1073. He subsequently
allowed the use of the photograph during questioning of a police
officer, stating, "I believe that the identification has been
connected to that."
40. The prosecutor in the present case argued that in State v.
Bishop. 753 P.2d at 475, this Court upheld the admission of
photographs of the five victims which were taken before the
homicides because it held that "those photographs had no prejudicial
effect whatsoever to the defendant, that there was nothing improper
about the trial for allowing the photographs in." T. 1071.
Contrary to the argument of the prosecutor, in Bishop, this Court
did not deal directly with the issue of whether the photographs
depicting the victims' appearance before the crime was committed
were relevant or whether the prejudicial effect of such photographs
substantially outweighed the probative value. Instead, the Court
discussed generally whether the defendants stipulation to the
identity of the victims could be used to preclude the admission of
certain evidence, including the pre-homicide photographs. Id. at
475.
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Evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible, and,
even if relevant, evidence is not admissible if the probative value
of such evidence "is substantially outweighed by" is prejudicial
effect.

Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
In Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1257-8, the defendant challenged

the admission of a family photograph of the two victims.

This Court

did not directly address the issue of whether admission of the
photograph was error, but noted that
several courts have recognized that the probative
value of a photograph showing a homicide victim7s
appearance before the crime was committed is
often weak. See, e.g., Ritchie v. State, 632
P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981);
People v. Ramos. 30 Cal. 3d 553, 577-78, 639 P.2d
908, 921-22, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 279-80 (1982),
rev'd on other grounds. 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct.
3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983).
In Ritchie v. State. 632 P.2d at 1246, and People v. Ramos.
639 P.2d 908, both of which were cited by this Court in Lafferty,
the courts held that the trial court erred in admitting a photograph
of the deceased while alive.

The Ritchie Court stated:

The probative value of the enlarged photo is
questionable and could be highly prejudicial. In
a close case, on appeal, such a photograph may
well tip the scales in appellant's favor.
Ritchie. 632 P.2d at 1246.

See also Smith v. State. 650 P.2d 904,

909-10 (Okla. Cr. 1982) (discussing prejudicial nature of 3 x 5-inch
photograph of victim while alive and acknowledging that such a
photograph may inflame passions of jurors and require a new trial in
a close case).
In the present case, although Appellant had stipulated to
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the identification of Maureen Hunsaker as the person whose body was
found at Storm Mountain (T. 1071), the State introduced the
photograph for the sole purpose of establishing identification.
T. 1070. The State had no need for this evidence, and the enlarged
smiling and pretty depiction of Ms. Hunsaker was certain to inflame
the passions of the jury.
Because this was a circumstantial case, erroneous admission
of this photograph may well have "tipped the scales," requiring a
new trial.
POINT XII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED
SEVERAL ITEMS OF "REAL" EVIDENCE.
What is called "real evidence"—mostly bullets,
bad florins, and old boots—is of much value for
securing attention. This is true even when these
exhibits prove nothing,—as is generally the
case. They look so solid and important that they
give stability to the rest of the story. The
mind in doubt ever turns to tangible objects.
They who first carved for themselves a Jupiter
from a log of wood knew very well that the idol
could do nothing for them; but it enabled them
easily to realize a power who could. A rusty
knife is now to an English juryman just what a
"scareabaeus" was to an Egyptian of old. I have
seen a crooked nail and a broken charity-box
treated with all the reverence due to relics of
the holiest martyrs [footnote omitted].
Dean v. Hocker. 409 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1969), citing Wigmore on
Evidence, § 1157, at 253 (3d ed. 1942).

As the Dean v. Hocker court

noted, "there still lurks in the cupboard of judicial thought the
idea that physical objects do have an impact on jurors and that the
judge, as a preliminary matter, should avoid the impact where the
real evidence has little or no relevance."

Id.

Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) preclude
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the admission of irrelevant evidence, or relevant evidence where the
probative value evidence is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.

See generally Maurer, 770 P.2d 981.

In the present case, the State introduced numerous items in
violation of Rules 402, 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.41
A.

TROY DENTER'S GUN

Over Appellant's objection (T. 1412-3), the trial judge
admitted Troy Denter's gun as State's Exhibit 35.

T. 1416, 1417.

Mr. Denter testified that he kept the gun and shells in his car and
that Appellant had asked him to purchase it.

T. 1411-2, 1417.

There is no evidence that a gun was used in this case.
exhibit was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

The

Its admission

violated Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).
B.

THE THREE KNIVES

The State introduced and the trial judge admitted three
knives as State's Exhibits 43, 44 and 45.

R. 787.

State's

Exhibit 45 was a pocketknife which Troy Denter had seen Appellant
wearing about a week before the homicide; Denter could not recall
whether Menzies wore the knife when he borrowed the car.

T. 1408.

Dr. Sweeney testified that the knife was "consistent" with the
wounds.

T. 1635.

blood on it.

Martha Kerr tested this knife and did not find

T. 1978.

Exhibit 43 was Troy Denter's deer hunting knife.

T. 1410,

41. Some of these items were seized in violation of the fourth
amendment. See discussion supra at 85-97.
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1680.

Although Dr. Sweeney testified that the knife was consistent

with the wounds, Martha Kerr tested it and did not find blood, hair
or fibers.

T. 1638, 1978-9.

Exhibit 44 was a third knife.

T. 2002.

Dr. Sweeney did

not testify that this knife was consistent with the wounds, and
although Martha Kerr found human blood on this knife, it was not the
blood of Appellant or Ms. Hunsaker.

T. 1997.

These three knives were irrelevant evidence and their
admission was prejudicial.

Exhibit 44, which was not connected in

any way to the homicide, contained human blood which may well have
gotten on the knife when someone cut his or her finger using it.
Nevertheless, the knife created the prejudicial inference that the
knife had been used on someone else.

Although the other two knives

were consistent with the wounds, so are all other knives of similar
size.

Allowing this testimony of consistency without otherwise

linking the knives to the homicide was highly prejudicial.

Showing

that Menzies had access to knives is meaningless but nevertheless
implies that he is violent or dangerous where the evidence is not
otherwise connected to this case.
The trial judge erred in admitting this evidence.

See

Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).
C.

TENNIS SHOES

A further example of the State's bombardment of the jury
with irrelevant evidence was the introduction of State's Exhibit 75,
the tennis shoes seized from the Menzies apartment.

R. 788,

T. 1745; see Rules 401, 402, 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
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The

officers found the shoes in the same area as the purse and Nicole's
purple coat, which the State also attempted to introduce despite its
complete lack of relevance.

T. 1745, 1747.

This evidence served no

evidentiary purpose.
D.

TEN-CODE

A ten-code is a card that identifies the short numerical
code that stands for various messages; some of the messages are used
in police work.

See T. 1744. Officers seized a ten-code from the

Menzies apartment, and the State introduced it at trial over
Defendant's objections.

T. 2129.

Although the ten-code had no probative value, the jury may
well have concluded that other than police officers, the only people
who possess such items are criminals.
E.

JOGGING JACKET

The State introduced Ms. Hunsaker's blood-covered and cut
jogging jacket.

T. 990-1, R. 787, Exhibit 53.

The jacket was of no probative value; yet, the large
amounts of dried blood against a light blue background had a highly
inflammatory and prejudicial effect.

Cf. State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d

1135 (Utah 1989) (admission of blood-covered shirt harmless because
shirt and blood similar in color).
The only conceivable purpose for introduction of the jacket
was to show the jury the obvious blood on it.
emphasized this in questioning Jim Hunsaker.

The prosecutor
T. 990.

Introduction

of this piece of evidence violated Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983).

See, e.g., Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257.
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F.

MENZIES' JACKET

Both Tim Larabee and Beth Brown initially described the ski
parka worn or carried by the man at Storm Mountain as different from
the appearance of Appellant's jacket.

T. 2260, 1204. Each was

later shown only the jacket found at Appellant's apartment.
T. 2260, 1264, 1273.

Both said the jacket was "similar" to the one

they had seen despite their earlier inconsistent descriptions.
T. 1204, 2260.
Where procedures utilized by officers in obtaining an
identification of a criminal defendant by a witness are so
suggestive that they make the identification unreliable, a
defendant's due process rights under the federal and state
constitutions may be violated by the use of such an identification
at trial.

See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968);

State v. Perrv. 492 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1972); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
777-785.

The concern in suggestive eyewitness identification cases

is that the procedure utilized might be "so unnecessarily suggestive
and so conducive to mistaken identification as to result in a denial
of due process."

State v. Marsh. 652 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Utah 1982)

(citing Foster v. California. 394 U.S. 440 (1969), and Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)); State v. Thamer. 777 P.2d 432 (Utah
1989) (suggesting that showing a single photograph may result in an
unduly suggestive procedure).
Although identification of a jacket is distinguishable from
identification of a person, the procedures utilized for identifying
an important piece of evidence which links the defendant to the
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victim should be subject to the same concerns regarding reliability
and the same protections against admitting highly inflammatory and
prejudicial evidence which is unreliable.
In the present case, the State argued the jacket was "the
jacket everybody identified as [Menzies'l jacket" (T. 2688) and used
the jacket and the identification of it by Larabee and Brown to link
Menzies to the crime.

In reality, the jacket had minimal or no

probative value since it was merely "similar" to the one seen at
Storm Mountain.

Furthermore, the witnesses acknowledged the

"similarity" only after a highly suggestive and unreliable procedure
was used.
The trial court should not have admitted the parka or the
students' identification of it.
G.

TROY DENTER'S CAR

The procedures utilized by the officers to obtain an
identification of the vehicle from Tim and Beth were as suggestive
as the procedures involving the parka and rendered any
identification unreliable and inadmissible.

Officers led Tim to

believe they had the car he had seen and took him to the circuit
court parking lot.

T. 1270-1, 1294-5.

Tim told officers that he

did not think the car "would be the same car I saw at Storm
Mountain."

T. 1271.

However, no other large, light colored, older

model vehicles were in the parking lot.42
The car was a different color than Larabee originally

42. Although Beth Brown thought she would recognize the car if she
saw it again, she was unable to select Troy's car. T. 2256.
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described to police (T. 1263, 1271), and, when shown a book of
photographs of "all types of vehicles," Larabee selected a cream
colored 1968 Buick Riviera (T. 1706), not a white 1974 Chevrolet
Impala similar to the car owned by Troy Denter.

He did not think

that it was the same car he had seen at Storm Mountain and
apparently based his selection on the condition of the vehicle—that
it was beatup and dirty.

T. 1271.

Because of the suggestive procedure utilized in showing the
Denter vehicle to Larabee and his inability to positively identify
it, the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 3, 4, 5, and 6 as
photographs of the vehicle at Storm Mountain.
H.

HANDCUFFS, HANDCUFF BOX AND NICKED TREE THEORY

The State admitted a pair of handcuffs found in Menzies'
apartment over Defendant's objection (T. 1680-81).43
Over Appellant's objection, the State demonstrated the
ligature marks caused by handcuffs by placing handcuffs on a man
approximately six foot five inches, 270 pounds for thirty seconds.
T. 1387-8. Ms. Hunsaker was apparently approximately 130 pounds.

43. Over defense objection, Detective Thompson testified in
response to the prosecutor's leading question that the marks on
Ms. Hunsaker7s wrists were consistent with marks made by handcuffs,
and that while he was at the autopsy, he conducted experiments with
wrist ligatures, including handcuffs, to determine what had caused
the marks on Ms. Hunsaker7s wrists. T. 1323-8, 1385. Detective
Thompson's report did not initially include handcuffs as items
tested; "handcuffs" was later written on the typed report. T. 1362,
1382. Dr. Sweeney could not remember any experiments done with
wrist ligatures during the autopsy (T. 1668) , and Detective Thompson
could not remember who was present during the experiments
(T. 1390-1). Dr. Sweeney also testified that "quite a number of
things besides handcuffs could have caused the ligature marks.
T. 1618.
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T. 1389.

Over defense objections, the court also admitted an empty

handcuff box found near the dumpster for Menzies' apartment.
T. 1406.
In addition, without foundation, corroborative evidence or
any prior notice to Appellant that he had such a theory,
Detective Beckstead presented his "nicked tree theory" that
Ms. Hunsaker had been cuffed to the tree prior to her death.
T. 1752.44
No blood, hair or fibers were on the handcuffs taken from
Menzies' apartment.

T. 1977.

The handcuffs and box had minimal, if

any, relevance in this case,; nevertheless, the State introduced
them in a highly prejudicial and inflammatory manner.

The trial

court erred in failing to exclude these items and erred in
permitting the highly inflammatory in-court demonstration and
presentation of the "nicked tree theory."

Rules 402 and 403, Utah

Rules of Evidence.
POINT XIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE AN UNSIGNED SOCIAL SECURITY CARD
BEARING THE NAME OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER.
Although the police had thoroughly searched Mr. Menzies'
apartment and several people including the police had access to the
items in the apartment during the ensuing months, Nicole's new
husband claimed to have found a Social Security card with Maureen

44. Neither the nicks in the tree nor the theory were mentioned in
any of Detective Beckstead's seven or eight reports. T. 1753. He
claimed there were photographs of the nicks (T. 1754) but they were
never introduced. The theory was never written in a report nor
investigated further. T. 1756.
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Hunsaker's name at least half visible, "right on top" of a
bassinet.

T. 1509, 1510, 1495, 1512, 1517. The card was not signed

and looked brand new, without any wrinkles, folds or smudges.
Exhibit 42, T. 1510. Mr. Duffy took the card to Janet Franks, who
gave it to the police.

T. 1510-11, 1483, 2263, 2265.45

Over defense objection (T. 1499, 2577), the trial judge
admitted the card.

T. 1505, 2578.46

A. THE SOCIAL SECURITY CARD WAS INADMISSIBLE
HEARSAY.
The card was hearsay in that it suggests "I am the card of
Maureen Hunsaker" and the State introduced it to prove the truth of
the matter asserted therein.

Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c) and 802

make such hearsay generally inadmissible.

See generally Matter of

Estate of Morrell. 687 P.2d 1319 (Colo. App. 1984).
The trial court ruled that if the card were hearsay, it was
admissible under the catchall exception of Rule 803(24).

T. 1505.

In State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989), this
Court determined that the hearsay did not fit within the catchall
exception and pointed out that the provision "was intended for use
in those rare cases where, although the out-of-court statement does

45. The card was in police custody for the next eleven months
before it was reported or given to the County Attorney's Office or
defense counsel. T. 2265-6. The State did not establish the
location of the card during the fourteen months prior to trial. See
T. 2576-7.
46. Although the card was unsigned and indistinguishable from other
Social Security cards except that it bore the name and number of
Maureen Hunsaker, Jim Hunsaker testified that it was his wife's
card. T. 992.
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not fit into a recognized exception, its admission is justified by
the inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its
admission."

Id. at 482.

In the present case, the card was not inherently reliable
nor was there a need for its admission.
relatively easy to obtain.

Social Security cards are

Any document which purports to establish

the applicant's identity—including school report cards, marriage
records, health insurance cards, church membership or confirmation
records—is sufficient.
The whereabouts of the card during the several months after
Mr. Menzies was arrested until December 12, 1986 as well as the
whereabouts for the fourteen months following December 12, 1986 are
uncertain and raise question as to the card's reliability.
In addition, the tenuous nature of the link between
Mr. Menzies and the card establish that this card was not admissible
under Utah Rule of Evidence 803(24).
B. THE CARD WAS IRRELEVANT AND INCOMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
To establish that a piece of evidence is relevant, the
proponent of the evidence must authenticate or identify it to a
point "sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what the
proponent claims."

Utah Rule of Evidence 901(a) (1953); see also

Federal Rule of Evidence Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 901.

See

Frias v. Valle, 698 P.2d 875, 877 (Nev. 1985) (thermograms not
properly authenticated even though patient's name appeared on them);
Mishler v. McNallev, 730 P.2d 432 (Nev. 1986) (investigative memo
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from hospital not properly authenticated).
In the present case, the State failed to authenticate the
unsigned indistinguishable card as one carried by Ms. Hunsaker.

The

State introduced no evidence establishing that a Social Security
card had actually been issued to Ms. Hunsaker or the date of
issuance.

The husband's conclusion that she carried the card was

the only attempt made by the State to authenticate it.

The card was

unreliable unauthenticated evidence that should not have been
admitted.
C. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE CARD
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED ANY MINIMAL PROBATIVE
VALUE.
In the present case, any link between Mr. Menzies and the
Social Security card was tenuous.

The State did not authenticate

the card, it was found several months after the incident in a highly
visible spot which had been searched and disturbed several times,
and it was unaccounted for for fourteen months.
While the card was of minimal, if any, relevance, the
prejudicial impact was enormous.

The sight of the bereaved husband

identifying the card as something his wife carried affected the
jurors7 emotions in an unacceptable manner.

The trial court erred

in admitting this evidence.
POINT XIV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT ADMITTED HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF
MAUREEN HUNSAKER.
On February 23, 1987, at approximately 11:00 p.m, Maureen
Hunsaker telephoned her home.
husband and Officer Gamble.

R. 1155:1022.

She spoke with her

Each person testified that she
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responded affirmatively when asked whether she had been robbed.
R. 1155:1046, 1047.47

Both the officer and Jim Hunsaker testified

that she sounded nervous and upset and that "they" would let her go
sometime that night.

R. 1155:986, 1047.

The trial judge denied Appellant's pretrial motion to
suppress the statements.

R. 360-70; R. 1163:129, 134, 129-45.

A. HEARSAY STATEMENTS CONCERNING MAUREEN
HUNSAKER'S STATE OF MIND WERE IMPROPERLY ADMITTED.
The statements "I am fine" and "I just want to talk with my
husband," along with the testimony of Jim Hunsaker and
Officer Gamble that she appeared nervous and upset, were irrelevant
and inadmissible.

Although the State argued that the statements

were admissible under the state of mind exception of Rule 803(3),
Utah Rules of Evidence, Maureen Hunsaker's state of mind was not
relevant to any issue in this case.
In State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977), this Court
outlined "general rules on the admissibility of evidence of
out-of-court statements made by a homicide victim who reports
threats of death or serious bodily injury made by the defendant."
State v. Auble. 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988).

While such evidence

is generally inadmissible, it "may be admitted under the
state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule if it is not used to
prove the truth of the matter asserted and if certain other criteria

47. Jim Hunsaker actually testified that in response to his
question, "Have you been robbed?," Ms. Hunsaker stated, "[t]hey told
me to tell you they robbed me and got me and that I am fine and they
are going to let me go some time tonight." R. 1155:986.
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are met[.]"

13.

This Court reiterated the Wauneka criteria in

Auble:
(i) The evidence is probative of the decedent's
state of mind at the time of the killing, and
(ii) the decedent's state of mind has already
been placed in issue by defense evidence or
argument that the killing was (a) a suicide,
(b) in self-defense, or (c) an accident to which
the decedent contributed by acting as an
aggressor.
Id., citing State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah 1977).
In the present case, Ms. Hunsaker's state of mind is not in
issue in the case since Appellant did not claim that her death was
caused by suicide, self-defense or accident.48
B. HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER
CONCERNING PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS WERE
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
The State also asserted that the statements suggesting a
robbery or release could be admitted under the present sense
exception of Utah Rule of Evidence 803(1).
In Commonwealth v. Barnes. 456 A.2d 1037, 1039-41 (Pa.
Super. 1983), the Court was "presented with the troublesome
situation in which the excited utterance itself is being used to
prove that an exciting event did, in fact, occur."

Id. at 1040.

The Court determined that "[w]here there is no independent evidence

48. While both Wauneka and Auble suggest that state of mind
evidence could conceivably go to the issue of the killer's identity
(754 P.2d at 937; 560 P.2d at 1380), as the State acknowledged when
arguing that the statements were not unduly prejudicial, the
statements of Maureen Hunsaker do not identify anyone other than
herself. R. 1163 at 139-40; see also R. 1155 at 986, 1046-7.
Hence, the hearsay statements are not relevant to any issue in the
case and, therefore, cannot be admissible under 803(3).
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that a startling event has occurred, an alleged excited utterance
cannot be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule," and
reversed the defendant's convictions.

Id.

In the present case, the State presented little evidence
that a robbery or kidnapping occurred.
113-20

See discussion supra at

Under such circumstances, the statements were inadmissible.
C. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE STATEMENTS
OUTWEIGHED THEIR PROBATIVE VALUE.
Assuming, arguendo, some or all of the statements made by

Maureen Hunsaker are found to be relevant, they should not have been
admitted, since they were unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Menzies under
Utah Rule of Evidence 403.
P.2d at 1380-1.

See Auble, 754 P.2d at 937; Wauneka, 560

Evidence

is unfairly prejudicial if it "appeals to the
jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish," or otherwise
"may cause a jury to base its decision on
something other than the established propositions
in the case" [citations omitted].
Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984.

The hearsay evidence of Ms. Hunsaker's

statements, if admissible under 803(3), must be subject to the
scrutiny of Rule 403 and its prohibition against unfairly
prejudicial evidence.
Because the jury knew that Ms. Hunsaker was not ultimately
released and returned to her family, these statements were certain
to appeal to the jury's sympathy, arouse its sense of horror, and
provoke its instinct to punish.

The jury was left with a horrifying

and pathetic scenario in its mind after hearing this evidence of a
husband and victim communicating hope during their last
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conversation.

These statements should have been excluded as

impermissible hearsay and as being unfairly prejudicial and
inflammatory.
POINT XV. CUMULATIVE ERRORS OCCURRING IN THE
GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE OF THIS TRIAL DENIED
MR. MENZIES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A FAIR
TRIAL.
If this Court fails to reverse the convictions of
Mr. Menzies based on any of the individual errors claimed herein, he
urges that the cumulative effect of the errors establishes prejudice
sufficient to deny him his state and federal rights to a fair
trial.

Amendments V, VIII and XIV, Constitution of the United

States; Article I, §§ 7, 9 and 12, Constitution of Utah.

See

Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); State v.
Ellis. 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498,
501-2 (Utah 1986).
POINT XVI. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF CAPITAL HOMICIDE.
The jury convicted Appellant of an intentional homicide
with two statutory aggravating circumstances:
aggravated kidnapping.

R. 898.

robbery and

In order to convict a defendant,

the State must prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 315-8 (1979) (citing

In re Winshio. 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1)
(1953 as amended).

In reviewing a jury verdict, this Court will

reverse
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
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defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted. [citations omitted]
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE LINKING
MR. MENZIES TO THE CRIME.
The evidence placing Mr. Menzies at Storm Mountain was weak
and circumstantial.

Tim Larabee did not have a frontal view of the

man, picked someone other than Appellant at the lineup, and did not
make an in-court identification.

See discussion supra at 38. The

procedure for selecting the car and parka were unduly suggestive,
thereby giving such evidence little or no probative value.
The latent thumbprint inside Troy Denter's car was also
circumstantial evidence.

The car belonged to Mr. Denterf not

Appellant, and the print demonstrated only that Ms. Hunsaker had
been in the car at some point, not that she had been there in
February 1986 or was under Appellant's control while there.
Although officers found a lime green carpet fiber on
Ms. Hunsaker's clothing, the State's fiber analyst could not offer
any probability that the "similar" fiber found on the driver's side
of the vehicle was from the same source or whether there had been a
secondary transfer of the fiber.

T. 1994-8.

Furthermore,

Mr. Denter's car was used to move items out of Mr. Menzies'
apartment; fibers from the Menzies carpet could easily have gotten
into the car during that process.

T. 1404.

Given the testimony of the fiber analyst that fiber
analysis is an inexact process (T. 1994) and the wide range of
explanations for the fiber analysis results, the weakness of this
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evidence is apparent.

Nevertheless, the State argued that the fiber

analysis was "one of the most compelling pieces of evidence that
[the State had] introduced in this case linking the defendant to the
kidnapping of the victim . . . ." T. 2629.

The State's reliance on

this relatively meaningless evidence as one of its most compelling
pieces of evidence points out the weakness of the State's case
linking Mr. Menzies to this crime.
The unsigned Social Security card could have been placed in
Nicole's possessions any time by someone other than Appellant or
Ms. Hunsaker.

Likewise, the cards found at the jail were not

directly tied to Appellant.
The evidence introduced by the State in an attempt to link
Mr. Menzies to this crime was circumstantial at best and, in some
instances, without little, if any, probative force.
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY ELEMENT OF ROBBERY
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Robbery is defined as follows:
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property in the possession of another
from his person, or immediate presence, against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1989 Supp.).

The crime of Theft was

presented to the jury as a lesser included offense.

R. 892.

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1990).49
For a robbery rather than a theft to occur, the property
must be taken by means of force or fear.

Compare Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-6-301 with § 76-6-403; see State v. Aldershof. 556 P.2d 371,
373-4 (Kan. 1976) .
The State's evidence that property had been taken consisted
of (1) a cash drawer empty of bills at the Gas-A-Mat, (2) the audit
results form the Gas-A-Mat, (3) money found at the Defendant's
apartment, (4) an empty purse found at the Defendant's apartment,
(5) several identification cards found at the jail, (6) the
telephone call of February 23, 1986, and (7) a Social Security card
that mysteriously appeared months after the homicide occurred.
Although money appeared to be missing, the evidence
established that if the booth door were left open, anyone could have
taken the money.

T. 1167. The two audits were fraught with error

and came up with significantly different amounts as to what was
missing.

T. 1138, 1137, 1176, 1141. The second audit also showed

231 packs of cigarettes missing, but an employee later determined
that no cigarettes were missing.
have pumped gas and left.

T. 1178-9, 1186.

People could

T. 1031.

Even if this inconclusive evidence were sufficient to show
money was taken, it does not establish that it was taken by
Appellant.

There were no signs of struggle in the booth

49. Theft is not an aggravating circumstance which elevates an
intentional homicide to a capital homicide. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202(1).
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(T. 1041-42) and Appellant's fingerprints were not in the booth.
T. 1887.
The State claimed the money found in the umbrella in
Appellant's apartment was "a figure very similar to the amount
missing" and made the inflammatory claim that because Appellant was
unemployed, the money must have been stolen.

T. 2620-1.50

Depending on which audit one believed, the cash may have been close
to the amount; however, even if that were the case, it does not
establish that the money came from the Gas-A-Mat or was gotten by
force or fear.
The empty purse which Jim Hunsaker identified as belonging
to his wife did not prove a robbery.

Jim Hunsaker was not sure that

his wife had taken her purse to work (T. 1006), and there is no
evidence that Ms. Hunsaker had the $20 her husband thought he had
given her.

Again, even if the State established that Ms. Hunsaker's

money was missing, the evidence does not establish that it was taken
by force or fear

Nor do the cards found in the jail also do not

establish that Appellant took them by use of force or fear.51

50. This statement ignores the fact that Nicole received disability
income.
51. The stories of Mr. Menzies' made dash to the clothing room
vary. One officer (the same one who admittedly misrepresented
information in order to effect a warrantless search (T. 1540))
originally reported that during booking into the jail, Mr. Menzies
"did not give me any problems or trouble and was very cooperative."
T. 1543. That same officer, only after being told that Mr. Menzies
was a homicide suspect (T. 1544), reported that during booking,
Mr. Menzies straightened up, with a frightened wide-eyed look as
though he were going to become aggressive, and ran "all out" down
the jail hallway. T. 1521-1522, 1543, 1545. That officer also
(continued)
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Nor does Ms. Hunsaker's telephone call establish that she
was robbed.

In response to a leading question, she stated, "They

have told me to tell you I was robbed."
distinct from indicating a robbery.

T. 1025, 1702-3.

This is

In addition, the term "robbed"

or "robbery" is often interchanged by lay persons with "theft" or
"burglary."
The evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, fails to establish that property was taken from
Ms. Hunsaker by use of force or fear.

(footnote 51 continued)
testified that Mr. Menzies was alone in the clothing room somewhere
from thirty to forty-five seconds to two to three minutes
(T. 1523-1524) despite the fact that in his initial report, he made
no mention of Mr. Menzies running down the corridor or being
anything other than cooperative. T. 1543. Another officer
testified that Mr. Menzies walked down the hallway and was out of
sight for just five to eight seconds. T. 1548, 1550, 1554.
Further, despite their capacity to video tape the area and the
critical nature of this evidence to the State's case, no video tape
of the incident was ever produced. T. 1557-1558.
The clothing room was searched following Mr. Menzies'
alleged trip there. T. 1533. His "dash" supposedly occurred
somewhere between 6:40 p.m. (T. 1520) and 7:19 p.m. (T. 1554) or
7:29 p.m. (T. 1889), according to police officers specially trained
in the skills of observation and accurate reporting. Yet, the cards
were allegedly found between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. (T. 1561).
Further, the cards could have fallen out from any other bundle of
clothes in the hamper. T. 1567, 1569. Once they were found, the
cards were placed in an unlocked (T. 1574) desk drawer.
T. 1562-1563. The cards were seen and/or handled by at least two
other officers (T. 1572-1573, 1600) before they were given to the
Sheriff (T. 1603) on an unknown day (T. 1602). Finally, the Sheriff
never testified to complete the already questionable chain of
custody.
Mr. Menzies' hands were cuffed behind his back. T. 1551.
He was out of sight for only five to eight seconds. T. 1550. He
had some money (T. 1556, 1889) and other personal belongings
(T. 1556) in his pocket after he returned from the clothing room.
Yet, Mr. Menzies is supposed to have removed five or six inculpatory
cards (T. 1573), buried them under other clothing (T. 1566), without
mixing in any of his own property or money, all within five to eight
seconds, with his hands restrained behind him.
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C. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY NECESSARY ELEMENT OF
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Mr. Menzies was convicted of Aggravated Kidnapping, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b), (c):
A person commits aggravated kidnapping if the
person intentionally or knowingly, without
authority of law and against the will of the
victim, by any means and in any manner, seizes,
confines, detains, or transports the victim with
intent: . . . ( b ) To facilitate the commission,
attempted commission, or flight after commission
or attempted commission of a felony; or (c) To
inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another . . . .
R. 899.
If the taking or confinement of the victim is merely
incidental to committing the aggravating acts or other criminal
acts, an Aggravated Kidnapping conviction cannot stand.

State v.

Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981); see also People v. Daniels, 459 P.2d
225 (Cal. 1969); Annotation, Seizure or Detention for the Purpose of
Committing Rape, Robbery, or Similar Offense as Constituting
Separate Crime of Kidnapping, 43 ALR3d 699 (and citations contained
therein).
In this case, the evidence was not sufficient to establish
that a detention independent from that which was necessary to
accomplish the homicide occurred.
The only evidence that Ms. Hunsaker was restrained were the
ligature marks around her neck and her wrists.

T. 1609, 1615. The

State medical examiner testified that the neck ligature was caused
by whatever strangled the victim.

T. 1610. He concluded the
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strangulation either caused or occurred at the time of death.
T. 1640-41. The doctor agreed with and then reiterated the
conclusion that the wrist ligatures occurred at "about the same
time" as the neck ligature; hence, they all occurred at or near the
time she died.

T. 1666-67.

The evidence gathered at the Gas-A-Mat from which
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared on February 23, 1987, shows, at most, that
Ms. Hunsaker did in fact leave the Gas-A-Mat.
Although Jim Hunsaker testified that Ms. Hunsaker left her
coat, it was not a cold day and she was dressed warmly.

T. 983,

980, 1013-14. The cigarettes and lighter in the booth were not tied
to Ms. Hunsaker or Appellant by brand or other details.

T. 983.

The saliva was consistent with that of 36% of the population,
including Appellant and Ms. Hunsaker.

T. 1992-3, 1998.

No prints, indication that prints had been wiped away, or
signs of a struggle were found in the booth.

T. 1887, 1041, 1159-64.

Britton's testimony, all of which could have been taken
from news reports, likewise did not establish that an aggravated
kidnapping occurred.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, fails to establish an aggravated kidnapping.
PENALTY PHASE ARGUMENT
POINT XVII. ADMISSION OF MR, MENZIES/ ENTIRE
PRISON FILE VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE AND
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE
PROCESS UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
Over Defendant's numerous objections (T. 2839-40, 2843,
2885, 2886, 3135, 2894, 2892-3, 3132-4), the trial judge admitted
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during the penalty phase the entire file compiled by the prison on
Mr. Menzies.

T. 3183.

See Addendum L for outline and index of

items contained in file.
State's Exhibit 8 consists of 333 pages compiled by
numerous people at the Utah State Prison between 1976 and 1984.52
The file contains old psychological evaluations which are replete
with hearsay (e.g.. 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 143); a social
evaluation which relies on other reports (E8:5); approximately
thirty incident reports, many of which deal with unadjudicated
criminal conduct (e.g., 34, 35, 36 (bomb incident), 50, 51
(interfering with an officer), 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64 (weapons
violations), 67, 68, 69-73, 78, 79 (riot and firebomb incident));
"c" notes from unidentified sources, many of which discuss
unadjudicated criminal conduct53 (e.g., 175 (act of violence or
threat), 180 (allegations of rape, roughing up and hitting inmates),

52. Pursuant to order of this Court, appellate counsel has numbered
the loose pages in the file. The order of the loose pages remains
as it was when received by the district court. Where several pages
are stapled together, they are numbered as one page. Reference to
the prison file will be as follows: E8:page number.
53.

The parties stipulated that:
[A] "c note" is a chronological note of an
officer's observations or what he hears from
others. A "c note" involving alleged bad acts
may result in a write-up or disciplinary hearing.
A disciplinary hearing involves the
presentation of evidence. The burden at the
disciplinary hearing is the preponderance of the
evidence. The further stipulation would be that
contraband as it appears in that file includes
any items not allowed to be possessed by
prisoners according to prison rules, such as an
excessive number of books, and may or may not
involve alcohol or controlled substances.
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181 (weapons)); a presentence report for the 1976 aggravated robbery
conviction (E8:83); and disciplinary hearing results.54

See

Addendum L.
A. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE.
The trial judge in the present case incorrectly concluded
that the Rules of Evidence do not apply in the penalty phase of a
capital trial.

T. 2885.

Section 76-3-207(2) states in part:

(2) . . . Any evidence the court deems to have
probative value may be received regardless of its
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence . . . .
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1980), this
Court did not directly address whether the hearsay rule applies in
the penalty phase of a capital trial, but pointed out that the
statute, which calls for the "relaxation11 of the rules and which
"does not necessarily require application of the exclusionary rules
of evidence," is not "constitutionally infirm per se."
In Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1257, this Court applied Rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence to the penalty phase of a capital trial.
Hence, while there may be some "relaxation" of the rules of

54. Many pages of the file are duplicates (e.g., E8:3-9 duplicates
E8:l); some are illegible (e.g., E8:48, 68, 72, 232, 287); a report
ends mid-sentence (E8:71); another report warns the reader that the
report must be read in conjunction with other materials which
apparently are not included in the file (E8:88). Many signatures on
reports are illegible (E8:42, 49, 51, 53); rap sheets and other
portions allege crimes and bad acts without providing factual
details, source of information or whether a conviction occurred.
The "c notes" in the file do not identify sources and may reflect a
compilation of information from several people. In addition, at
least one incident report does not involve Mr. Menzies even though
it is contained in his file. E8:65-6.
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evidence, they nevertheless apply to the penalty phase.
Indeed, the State acknowledged in the present case that
while the rules of evidence were relaxed in the penalty phase, they
were "still in effect."

T. 2886.

Despite his ruling, the trial

judge also applied the rules of evidence in other parts of the
penalty phase, sustaining a hearsay objection.

T. 2771.

Mr. Menzies maintains that a complete disregard of the
rules of evidence in the penalty phase violates the eighth amendment
since the special need for reliability would not be met by allowing
information unlimited by traditional rules of evidence to be
introduced.
In Brown, 607 P.2d at 271, this Court stated:
Scrupulous care must be exercised by the
State in capital cases in both the guiltdetermining and penalty phases in presentation of
evidence and argument because of the acknowledged
uniqueness of the death penalty . . .
And that scrupulous care must particularly
extend to evidence introduced by the State in the
penalty phase where the evidence is probative but
would not be admissible under the exclusionary
rules of evidence in the guilt-determining
phase. When the State offers this type of
evidence in the penalty phase, it must be certain
that it is not prejudicial to the defendant—
prejudicial, of course, in the legal sense,
[citation omitted].
In Brown, this Court determined that admission of a hearsay
statement which quoted the defendant as saying "I just head-shot two
f

for messing with my brother" was prejudicial, warranting

reversal.

Id. at 269.

In the present case, the file itself was inadmissible
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hearsay pursuant to Rules 801 and 802, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983).

In addition, the file contained numerous reports which were

hearsay and which were compiled based on the hearsay reports of
others.

See, e.g., E8:83, 104, 108, 109, 110. Although the State

claimed that the file was admissible under Evidence Rule 803(8), the
public records exception (T. 2842), neither exception applies.
The "essential test" in determining whether papers fit
within the business record exception "is the reliability of the
document."

State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Utah 1983).

The

required foundation for admission under this exception is:
(1) the record must be made in the regular course
of the business or entity which keeps the
records; (2) the record must have been made at
the time of, or in close proximity to, the
occurrence of the act, condition or event
recorded; (3) the evidence must support a
conclusion that after recordation the document
was kept under circumstances that would preserve
its integrity; and (4) the sources of the
information from which the entry was made and the
circumstances of the preparation of the document
were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.
Id.
In Bertul, this Court pointed out that "whether police
records are admissible depends on the nature of the records and the
purpose for which they are offered."

Id. at 1184.

Police reports

which are prepared for purposes of prosecution and statements of
witnesses to a crime lack the necessary indicia of reliability.
In addition, to be admissible under the business record
exception, the document must be "identified by its entrant or one
under whose supervision it is kept and shown to be an original or
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Id.

first permanent entry . . .

#

by one having the duty to so record

and personal knowledge of the transaction represented by the
entry."

State v. Edgman, 447 N.E.2d 1091 (Ind. App. 1983), quoting

American United Life Ins. v. Pefflev, 301 N.E.2d 651, 656 (Ind. App.
1973) .
Many of the reports in the prison file, including all
negative c notes and disciplinary matters, were prepared for prison
discipline and/or security classification; the file also contains
police reports.

See, e.g., E8:34-5, 58-9, 78-9, 98-9. These

reports contain secondhand information or "information as to which
memory, perception, or motivation of the reporter may raise a
serious question of reliability."

Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184; see

also Layton City v. Peronek. 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990).
In Bertul, this Court also applied the "trustworthiness"
requirement to the public records exception:
As with business records, investigatory reports
of government officials containing opinions not
based on first-hand knowledge are not admissible
under that exception. E.g., Emmett v. American
Insurance Co., 265 A.2d 620 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970)
(fire officials report); Dale v. Trent, 146 Ind.
App. 412, 256 N.E.2d 402 (1970) (policeman's

report); Middlesex Supply, Inc. v. Martin & Sons,
Inc., 354 Mass. 373, 237 N.E.2d 692 (1968) (fire
chief's report); Hall v. Boykin, 207 So.2d 645
(Miss. 1968) (highway patrolman's accident
report).
Id.; see also Harrv v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah App.
1987); Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 1987).
Because of the lack of reliability of the various entries
in the file, neither the business records nor public records
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exception applies; the prison file was inadmissible hearsay.
B. ADMISSION OF THE ENTIRE PRISON FILE VIOLATED
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE
PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
constitution provide an accused with the right to confrontation.
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-9, 85 S.Ct. 1074,
1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), the Court stated:
The primary object of the [confrontation clause]
was to prevent depositions or ex parte
affidavits . . . [from] being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination of the
witness and cross-examination in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing
the recollection and sifting the conscience of
the witness, but of compelling him to stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
The right to confrontation is a fundamental aspect of due
process which "has been placed on a par with the right to notice and
an opportunity to be heard and the right to counsel."

Proffitt v.

Wainwriaht. 685 F.2d 1227, 1251 (modified. 706 F.2d 311 (11th
Cir.)), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1002, 104 S.Ct. 508, 78 L.Ed.2d 697
(1983), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-5, 93
S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly
held that the right to confrontation applies to the penalty phase of
a capital trial, various other courts have acknowledged that the
right to confrontation applies to the penalty phase.

See, e.g.,

Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1986); Proffitt v.
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Wainwriaht. 685 F.2d 1227; Moore v, Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th
Cir. 1989); Lanier v. State. 533 So.2d 473, 488-9 (Miss. 1988);
Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987). 55

See

also State v. Glenn. 504 N.E.2d 701, 710 (Ohio 1986).
In Proffitt, the Court recognized that the eighth amendment
requires greater substantive and procedural protection in sentencing
than in noncapital contexts.
The constitutional requirements governing capital
sentencing, by contrast, have undergone
substantial evolution in the wake of Furman v.
Georgia. The thrust of Furman and its progeny is
that the risk of arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty inherent in sentencing
determinations made without substantive and
procedural standards conflicts with the eighth
amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. Because the death penalty, unlike
other punishments, is permanent and irrevocable,
the procedures by which the decision to impose a
capital sentence is made bring into play
constitutional limitations not present in other
sentencing decisions. [citations omitted].

55. Decisions which have held that the right to confrontation was
not violated by the introduction of reports or other hearsay
materials during the penalty phase have relied on the defendant's
opportunity to "rebut, deny or explain the information." See
Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 888 (9th Cir. 1991).

In Creech, the

Court pointed out,
It is apparent, however, that Creech had the
opportunity, other than through crossexamination, to dispute the accuracy of the
presentence report prior to and at his January,
1982 sentencing hearing because his counsel was
given the report prior to the sentencing hearing.
Regardless of whether a discovery violation occurred in the present
case as the result of the State's failure to provide the
confidential prison file to Appellant prior to the sentencing
hearing (see discussion infra at 139), the failure to provide the
file resulted in a due process violation because Appellant did not
have time or ability to track the numerous named and unnamed sources
in the report, or to otherwise "rebut, deny or explain the
information."
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In Moore. 885 F.2d at 1511, the Court held that the
existence of the right to confrontation in the penalty phase of a
capital trial was so apparent that failure to raise the
confrontation claim earlier constituted an abuse of writ despite the
fact that the earlier proceedings occurred before the decision in
Proffitt.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the penalty phase of a capital trial is a critical stage of the
proceeding during which the accused is entitled to due process of
law and effective assistance of counsel.

Gardner v. Florida, 430

U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).
Although the Gardner court did not explicitly address
whether the right to confrontation applies in capital sentencing
hearings, the conclusion in Gardner that "petitioner was denied due
process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in
part, on the basis of information which he had not opportunity to
deny or explain" (Id. at 362) compels such a determination.

The

reasoning in Gardner, including its emphasis on importance of due
process in the penalty phase, and its explanation of the transition
in death penalty jurisprudence which followed the decision in
Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, demonstrates that the right to
confrontation applies in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
In Gardner, the Court distinguished the pre-Furman case of
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Williams v. New York.56 337 U.S. 242, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed.2d 1337
(1949), pointing out that:
In 1949, when the Williams case was decided, no
significant constitutional difference between the
death penalty and lesser punishments had been
expressly recognized by this Court. . . . In the
intervening years there have been two
constitutional developments which require us to
scrutinize a State's capital-sentencing
procedures more closely than was necessary in
1949.
First, five Members of the Court have now
expressly recognized that death is a different
kind of punishment from any other which may be
imposed in this country. [citations omitted]

Second, it is now clear that the sentencing
process, as well as the trial itself, must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause.
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-8.

See also Proffitt, 685 F.2d at 1252

(pointing out that holding in Williams no longer applies in light of
Furman and its progeny); Specht v. Patterson. 386 U.S. 605, 875
S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967) (right to confrontation applies at
sentencing hearing under Sex Offender Act).
The fundamental importance of the right to confrontation
coupled with the special need for reliability in sentencing in
capital cases (see State v. Holland. 777 P.2d at 1026-7) mandates
that the right to confrontation apply in the penalty phase of a
capital trial.

56. The 1949 decision in Williams affirmed the New York Court of
Appeals opinion that due process was not violated by the inability
of the appellant to confront the witnesses included in the
presentence report.
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The following test applies in determining whether the right
to confrontation has been violated:
The first requirement is that the witness must be
unavailable; the second requirement is that the
testimony must bear sufficient indicia of
reliability to permit its introduction at trial.
Brooks, 638 P.2d at 539, citing Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. at 66.
Evidence which is admissible under a hearsay exception may
nevertheless violate the confrontation clause, and evidence which is
inadmissible does not necessarily violate that clause.
P.2d at 1111-2.

Webb, 779

"The critical inquiry is whether the values

embodied in the confrontation clause are impinged upon by the
admission of hearsay, and, if so, whether there are adequate
safeguards to protect those values."

Id. at 1112.

The prosecution has the burden of establishing that the
hearsay declarants in the prison file were unavailable.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-5.

Ohio v.

In Webb. 779 P.2d at 1113, this Court

focused on the importance of this requirement in protecting the
confrontation rights of an accused, and gave a "stringent
construction" to the unavailability requirement.

See discussion on

"unavailability" supra at 53-7.
Because the State made no showing that the declarants, many
of whom were not identified in the file (see, e.g.. E8:180, 181,
188, 222, 223, 224, 225), were unavailable, admission of the records
violated the confrontation clause of Article I, § 12 of the Utah
constitution.

See Rule 804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (defining

unavailability); Chapman. 655 P.2d at 1122; Case. 752 P.2d at 356;
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White, 671 P.2d at 193.
Although failure to meet the unavailability prong requires
reversal (see Webb, 779 P.2d at 1114), this Court should note that
the second prong, the reliability requirement, was also not met in
this case.

This requirement focuses on whether there are "indicia

of reliability" which "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."

Mancusi v.

Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 216.
Although " [reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,"
applicability of such an exception does not necessarily make hearsay
reliable.

See Webb, 779 P.2d at 1112.

See discussion on

"reliability" supra at 57-61.
As set forth supra at 122-6, the prison file did not fit
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
indicia of reliability.

Nor were there other

In fact, the way in which the prison file

was prepared and the purpose for which it was used indicate the
opposite—that the information contained therein is unreliable, and
the use of that information as aggravating evidence in support of
the imposition of the death penalty violated Appellant's right to
confront the witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.
C. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNDER THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Regardless of whether a right to confrontation during the
penalty phase exists under the federal constitution, Article I, § 12
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of the Utah constitution guarantees such a right.
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), this Court
held that because of the critical nature of a preliminary hearing in
weeding out improvident prosecutions, the Utah constitutional right
to confrontation applies at such proceedings.

This Court stated:

The adversarial nature of the preliminary hearing
is conducive to the imposition of those
procedural safeguards. The application of the
right of cross-examination, and the exclusion of
certain out of court statements at this stage of
the criminal prosecution insures essential
protection of the defendant's substantive rights.
Id. at 785.
In determining whether the right to confrontation applies
to a particular proceeding, the Court must "examine the nature and
purpose of that proceeding and determine if confrontation is
necessary to insure the protection of any substantive rights of the
accused."

Id. at 782.
The nature and purpose of a penalty phase proceeding in a

capital case is to protect a defendant's substantive right to life
by insuring that the imposition of the death penalty is limited to
appropriate cases.

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80-1 (Utah 1982).

The "special need for reliability" in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial requires that the fact finder determine not only that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt, but also that "the death penalty was justified and
appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Holland, 777 P.2d

at 1027.
The unique nature of the death penalty and the special need
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for reliability in the sentencing phase demonstrate that the need
for confrontation in such a hearing is even greater than such need
in a preliminary hearing.

The penalty phase of a capital case "must

satisfy the requirements of the Due Process clause."

Gardner v.

Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358.
As outlined supra at 126-8, various courts have held that a
right to confrontation exists during the penalty phase.

See, e.g.,

Walton v. State. 481 So.2d at 1200; Proffitt v. Wainwricrht, 685 F.2d
at 1256.

Assuming, arguendo. that this Court does not follow the

precedent of those cases in analyzing the role of the sixth
amendment in the penalty phase, the rationale of such cases is
nevertheless applicable to the state constitutional right to
confrontation in the penalty phase.
The importance of the right to confrontation in a criminal
proceeding and the special need for reliability in the penalty phase
of a capital trial require that the state constitutional right to
confrontation apply in the penalty phase.
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO NOTICE AND AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
Many of the procedural protections which are vital in
criminal prosecutions do not apply to disciplinary hearings in
prisons.

See Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539, 562-3, 94 S.Ct.

2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (addressing and explaining the
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disparity); Homer v. Morris. 684 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1984). 57
In Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court
determined the contours of due process applicable to disciplinary
hearing allegations of serious misconduct which might result in loss
of "good time" credits.

The Court concluded that an inmate has a

right to notice and at least twenty-four hours to prepare, and a
"written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons" for disciplinary action.

Id. at 564.

However, an inmate does not have the right to call
witnesses, present documentary evidence, or confront and
cross-examine witnesses.

Id. at 566-7.

Although illiterate inmates

or those involved in complex cases may seek assistance from a fellow
inmate or staff member, they do not have a right to assistance of
counsel.

Id. at 567, 570.

See also Baxter v. Palmicriano, 425 U.S.

308, 322 (1976).
A number of disciplinary hearing findings appear in the
prison file (see, e.g.. E8:223, 219, 233, 236, 241, 244). The file
also contains forms which indicate that nothing the inmate says at
the hearing and none of the evidence from the hearing will be used
in a criminal prosecution.58

E8:231, 221, 231, 245, 251.

57. Many cases have noted that the lesser standards of due process
which apply in prison administration are adequate because the prison
records have no collateral effects outside the prison. See Duran v.
Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981); Meachum v. Fano. 427 U.S. 215,
229 n.8 (1976).
58. The file contains forms which outline an individual's rights in
the prison disciplinary system. Those forms state:
(continued)
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Given the minimal protections afforded at a disciplinary
hearing, admission of disciplinary decisions or information in the
penalty phase of a capital trial (see, e.g., E8:222-225
(disciplinary information and finding relating to alleged stabbing))
as aggravating evidence violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the federal constitution and Article I, §§ 7, 9 and 12
of the Utah constitution.
POINT XVIII. THE PRISON FILE CONTAINED
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH THE STATE DID
NOT PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, IN VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
The prison file contains numerous allegations of
unadjudicated criminal conduct.

See Addendum L for list of

unadjudicated acts and cites to page numbers in prison file.

The

"rap sheets," "c notes," staff reports, psychological evaluation
report, and social investigation report contain allegations of
unadjudicated conduct.

Examples of such unadjudicated conduct are a

hearsay report that Appellant stabbed another inmate (the trial
judge did not mention this in his sentencing) (E8:222-5),
allegations of threats to inmates and others (the trial judge relied

(footnote 58 continued)
(1) nothing you say at this hearing about
the act with which you are charged can be used
against you in any criminal prosecution for that
act.
(2) no evidence discovered by or at this
hearing about the act with which you are charged
can be used against you in any criminal
prosecution for that act.
Testimony during the penalty phase clarified that prison
files contain allegations which are never resolved and that evidence
from prison investigations is not saved. T. 3000.
- 135 -

on this as an aggravating circumstance) (E8:205-84; T. 3260), an
allegation that Appellant was involved in AWOL plot (E8:104)
(explicitly relied on by judge) (T. 3251), an allegation that
Appellant helped a dangerous patient escape (explicitly relied on by
judge) (T. 3263), and an allegation that Appellant had raped another
inmate at knife point (E8:180) (the trial judge did not mention this
in his ruling).
In Laffertv. 749 P.2d at 1259-60, this Court allowed the
introduction of unadjudicated violent crimes during the penalty
phase but required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed such crimes.

In State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d

1030, 1033 (Utah 1991), and State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1283
(Utah 1989), this Court extended the Laffertv holding to include
evidence of any unadjudicated crime, regardless of whether such
crime was violent.
Although this Court has allowed the introduction of
unadjudicated crimes, it has acknowledged the potentially
prejudicial impact of such evidence where the State fails to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that such crime occurred.
If the State were permitted during the penalty
phase to use as evidence in aggravation material
that would be insufficiently probative to support
a conviction for the other criminal activity,
then there is a chance that this material might
be used by the sentencing body as the basis for
imposing death. Allowing the sentencer to be
influenced by material relating to crimes which
have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
would appear to violate the Supreme Court's
ruling in Gregg that evidence admitted during
sentencing must not unfairly prejudice the
accused.
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Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1259.
In an effort to protect against such unfair prejudice which
would violate due process and the eighth amendment, this Court
outlined requirements to be followed where the State introduces
unadjudicated criminal conduct during the penalty phase.
1260.

Id. at

Where the sentence is determined by a judge, the judge must

make specific written findings as to whether the unadjudicated crime
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. fn 16.

This Court

imposed this requirement of written findings
to assure that on review this Court can
adequately assess whether imposition of a death
sentence has been improperly based on evidence of
other crimes which have not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Written findings will
facilitate appellate review and reduce the
likelihood of reversal. Although we do not reach
the constitutional issues, we note that if
evidence of other violent crimes was admitted,
due process concerns could require vacating of a
death sentence if we found the evidence
insufficient to establish guilt and if the manner
in which the verdict was reported did not enable
us to be certain that the death sentence would
have been imposed without that evidence,
[citations omitted]
Id.
Although the trial court in the present case recognized its
duty under Lafferty to make findings as to whether unadjudicated
criminal conduct was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it failed to
make the required written findings.

T. 2757-8, 2900.

In his ruling, the trial judge stated:
Alleged bad acts have—this is character,
background history, mental condition: alleged
bad acts were unproven.
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T. 3265.

Despite this admittedly unclear ruling, the judge relied

on unadjudicated conduct in reaching his decision that death should
be imposed.

Unadjudicated conduct explicitly referred to which was

not previously mentioned included, "there was an extensive juvenile
record" (T. 3250); "he went AWOL from the shelter" and "they could
not work with him when he was involved in an AWOL plot" (T. 3251);
extensive drug use (T. 3253); feigned seizure in order to escape
(T. 3257) ; "created diversionary tactic helping dangerous patient to
escape (T. 3263) ; referred for psychiatric evaluation "for pulling a
knife and inflicting injury to girl who teased him and indicated he
would 'cut her guts out/n (T. 3263); and "strong arm tactics,
threats to inmates and guards" (T. 3260).

This last category

encompasses a number of unadjudicated acts found in the prison file,
including the "c note" allegations of rape and knife incidents.
Other than hearsay statements contained in the file, the State
offered no evidence to prove that Mr. Menzies had in fact committed
these crimes.
The trial judge's failure to make written findings coupled
with his apparent reliance on some of the unadjudicated acts despite
a statement that alleged bad acts were not proven precludes this
Court from being "certain that the death sentence would have been
imposed without that evidence."

Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1260.

The

introduction of this hearsay evidence in the prison file did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Menzies committed these
crimes mentioned.

The introduction of the unproven crimes violated

due process and the eighth amendment.
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POINT XIX. THE STATED FAILURE TO PROVIDE
APPELLANT WITH THE PRISON FILE REQUIRES A NEW
PENALTY HEARING.
Appellant had filed guilt/innocence and penalty phase
motions for discovery (see Addendum G), and the State had
voluntarily complied by providing various reports and information to
the defense.

The State did not, however, provide defense counsel

with the 333-page confidential prison file which was in its control
and which it intended to introduce during the penalty phase.
T. 2888-90.

This failure violated Rule 16 of the

Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure, due process, and the eighth amendment.

See

State v. Lipsky. 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) ("fundamental
fairness requires that procedures . . . in the sentencing
phase . . . be designed to insure that the decision-making process
is based on accurate information"); Gardner v. Florida. 430 U.S. 349
(due process and the eighth amendment require that defendant in
capital case have "full access" to presentence report); State v.
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982).
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
State to disclose upon request any "relevant written or recorded
statements of the defendant."

The prison file is replete with

written statements of Mr. Menzies which the State intended to
introduce.

See E8:34, 35, 48-9, 69-73, 80-1, 104, 105, 180. The

State had previously provided other statements of Appellant and had
a continuing obligation to disclose this material.
at 916-7.
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Knight, 734 P.2d

The prison file also contains some positive information
about Mr. Menzies' conduct while in prison including the fact that
he was a good worker who followed orders.

See, e.g.,

141, 145-7, 150-2, 156, 157-8, 171, 177, 178. 58

E8:40, 135,

This information

was mitigating evidence which the State was required to provide to
defense counsel regardless of whether requested.

The State's

failure to provide defense counsel with this information violated
Rule 16(a)(4), due process and the eighth amendment.

See State v.

Carter. 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985); Bradv v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (suppression by state of
evidence favorable to accused violates due process); Gardner v.
Florida. 430 U.S. 349.
In addition, the file contained presentence reports and
other reports analogous to presentence reports which the State was
required to provide to Appellant before trial pursuant to due
process and the sixth amendment.
108, 109, 110.

See, e.g., E8:83, 88, 104, 105,

Lioskv. 608 P.2d at 1246-48; Gardner v. Florida. 430

U.S. 349.
Appellant's ability to adequately prepare for the penalty
phase was severely undermined by the State's failure to provide the
file to him.

Had he had access to the file, he would have attempted

to develop the mitigating information by investigating potential
witnesses who had made favorable statements, and prepared to attack

58. Although this mitigation evidence should have been conveyed to
defense counsel, it did not balance out the overwhelmingly
prejudicial effect of admitting the prison file.
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and meet the remainder of the State's evidence.

The failure to

disclose was prejudicial to Appellant in light of its impact on his
ability to adequately prepare for the penalty hearing.

See United

States v. Aaurs. 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976);
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661-62 (Utah 1985).
POINT XX. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE WHICH
CONTAINED IN-CUSTODY CLINICAL EVALUATIONS
VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' RIGHTS AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
The prison file is replete with reports which were made by
examiners while Mr. Menzies was in custody and during which he was
not informed of his right to remain silent or that the information
would be used against him in court.

E.g.. E8:83 (presentence

report), 88 (social investigation on Stated motion to certify), 105
(Boone evaluation as part of motion to certify), 108, 110 (Carlisle
psychological evaluation and assessment), 104 (Hinckley evaluation
as to whether Appellant was treatment candidate), 169 ("c notes"
include statements made by Appellant).
These reports rely on statements by Appellant to conclude
that he is dangerous, anti-social personality and not a candidate
for treatment.

E.g., E8:104, 83, 88, 105, 108-9.

The prison file also contains numerous statements made by
Appellant to prison authorities as part of disciplinary actions,
without Appellant being informed that such statements would be used
against him in court.

E.g., E8:31, 34, 36, 49.

In fact, as part of

the disciplinary hearing, he was given a disclaimer which explicitly
stated that his statements would not be used against him in court.
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E.g., E8:221, 231, 234.

See footnote 58 supra at 134-5.

In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68
L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination applies to the
penalty phase of a capital trial, and that such right was violated
where a psychiatrist who conducted a court-ordered competency review
testified during the penalty phase as to the defendant's future
dangerousness.

The Court pointed out that:

[b]ecause respondent did not voluntarily consent
to the pretrial psychiatric examination after
being informed of his right to remain silent and
the possible use of his statements, the State
could not rely on what he said to [the
psychiatrist] to establish future dangerousness.
Id. at 468.
Although Appellant introduced evidence relating to his
mental health in an effort to diffuse the impact of the various
reports and psychological evaluations (T. 2956-83, 3019-3105), he
did so after the State introduced the written psychological
evaluations contained in the prison file and Exhibit 1-D.
T. 2839-43, 2885-2894.

Such an effort to diffuse the impact of the

State's erroneously admitted evidence does not detract from the
reversible nature of this error.

See Estelle v. Smith at 465-6.

Erroneous admission of the numerous statements and
evaluations coupled with the trial court's explicit and implicit
reliance on such evaluations requires reversal since aggravating
evidence regarding Appellant's future dangerousness and criminal
culpability in various crimes was admitted.
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See Johnson v.

Mississippi. 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235(1983).
POINT XXI. ADMISSION OF "STALE11 UNADJUDICATED
CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED DUE
PROCESS AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The prison file contained unadjudicated acts which dated
back to Mr. Menzies' childhood.

Exhibit 1-D consisted of three

confidential 1976 and 1973 psychiatric evaluations, the last of
which refers to several knife incidents, including an incident where
Menzies allegedly threatened a girl with a knife.

The State made no

effort to prove any of these incidents had occurred.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 outlines the statute of
limitations applicable in Utah.59

This statute is "the primary

safeguard against prejudice resulting from having to defend against
stale criminal charges."
1985).

State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah

Allowing the State to "try" these charges well after the

statutes of limitations had run left Appellant without a meaningful
opportunity to defend against the allegations.

This "unfairly

prejudicial evidence" violates the eighth amendment and federal due
process.

See generally Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct.

2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia. 446 U.S. 420, 423
(1980); People v. Phillips. 711 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1985).
In Lafferty. this Court was not faced with the statute of
limitations issue because the unadjudicated conduct had occurred
while the defendant was in jail awaiting trial on the capital

59. The statute of limitations for most felonies is four years; the
statute of limitations for most misdemeanors is two years.
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homicide case.
In Taylor, 818 P.2d at 1032, where the State introduced
unadjudicated conduct which had occurred fifteen years earlier, this
Court acknowledged that the passage of time can raise due process
concerns, but held that due process was not violated where all three
of the alleged victims appeared and were subject to
cross-examination.
By contrast, in the present case, the State did not call
witnesses.

Instead, it relied on hearsay reports, some of which

came from unidentified sources, to establish, among other things,
that Mr. Menzies had participated in various unadjudicated violent
acts.

See, e.g.. E8:180, 181, 57, 59, 83, 88, 104, 105, 173, 175.
Although the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the

Utah and federal constitutions generally does not attach until an
individual is arrested (see Bailey. 712 P.2d at 283), allowing the
trial of stale charges during the penalty phase raises serious due
process and speedy trial concerns since the defendant is never
technically arrested on the stale charge, yet faces trial.
In State v. Smith. 699 P.2d 711, 713 (Utah 1985), this
Court stated:
[W]hen a prosecutor delays filing an indictment,
the delay does not constitute a violation of due
process unless there is a showing that the
prosecutor's delay "violates those 'fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of
our civil and political institutions,' and which
define 'the community's sense of fair play and
decency.'" (citation omitted] . . . For
preaccusation delay to constitute reversible
error, the delay must cause actual prejudice to
the defendant's case and result in tactical
advantage for the prosecutor.
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Id, at 713 (citations omitted).
By allowing the State to introduce allegations of criminal
acts dating back as much as twenty years without providing details
or witnesses for confrontation, the delay in prosecution resulted in
an unfair tactical advantage for the State which precluded Appellant
from adequately defending such charges.
The overwhelming impact of these unproven incidents,
coupled with the trial judge's often explicit reliance thereon,
requires a new penalty phase.
POINT XXII. ADMISSION OF STATE'S EXHIBIT 1-D
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE.
State's Penalty Phase Exhibit 1-D consists of three
psychiatric evaluations which were done on March 1, 1976 (Troy
Gill, M.D.), February 19, 1976 (Robert Strachan, Ph.D.) and
February 15, 1973 (Peggy Ellis, psychiatric social worker).

The

first two evaluations contained in 1-D were made "for the purpose of
determining whether or not [Mr. Menzies] should be certified as an
adult for adjudication of the criminal charges which have been
brought against him."

1-D:1.

The last report was made in order to

decide whether to let Mr. Menzies live with his father, or make some
other disposition of his case.
information.
release!!!"

This report is marked "Confidential

To be used for benefit of this patient only.

Do not

1-D:8.

Exhibit 1-D is inadmissible for a number of reasons.
First, it is not a self-authenticating document under Rule 902 and
is not otherwise authenticated as required by Rule 903, Utah Rules
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of Evidence.

See Lamorie. 610 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1980).

The evaluations are hearsay and do not fit within a hearsay
exception.

Rules 801, 802, 803, Utah Rules of Evidence; see

discussion supra at 122-5.

In addition, they contain hearsay

statements of other individuals, some of whom are identified while
others are not.

See, e.g.. 1-D:3.

Admission of the exhibit violated Mr. Menzies' right to
confrontation under the state and federal constitutions.
Proffitt v. Wainwriqht, 685 F.2d at 1251; Walton v. State, 481 So.2d
at 1200.

See discussion supra at 126-33.

The State made no showing

that the three declarants were unavailable, nor did it make any
showing as to how or where the declarants had obtained the hearsay
information contained in the reports.

Nor did the State make any

showing that the reports were reliable.

They were made many years

ago to decide whether to certify Mr. Menzies as an adult.

Each

evaluator apparently spent time with Mr. Menzies on only one day.
The admission of this exhibit precluded Appellant from
cross-examining the evaluators.
Mr. Menzies' fifth amendment rights against
self-incrimination were also violated by admission of the exhibit.
The reports were made based on interviews with Mr. Menzies.

The

first two occurred while he was in custody at the juvenile detention
center; it is not clear whether he was in custody for the third.
See discussion supra at 141-3; Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454.
Exhibit 1-D also contains unadjudicated acts which the
State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
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See Lafferty, 749

P. 2d at 1259; discussion supra at 135-8. The exhibit mentions at
least twice an incident where Mr. Menzies allegedly threatened a
girl with a knife.

1-D:3, 9.

The February 15, 1973 report also

indicates that "[t]here have been several knife incidents since that
time."

1-D:9.

The source of this information, the facts of the

incident, the name of the girl and/or other victims, or any further
details are not supplied, and the State made no further effort to
prove that these incidents occurred.

Admission of this information

violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

The possibility that

the trial judge relied on this information in sentencing requires a
new trial.
POINT XXIII. THE STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CHANGING ITS
PENALTY PHASE WITNESS LIST SHORTLY BEFORE THE
HEARING AND FAILING TO PROVIDE PENALTY PHASE
DISCOVERY.
On March 5, 1986, defense counsel submitted a request for
discovery.

See Addendum G.

R. 27-8. This request included, among

other things, a request for all police reports and statements
attributed to Appellant.
Appellant filed a supplemental motion to discover (R. 628)
and made a written and oral motion for disclosure of the
prosecution's penalty phase witnesses.

R. 772-3.60

The trial judge

60. The record in this area is incomplete. The supplemental motion
is not included in the district court file and although reference is
made to a January 22, 1988 hearing, no minute entry appears for this
date. A minute entry for January 25, 1998 indicates in part:
This case comes on regularly before the court on
defendant's motion in limine . . . The court
hereby orders the defendant's argument has been
(continued)
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ordered the State to provide Appellant with a list of its penalty
phase witnesses no later than January 28, 1988.

R. 755.

On February 3, 1988, the State submitted its list of
penalty phase witnesses including Vi Lealeifalea, Carl McBrayer,
Beverly Tischer, Ed Colbert, Charles Illsey, Bryon Stark, Myrna
Shultz, David Yocum, and Greg Bown.

R. 775.

On March 11, 1988, the Friday before the Tuesday on which
the penalty phase began, the State gave defense counsel a revised
list of penalty phase witnesses.
Addendum N containing both lists.

T. 2715; R. 774, 1090; see
This list omitted Byron Stark and

Myrna Schultz and added nine new witnesses:

Breck LeBegue, Morris

Nelson, Denette Faretta, Cathy Olson, Bruce Bishop, Kurt Tanner, Jay
Labrum, Tom Wayman, and Joe Gee.

R. 1090.

Defense counsel objected to testimony from witnesses on the

(footnote 60 continued)
persuasive and the court finds the motion in
limine is well taken. In the event this case has
a penalty phase the court orders a written motion
and list of witnesses that will be used to be
exchanged no later than Thursday, January 28,
1988, at 5:00 p.m.
R. 755.
After repeated arguments and a suggestion by the State that
a January 25, 1988 hearing had not occurred, Tauni Lee prepared a
transcript of the January 25, 1988 hearing in January 1991. That
transcript has apparently never been transmitted to this Court
despite defense counsel's repeated efforts to locate it. The record
that does exist demonstrates, however, that Appellant made repeated
discovery requests and the State was ordered to provide Appellant
with a witness list by January 28, 1988. R. 755. To the extent
that this Court believes the record is incomplete on this issue, the
missing transcript violates Appellant's eighth amendment and due
process rights, requiring a new trial. See Appellant's opening
brief on transcript issue; State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah
1983); Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814 (Ok. Cr. 1988); Delap v.
State. 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977).
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second list, pointing out that the revised list violated a court
order and she had been unsuccessful in contacting at least some of
the witnesses.

T. 2715.

In response, prosecutor Ernie Jones claimed

Frankly, I think what the Court is going to find
is that some of the additional witnesses we put
on the list last Friday and provided to the
defense had to go to foundational requirements in
order to introduce documents, records of prior
convictions, that type of thing.61
T. 2716.
Despite the existence of a court order that he produce his
witness list no later than January 28, 1988 (R. 755), Mr. Jones
argued, "I don't recall the court ever setting a deadline saying
that, 'You have to have this list for the defense by a particular
day, or otherwise you can't use the evidence.'11

T. 2716-7.

The State called Officer Jay Labrum to testify concerning
Appellant's arrest for the 1975 7-Eleven robberies.

T. 2751.

Despite the fact that the State was aware of Labrum's existence and
role in the arrest, the State did not inform defense counsel until
four days before the penalty phase began that it intended to use
Officer Labrum as a penalty phase witness.

T. 2716-7; R. 1090.

Although Appellant had requested all police reports and statements
attributed to Appellant (R. 27-8), the State did not supply defense

61. None of the additional witnesses presented documentary evidence
or provided foundation for the introduction of such evidence. See
T. 2759-2785 (Officer Labrum); T. 2809-2823 (Bruce Bishop);
T. 2823-2838 (Kurt Tanner); T. 2867-76 (Officer Wayman);
T. 2876-2904 (Officer Gee). Officer Thompson, who appeared on
neither list, presented foundational testimony for the introduction
of photographs. T. 2833.
Interestingly, this reference to foundational witnesses is
similar to the information defense counsel claims to have received
when asking about Beverly Tischler's testimony. See discussion
regarding prison file supra at 139.
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counsel with Labrum's report; nor did it inform defense counsel of
the statements attributed to Appellant to which Labrum would
testify.

T. 2758.

This failure to provide police reports and

statements, despite a motion requesting such items and previous
voluntary compliance, violated due process and the eighth
amendment.

See Knight, 734 P.2d at 916; Wood. 648 P.2d at 81; see

discussion supra at 139, 40-9.
During the intervening weekend and single working day after
receiving the revised list, defense counsel was unable to reach the
officer.62

T. 2749.

Over Appellant's objection, the trial judge allowed Labrum
to testify.

T. 2748-9.

Defense counsel was given a copy of

Labrum's report at that time but did not have time to review and
prepare for the testimony.

T. 2758.

Labrum used the report, a copy of which he obtained from
the prosecutor's office, to testify as to various statements
allegedly made by Appellant.

T. 2777, 2759-75.

Labrum's testimony

included statements attributed to Appellant regarding the 1975
7-Eleven robberies, car thefts, drug use, and criminal activity
perpetrated after Appellant and Mark Iveson picked up a hitchhiker.
T. 2759-75.
Admission of Labrum's testimony violated Rule 16, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process.

Appellant had

62. The officer made only one attempt to return counsel's calls and
reached the after-hours answering machine. T. 2776-7. He did not
try to reach her at her home number. Id.
- 150 -

requested and the State had voluntarily provided police reports and
statements of Appellant.

Therefore, it had a continuing obligation

to provide this material.

See Knight. 734 P.2d at 916; Carter. 707

P.2d at 662.
Furthermore, the court had ordered the State to provide its
list by January 28, 1988. R. 755.

Defense counsel had relied on

that list in preparing for the complex penalty phase.

The State

offered no good cause for failing to include Officer Labrum on the
original list.

The resulting last-minute scramble by defense

counsel and the inability to obtain police reports and prepare for
the penalty phase violated due process.
Bruce Bishop and Kurt Tanner of the Utah State Hospital
were called to testify regarding information found in Appellant's
report concerning a screwdriver brought in by Nicole Arnold and a
dust pan handle.
list.

T. 2810-28. Neither witness appeared on the first

The trial judge relied on this testimony in sentencing

Appellant.

T. 3254.

Officers Wayman and Gee, whose names appeared on the second
list, testified regarding threats allegedly made by Appellant and
security precautions taken at the jail.

T. 2868.

The last-minute listing of these witnesses precluded
defense counsel from adequately preparing for trial and violated due
process and the eighth amendment.
In State v. Wood. 648 P.2d at 81, this Court recognized that
to assure that substantive standards that govern
imposition of the death penalty are fairly,
evenhandedly, and properly applied, the basic
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
observed . . • Thusf it is a violation of that
clause if a defendant is sentenced to
death . . . when defense counsel was not given
adequate time to review a complicated presentence
report. State v. Phelps, N.D. 297 S.W.2d 769
(1980). Death sentences have also been set aside
because of . . . the prosecution's failure to
disclose the name of a crucial witness so that
the defendant was unable to respond. Smith v.
Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
The State's last-minute shuffle of witnesses it was aware
of and for which it had reports violated Menzies' due process right
to discovery and an adequate opportunity to prepare.

This

last-minute shuffle allowed the death penalty to be imposed in an
arbitrary and capricious fashion, in violation of the eighth
amendment.
POINT XXIV. INTRODUCTION OF OTHER UNPROVEN BAD
ACTS AND CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE STATE REGARDING
BAD ACTS THAT IT DID NOT OTHERWISE PROVE VIOLATED
DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
In addition to the unadjudicated acts contained in the
prison record63, Exhibit 1-D, and the rap sheets, the State
introduced testimony of Carl McBrayer regarding both 7-Eleven
robberies (even though Appellant had been convicted of only one of
those robberies) (T. 2729-2748); the alleged aggravated assault of
the taxicab driver; the testimony of Kurt Tanner and Bruce Bishop
regarding the screwdriver incident at the hospital (T. 2809-27);
testimony of Jay Labrum regarding alleged automobile thefts, drug

63. Other than the crimes involved in the instant case, Appellant
has been convicted of five crimes as an adult. Those crimes are:
two aggravated robberies (taxicab and 7-Eleven), one escape, two
misdemeanor thefts. All other criminal conduct mentioned during the
penalty phase must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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dealing and drug use in 1975 (T. 2762, 2764-5); testimony of
Officer Illsey that Appellant allegedly gave false information
(T. 2855-6); and testimony of Lieutenant Wayman and Captain Gee
regarding alleged threats by Appellant and allegations that
Appellant was involved in "some escape situation (T. 2873-5,
2877-9).

The State also introduced Exhibit 1-A, an order of

certification which refers to allegations of aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated robberies, and thefts of motor vehicles.
In addition, on cross-examination of Jackie Rutherford,
Appellant's sister, prosecutor Jones asked whether Ms. Rutherford
was aware of several unadjudicated crimes that Appellant allegedly
committed (T. 2940-6), including whether she was aware Appellant had
helped someone escape from the State Hospital (T. 2944), whether he
ever told her he planned to kill Carl McBrayer during the 7-Eleven
robberies (T. 2945), and whether he ever told her he had used stolen
vehicles to commit the 7-Eleven robberies (T. 2946).

See Addendum M

for transcript of relevant portions of cross-examination.
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant had committed these acts.

Introduction of this evidence

violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

See Lafferty, 749

P.2d at 1259.
In addition, the trial judge's failure to make the required
written findings precludes this Court from being able to assess
whether the death penalty was imposed on an improper basis, in
violation of due process and the eighth amendment.
P.2d at 1260.
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Lafferty, 749

Finally, the prosecutor's questions of Ms. Rutherford
regarding bad acts which the State did not prove was misconduct
which violated due process and the eighth amendment.

See State v.

Emmett. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 1992) (error to ask a
question which "implies the existence of a prejudicial fact unless
the prosecution can prove the existence of that fact11) ; Lanier v.
State. 533 So.2d 473, 486-90 (Miss. 1988) (death sentence overturned
where prosecutor violated defendant's right to confrontation in
penalty phase by presenting inadmissible evidence during
cross-examination without providing an opportunity for the defendant
to confront any witness concerning the subject matter of the
cross-examination).
In State v. Singleton. 182 P.2d 920, 930 (Ariz. 1947)
(cited favorably by this Court in Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37),
the Court stated:
But when, as here, such questioning is raised and
then dropped with no further attempt on the part
of the State to prove its point, the
aforementioned "fishing expedition" having
failed, we believe it to be wholly improper and
highly prejudicial. To allow this sort of
examination would be to allow the imaginative and
overzealous prosecutor to concoct a damaging line
of examination which could leave with the jury
the impression that defendant was anything that
the questions, by innuendo, seemed to suggest.
If the questions were persistent enough and
cleverly enough framed, no amount of denial on
the part of a defendant would be able to erase
the impression in the mind of the jury that the
prosecutor actually had such facts at hand and
that probably there was some truth to the
insinuations.
See also State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1986) (error
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to ask about unproven felonies where State does not introduce
admissible extrinsic evidence to establish felonies).
Questioning Ms. Rutherford about her knowledge of unproven
crimes allegedly committed by Appellant, including vehicle thefts,
aiding in an escape, and intent to kill, was error.

Introduction of

unproven bad acts referred to in this point violated due process and
the eighth amendment.
POINT XXV. INTRODUCTION OF UNADJUDICATED ACTS
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
Although this Court has previously decided in Lafferty.
Taylor and Parsons that the State can introduce evidence of
unadjudicated crimes during the penalty phase of a capital trial,
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider that
holding.

See Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1258-60, 1263 (Stewart, Assoc.

Chief Justice, dissenting); Williams v. Lvnaucrh, 484 U.S. 935, 108
S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 270 (1987) (Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari); State v.
McCormick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979); State v. Bobo. 727 S.W.2d
945, 952-3 (Tenn. 1987); People v. Jennings. 76 P.2d 475 (Cal.
1988); State v. Bartholomew. 654 P.2d 1170, 1184 (Wash. 1982),
vacated and remanded. 463 U.S. 1203, 103 S.Ct. 3530, 77 L.Ed.2d 1383
(1983), aff'd. 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (Wash. 1984).
Furthermore, since the United States Supreme Court has not yet
finally decided this issue, Appellant asserts this issue and
maintains that the introduction of evidence of prior unadjudicated
crimes violates due process and the sixth and eighth amendments.
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See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (introduction of unfairly
prejudicial evidence during penalty phase violates eighth
amendment); see also State v. McCormick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979);
Bobo. 727 S.W.2d at 954-3.
Evidence of unadjudicated crimes during the penalty phase
violates state and federal due process, cruel and unusual
punishments prohibitions, and the eighth amendment reliability
requirements and results in arbitrary and capricious imposition of
the death penalty.

See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gardner v.

Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
The wholesale introduction of allegations of prior bad acts
during the penalty phase in this case, regardless of whether they
were violent, had been proven or sufficient evidence existed to
prove them underscores the lack of advisability of allowing the
introduction of unadjudicated acts during the penalty phase of a
capital trial.
POINT XXVI. THE EXCESSIVE REPETITION OF EVIDENCE
OF PAST CRIMES VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
As previously indicated, Mr. Menzies has been convicted as
an adult of five crimes other than the crimes involved in the
instant case:

(1) Escape, a second degree felony (July 6, 1978)

(State's Exhibit 9), (2) Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony
(taxi—July 17, 1978) (State's Exhibit 10), (3) Aggravated Robbery
(7-Eleven—December 21, 1975) (State's Exhibit 12), (4) Theft, a
misdemeanor, and (5) Theft, a misdemeanor.
Despite the fact that the State introduced Exhibits 9, 10
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and 12 during the penalty phase to establish the two aggravated
robberies and escape, it introduced repetitious and cumulative
evidence of these convictions.

In addition to the juvenile and

adult rap sheets (Exhibits 1-C, 15, 16) which suggest a far longer
criminal history, the State introduced repeated evidence of the
crimes in the prison file.

See index of prison file in Addendum L.

The judgment for the taxicab robbery appears three times in
the file in addition to its introduction as Exhibit 10 (E8:19, 4,
22).

That robbery is referred to in the prison file in rap sheets,

booking sheets, warrants, newspaper articles, and other documents at
least an additional eleven times.

E8:10, 11, 26, 17, 62, 85,

111-112, 130-33, 139, 146, 151.
The judgment for the other robbery appears three times in
the file in addition to its introduction as Exhibit 12 (E8:1C, 7,
21) and is referred to in the file at least an additional eighteen
times.

E8:10, 24, 62, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89-103, 107, 111-2, 124,

129, 130-3, 139, 146, 151, 214.
The judgment for the single escape appears three times (in
addition to Exhibit 9) (E8:l(b), 5, 23) and is referred to at least
twenty other times in the file (E8:10, 11, 28, 62, 80, 81, 85, 107,
111-2, 130-3, 139, 146, 151, 188, 190, 195-204, 210, 252, 253) (see
prison file index in Addendum L).
The impact of this repetitious and cumulative evidence was
to create the incorrect allusion that Mr. Menzies had a far more
extensive record containing several escapes than he in fact had.
The prosecutor then relied on this misconception, arguing "How many
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times do we let someone escape? . . . ." T. 3194.

The cumulative

effect of the repetitious evidence was to emphasize and increase
aggravating evidence, thereby leading to the arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.

See Johnson v. Mississippi. 486 U.S. 578; Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153; State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71.
POINT XXVII. APPLICATION OF THE HEINOUSNESS
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE PRESENT CASE
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(q) sets forth the following
aggravating circumstance:
The homicide was committed in an especially
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally
depraved manner, any of which must be
demonstrated by physical torture, serious
physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the
victim before death.
In State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 1216 (Utah 1989), this
Court considered the application of subsection (q) and determined
that the subsection cannot be interpreted literally and pass
constitutional muster.

Although the concept of heinousness is

difficult to articulate, Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. at 428, and
its progeny require that the language of the subsection be
interpreted to "provide[] a meaningful distinction between capital
and noncapital murders."

Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1217.

Furthermore, where a state is a weighing state such as
Utah, emphasis is given "to the requirement that aggravating factors
be defined with some degree of precision."
U.S.

Stringer v. Black, 503

, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992).
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In Godfrey, the United States Supreme Court reversed a
death sentence because an aggravating factor that the murder "was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" failed to guide
the sentencer since all murders could fit that description.
In Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1217, this Court pointed out that
subsection (q) "is analogous to" the Georgia statute considered in
Godfrey and relied on Godfrey, stating:
Thus, the Supreme Court apparently requires not
only serious physical abuse before death, but
also that any such abuse evidence a mental state
materially more depraved or culpable than that of
most murderers. [citation omitted] Moreover,
the physical abuse must be qualitatively and
quantitatively more different and more culpable
than that necessary to accomplish the murder.
In other words, for subsection (q) to be applicable, there
must be evidence of serious physical abuse or torture before death,
and not just the physical abuse which caused the death, and a more
depraved mental state than that which is evident in any homicide.
In State v. Wood. 648 P.2d at 85-6, this Court had
considered the trial judge's reliance on the "ruthlessness and
brutality of the murder . . . " as an aggravating circumstance, and
pointed out that:
Under the rule established in Godfrey v. Georgia.
446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398
(1980), there was error in the weighing process
in this case because the trial court relied on an
aggravating circumstance which, without some
limitation, is improper.
This Court explained further "that the sentencing process
was flawed because the aggravating factor relied on was
constitutionally impermissible . . . since it describes all murders"
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and required that "'ruthlessness and brutality,' as an aggravating
factor, must be limited to those murders involving an aggravated
See also Carter. 116 P.2d at 895.

battery or torture."

After Wood, the legislature enacted the current
subsection (q) "apparently to avoid [the] constitutional infirmity"
of the Wood aggravating circumstance.

The subsection explicitly

requires that the heinousness "must be demonstrated by physical
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the
victim before death."

(emphasis added)

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-5-202(1)(h); Carter, 707 P.2d 656.
The prosecutor's argument in the instant case that the
homicide was brutal and the trial judge's finding that
subsection (q) applied in the present case ignored the dictates of
the statute, Wood and Godfrey.

In the present case, there is no

evidence that physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious
bodily injury occurred before death.
The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was
"strangulation with stab wounds to the neck contributing to the
death."

T. 1639.

He clarified that the strangulation and stab

wounds were both potentially fatal, that they occurred within a
short proximity of each other, and that Ms. Hunsaker died quickly.
T. 1640-1; 1619-21.

The ligature marks on the wrists were

contemporaneous with the stab wounds.

T. 1666-7.

As was the case in Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1218, there is no
evidence in this case that the murderer "intended to do or in fact
did anything but kill his victim . . . ." Also similar to Tuttle.
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although the method of killing "is gory and distasteful, there is
absolutely no evidence that [he] had a quicker or less painful
method available to him or that he was an expert at such matters and
intentionally refrained from administering one wound that would have
caused instantaneous death in favor of a number of wounds that would
prolong the victim's life and suffering."

Id.

In addition, there is no evidence of mental depravity
beyond that which is evident in any homicide.

In People v.

Davenport, 710 P.2d 861, 875 (Cal. 1985), the court stated:
The very use of the term torture to describe the
class of murders to which the subdivision applies
necessarily imports into the statute a
requirement that the perpetrator have the
sadistic intent to cause the victim to suffer
pain in addition to the pain of death, which
intent is distinct from the intent to cause the
victim's death.
See also State v. Cornell, 741 P.2d 501 (Or. 1987); Jackson v.
State, 451 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1984); Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1217. The
trial judge and prosecutor failed to limit the construction of
subsection (q) as required by Wood and Godfrey, in violation of the
eighth amendment.
U.S.

T. 3250, 3209.

See Sochor v. Florida, 504

, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2121, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992).

Cf. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511
(1990).
The reliance on subsection (q) and/or the "brutality" of
the homicide as an aggravating factor is eighth amendment error
which requires vacating the death sentence.
at 2119.

fl

See Sochor, 112 S.Ct.

[I]n a state where the sentencer weighs aggravating and
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mitigating circumstances, the weighing of an invalid aggravating
circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment."
Florida.

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 2926,

citing Sochor v. Florida. 504 U.S.

Espinoza v.

L.Ed.2d

(1992),

, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119, 119

L.Ed.2d 326 (1992); Stringer v. Black. 503 U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1130,

1140, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992); Parker v. Dugger. 498 U.S.

, 111

S.Ct. 731, 738, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi. 494
U.S. 738, 752, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1450, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990).
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "close
appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating
factors [is required] to implement the well-established Eighth
Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing determinations in
death penalty cases."

Stringer. 112 S.Ct. at 1136.

In Stringer,

the Court compared an invalid aggravating circumstance to a "thumb
on a scale" weighing in favor of death and acknowledged that such
factors create the possibility of "randomness" and "bias in favor of
the death penalty."

Stringer. 112 S.Ct. at 1137, 1139.

Therefore,

in order not to violate the eighth amendment and to assure
individualized sentencing, the effect of an invalid aggravating
factor must be carefully assessed.
In Carter. 776 P.2d at 895, this Court invalidated a death
sentence based on the failure to instruct the jury that in order to
find that subsection (q) applied, it must determine that "physical
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the
victim [occurred] before death."

Despite the existence of another

aggravating circumstance, the uncertainty as to whether the jury
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would have imposed the death penalty had they been properly
instructed required a new penalty hearing.

The uncertainty in the

present case likewise requires a new penalty hearing.
POINT XXVIII. APPLICATION OF THE "PREVENTING A
WITNESS FROM TESTIFYING" AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(i) sets forth the following
aggravating circumstance:
(1) The homicide was committed for the purpose
of: (i) preventing a witness from testifying;
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence
or participating in any legal proceedings or
official investigation; (iii) retaliating against
a person for testifying, providing evidence, or
participating in any legal proceedings or
official investigation; or (iv) disrupting or
hindering any lawful governmental function or
enforcement of laws.
The State argued this aggravating circumstance during the
penalty phase, speculating that the homicide occurred to keep
Ms. Hunsaker from testifying against Appellant at a trial of the
robbery which the State claimed occurred as part of this case.
T. 3202, 3209.64

The trial judge relied on this aggravating

circumstance in imposing the death sentence.

T. 3250.

Application of subsection (i) to this case requires a new
penalty hearing because (1) the interpretation given subsection (i)
in the instant case could apply to almost any homicide and fails to
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and

64. In closing, defense counsel stated, "Iflve eliminated any
mention of torture or brutality or to eliminate a witness because,
your honor, legally speaking, those are factors which this court
cannot consider." T. 3222.
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(2) the evidence does not support the determination.
The language outlining aggravating circumstances must be
interpreted in a sufficiently narrow manner so as to pass
constitutional muster.
Wood, 648 P.2d at 85-6.

See State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1215-9;
The proper interpretation of this

subsection requires that the decedent would have been a witness in a
separate proceeding involving a crime which is distinct from the
incident surrounding her own death.

See Brown, 607 P.2d at 267

(upholding application of this aggravating circumstance where
decedent had been subpoenaed to testify against defendant in a trial
for a distinct crime, and evidence showed defendant knew that
decedent was to be a witness against him and had told others that he
would kill decedent); State v. Griffin, 685 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah
1984) (upholding jury verdict where evidence showed that defendant
intended to kill woman to keep her from testifying in separate
burglary trial).
Other courts have interpreted similar statutory aggravating
circumstances to require that there be a pending judicial proceeding
involving circumstances distinct from the events surrounding the
homicide in order for the aggravating circumstance to apply.

See,

e.g., State v. Williams, 652 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. banc 1983);
Commonwealth v. Crawley, 526 A.2d 334 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Caldwell, 532 A.2d 813 (Pa. 1987); see also Ala. Code
§ 13A-5-40(a)(14) (requiring separate proceeding be in place for
aggravating circumstance to apply); Cal. Crim. Code § 190.2(10)
(1989) (statute explicitly precludes application of aggravating
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circumstance to circumstances surrounding homicide itself); Idaho
Code § 19-2525(g)(10) (Supp. 1989) (limits application of
aggravating circumstances to situation where decedent was witness in
separate judicial proceeding).
In order to adequately channel and narrow the application
of the death penalty, subsection (i) must be interpreted to require
that legal proceedings or an official investigation separate from
the events surrounding the homicide be pending.

The application of

this aggravating circumstance where no separate proceedings or
investigation existed violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments
since it could otherwise apply in almost any homicide where the
defendant had committed other bad acts as part of the homicide.
In addition, the State failed to introduce evidence
demonstrating that the homicide occurred to keep Ms. Hunsaker from
testifying.

The State speculated, as can be done in any homicide

where an underlying felony is involved, that Ms. Hunsaker was killed
to prevent her from testifying in this case (T. 3209) but failed to
introduce evidence supporting such speculation.
The application of subsection (i) violates the eighth
amendment.

Since the judge relied on this aggravating circumstance,

the sentence must be vacated.
POINT XXIX. APPLICATION OF THE PECUNIARY GAIN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY
HEARING.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(f) provides:
(f) The homicide was committed for pecuniary or
other personal gain.
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Although the State neither charged subsection (f) nor urged its
application, the trial judge sua sponte considered and relied on
this aggravating circumstance in imposing sentence.
The trial judge's reliance on this aggravating circumstance
was improper since the aggravating circumstance duplicates the
robbery aggravating circumstance.

Unless the circumstance is

interpreted to require something other than the robbery which had
already been found, the circumstance is vague and fails to channel
since it would allow the sentencer to take a single act—a
robbery—and turn it into two aggravating circumstances in any
homicide where a robbery occurred.

See generally Furman, 408 U.S.

328; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
In cases in which this Court has applied the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance, a pecuniary gain other than that which
flows from the robbery was anticipated.

For example, in State v.

Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1226-7 (Utah 1986), this Court examined
subsection (f) in the narrowed circumstance where "the defendant
wanted her father murdered because [he] had cut defendant off
financially, and she wanted to get her inheritance," and approved
the subsection in that narrow context.65
In State v. Valdez. 748 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Utah 1987), this
Court found sufficient evidence to support the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance where the decedent had filed a paternity

65. In Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1306
that subsection (f) was vague, in
fourteenth amendments and Article
constitution. This Court did not

(Utah 1986), the
violation of the
I, § § 7 and 9 of
reach the merits
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defendant claimed
eighth and
the Utah
of the claim.

action for support against the defendant.

In Johnson, 774 P.2d

1141, where the defendant held a life insurance policy on the
decedent, this Court upheld the application of the aggravating
circumstance.

In each instance where the aggravating circumstance

has been upheld, evidence separate from the elements of the crime
has shown that the defendant stood to gain financially by the death.
Because any robbery is committed for pecuniary gain,
application of subsection f) violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States constitution.

The application of

the circumstance requires a new penalty phase because this Court
cannot be certain, especially where the court sua sponte relied on
the circumstance, that it did not affect the outcome.

See

discussion infra at 167.
POINT XXX. RELIANCE ON UNCHARGED AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES DURING SENTENCING REQUIRES A NEW
PENALTY PHASE.
In the present case, the State charged three statutory
aggravating circumstances in the Information:

the homicide was

committed during the course of a robbery or aggravated robbery
(subsection (d)), the homicide was committed during the course of a
kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping (subsection (d)), and the
defendant had previously been convicted of two violent felonies
(subsection (h)). R. 48. 66
The jury found both aggravating circumstances.

T. 898.

66. The trial judge ruled that subsection (h) was unconstitutional,
so that aggravating circumstance was stricken.
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During the penalty phase, the prosecutor argued two additional
uncharged aggravating circumstances applied:

(1) heinousness

(T. 2721), and (2) preventing a witness from testifying (T. 2721-2,
1724).

The trial judge relied on these two uncharged aggravating

circumstances and sua sponte relied on another uncharged aggravating
circumstance, pecuniary gain, in passing sentence.

T. 3249.

"Notice of issues to be resolved by the adversary process
is a fundamental characteristic of fair procedure."
Idaho, 500 U.S.

, 111 S.Ct.

Lankford v.

, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991).

There is no question that the Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses the right to fair notice of
criminal charges. The Supreme Court in
In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92
L.Ed.2d 682 (1948), in dealing with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
stated that:
A person's right to reasonable notice of a
charge against him, and an opportunity to be
heard in his defense—a right to his day in
court—are basic to our system of jurisprudence.
Watson v. Jacro. 558 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1977).
"The Utah Constitution contains at least two possible
sources of a right to adequate notice of criminal charges:
article I, section 7 and article I, section 12." State v. Fulton,
742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987); Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1261.

Although

this Court has not distinguished the scope of the two provisions, it
has recognized that:
The crux of both theories is that a criminal
defendant must be sufficiently apprised of the
particulars of the charge to be able to
"adequately prepare his defense." State v.
Burnett, 712 P.2d at 262; accord McNair v.
Hayward, 666 P.2d at 326.
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Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1214.
In Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 816, 823 (Utah 1980), this
Court noted that the listing of eight aggravating circumstances in
§ 76-5-202 puts a defendant on notice of "what the State must prove
and thus [is] able to prepare his defense."
By contrast, § 76-5-202 now contains seventeen aggravating
circumstances, many of which contain subcategories.

A capital

defendant who is aware of the statute is nevertheless not "apprised
of the particulars of the charge to be able to 'adequately prepare
his defense.'11

Nor does Andrews address the state constitutional

lack of notice claim.
Mr. Menzies waived his right to a jury during the penalty
phase without notice that these additional circumstances would be
pursued.

The lack of notice violated the fourteenth amendment and

Article I, § § 7 and 12 of the Utah constitution.

See Hubbard, 500

So.2d at 1215; Lankford v. Idaho, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991).
In addition, statutory aggravating circumstances (a)
through (q) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 are elements of the crime
of capital homicide.

See generally State v. James, 767 P.2d 549,

556-7 (Utah 1989); Andrews v. Shulsen. 600 F.Supp. 408, 420-1 (D.C.
1984).

As elements of the substantive offense, they should be

alleged and proven in the guilt/innocence phase.

See Hubbard v.

State, 500 So.2d 1204, 1215 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd. 500 So.2d 1231
(Ala. 1986), cert, denied 480 U.S. 940 (1987).
Allowing the State to raise additional statutory
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circumstances during the penalty phase permits the State to
"sandbag" an aggravating circumstance with evidentiary problems,
then rely on such weak aggravating circumstance during the penalty
phase, where evidentiary rules are relaxed.

Furthermore, in light

of the jury verdict, the ease of finding the additional
circumstances is increased; had all been charged in the
guilt/innocence phase, the presumption of innocence would have
attached to all equally.

See State v. Bartholomew, 683 P.2d 1079

(Wash. 1984); Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1262-3 (Stewart, J., dissenting
and concurring).
Relying on the uncharged statutory aggravating
circumstances violated due process, the eighth amendment, and
Article I, § § 7 and 12 of the Utah constitution.
POINT XXXI. ADMISSION OF THE ADULT AND JUVENILE
RAP SHEETS DURING THE PENALTY PHASE WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The State introduced Exhibit 15, a rap sheet which
contained a number of unadjudicated crimes.

T. 2850.

Although the

trial judge suggested that crimes for which there were no
convictions be blocked out and never formally admitted the exhibit,
Exhibit 15 was apparently admitted and included in the exhibits in
this case.

(See exhibit box.)

Exhibit 16, which was admitted (T. 2865) contains charges
of burglary, automobile theft and one escape for which there is no
conviction.
In addition, the prison file contains various rap sheets
with unadjudicated crimes.

E8:10, 84, 85, 86, 87, 107.
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The court also admitted a juvenile rap sheet which
contained numerous entries for which there was no outcome and relied
on the number of arrests in assessing sentence.

Exhibit 1C; T. 2904.

Admission of the rap sheets violated due process, the
eighth amendment and the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Charges of escape,

automobile theft and burglary appeared on Exhibit 16 but were
apparently dismissed, and the State made no attempt to prove them.
Hence, the eighth amendment and due process requirements outlined in
Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1259, were not met.

The State made no attempt

to prove other crimes appearing on Exhibit 15, 16 or 1-C, including
possession of a stolen vehicle, contributing, another burglary, and
some thefts.

Appellant has been convicted of two aggravated

robberies, one escape and two thefts.

Exhibits 9, 10 and 12.

Introduction of the rap sheets without proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant committed the other crimes violated due process
and the eighth amendment.

See Id.67

In addition, admission of the rap sheets violated
Appellant's right to confrontation during the penalty phase.

See

Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 386-88 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987);
Lanier, 533 So.2d at 488-90; Balfour v. Mississippi. 598 So.2d 731

67. The rap sheet was inadmissible hearsay. Rule 801, Utah Rules
of Evidence; Beltran. 728 S.W.2d 382. Nor was the proper foundation
laid for admission of State's Exhibit 15 and 16. It is not a
self-authenticating document pursuant to Rule 902, Utah Rules of
Evidence. The certificate does not contain a seal and therefore
does not comply with paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of Rule 902, as
required by paragraph (4) of that same rule. See generally State v.
Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346-8. Nor did Sgt. Illsey's testimony
authenticate the document.
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(Miss. 1992); Harris v. State. 1992 WL 136496 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992). 68
Although in Tavlor. 818 P.2d at 1034, this Court held that
juvenile offenses are relevant to sentencing in a capital case,69 it
required that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such
crimes occurred in order to comply with due process and the eighth
amendment.
The failure to prove unadjudicated crimes which appear on
the rap sheets violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
POINT XXXII. THE ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE
CORPSE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Over defendants objection, the trial judge admitted during
the penalty phase two photographs of the corpse as State's Exhibits
6 and 7.

T. 2833-2838, 2882.

In admitting the photographs, the

trial judge reasoned that:
those pictures would be helpful to the Court in
observing what the scene was. Although it's been
described, I think the pictures would give the
Court a better picture. It doesn't appear to be
gruesome as far as the Court is aware, that
State's 6 and 7 depicts especially, essentially
the scene.
T. 2882-3.
Contrary to the trial judge's ruling, neither exhibit shows

68. In a noncapital case, the court recognized in Brothers v.
Dowdle. 817 F.2d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987), that a "court may not
impose a more severe punishment simply because the defendant in some
way entangled with the police."
69. Despite the holding in Taylor and for purposes of preserving
this issue for further review, if necessary, Mr. Menzies notes that
he maintains that juvenile offenses, and particularly unadjudicated
offenses, should not be admissible in the penalty phase since the
passage of time and lack of conviction make such entries unreliable,
in violation of due process and the eighth amendment.
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the crime scene.

Exhibit 6 is a close-up of the mouth, chin and

gaping neck wounds; Exhibit 7 shows the head and upper torso,
focusing on neck wounds.

The exhibits appear to have been taken as

part of the autopsy.
The photographs had no probative value and were therefore
admitted in violation of Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983).

Even if they had depicted the crime scene, admitting them

in order to give the trial court an accurate impression of the scene
for evaluation of the subsection (q) aggravating factor was
improper.70
In Tuttle. 780 P.2d at 1219 n.18 (Utah 1989), this Court
pointed out, "[i]n Godfrey, the Court noted that the gruesomeness of
the murder scene is entirely irrelevant to a determination of its
heinousness.

See Godfrey. 446 U.S. at 433 n.16, 100 S.Ct. at 1767

n.16."
In addition, the photographs did not accurately depict the
wounds as they had been inflicted.

During cross-examination in the

guilt phase, Dr. Sweeney testified that the nature of skin
elasticity makes cuts gape after incisions are made, making the
resulting wounds shorter and wider than the original cut marks.
T. 1644-1648.

Dr. Sweeney also testified that as a result of the

time lapse between death and the autopsy, the photographs showed
dark patterns from settled blood which might have appeared to be

70. The State incorrectly argued that the pictures were relevant to
establish as an aggravating factor the brutal nature of the murder.
T. 2834-5.
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injuries but were not.

T. 1669.

Furthermore, information regarding the wounds and crime
scene was presented through the testimony of Detective Thompson
(T. 1314-1329) and Dr. Sweeney (T. 1606-1681).

Even if there were

some probative value to the photographs, they were cumulative of
other evidence.

See Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1257 ("An important

consideration in assessing the probative value of a photograph is
whether the facts shown by the photograph can be established by
other means.").
The photographs therefore had little or no probative value;
the prejudicial effect of the photographs based on their
gruesomeness made them inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence.
See State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988), overruled on
other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1992) (pointing out that
gruesome photographs of a corpse fall in a special category of
evidence which has "an unusually strong propensity to unfairly
prejudice, inflame, or mislead" and requiring "a showing of unusual
probative value" before such evidence is admissible under Rule 403);
State v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750, 752-3 (Utah 1986).

The color photographs were taken two days after the death,
were close-ups, did not prove disputed facts, and were gruesome.
These factors also weigh against admission.

See Lafferty, 749 P.2d

at 1257.

("Other factors will also come into play in the balancing

process.

These may include whether the photographs are in color or

black and white, when they were taken in relation to the crime,
whether they are close-ups or enlargements, their degree of
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gruesomeness, and the cumulative nature of the evidence, and whether
facts shown are disputed by the defendant,")
Admission of the photographs also violated Mr. Menzies'
fourteenth amendment due process rights and eighth amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

In State v. Laffertv.

749 P.2d at 1259, this Court recognized that:
under Gregg [v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-4
(1976)], the federal constitutional right of the
accused to due process and to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment are violated by the
admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence in the
penalty phase.
The trial judge's error in admitting the photographs
requires reversal since the prosecutor relied on the photographs to
establish the heinousness aggravating factor.

T. 2834-5, 2721,

2836, 3238.71
In State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 477 (Utah 1988), this
Court held that it was error to admit three photographs of the
wounds of one of the victims.

Two of the three photographs had no

probative value in light of the medical examiner's testimony, and
"[cumulatively and individually, the photographs had great
potential for unfairly prejudicing defendant."

Although "[tjhe

photographs were inflammatory and had significant power to prejudice
the jury unfairly," this Court determined that the error was

71. Admitting this evidence during the penalty phase to the bench
does not dissipate the prejudicial effect of the error. By
admitting the photographs, Judge Uno relied on inadmissible evidence
in reaching his decision. See Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1256-7, 1258
(addressing admissibility of photographs during penalty phase under
rules of evidence); State v. Howard. 544 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah 1975);
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
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harmless "in light of defendant's gruesome confession, detailing how
he brutally murdered the victims . . . ."

Id,

By contrast, no confession existed in this case, and the
State's case in chief was built on circumstantial evidence.

The

delicate weighing that occurs in the penalty phase and the need for
reliability in imposing the death penalty require reversal of the
death sentence based on this error.
POINT XXXIII. THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
DEATH PENALTY SHOULD BE IMPOSED BECAUSE OTHERWISE
APPELLANT MIGHT BE PAROLED REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY
PHASE.
The prosecutor argued that the death penalty should be
imposed because otherwise Appellant might be paroled.
judge relied on this argument in imposing death.

T. 3211.

The

T. 3254.

The argument is not supported by the evidence.

There is no

evidence that an individual with Mr. Menzies' background would ever
be paroled.

In fact, Paul Sheffield testified that someone with

such a background would probably never be paroled.

T. 3119-20. Of

the twenty-five capital homicide defendants serving life sentences
who have appeared before the full-time Board, only eight have
received parole dates.

T. 3117, 3123.

The average term for such

"special" defendants who had presented sufficient mitigation or
rehabilitation evidence is twenty years.

T. 3123.

That average

includes the sentence of Frances Schreuder, an extraordinary
defendant with a background as a socialite, no criminal history, and
no further reason to kill.

T. 3126.

Six others had been given

natural life, and the remaining eleven had rehearing dates.
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T. 3122-3.72
Nonetheless, even if the evidence did demonstrate that
Mr. Menzies might be paroled, relying on such a factor for imposing
a death sentence violates Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution
and the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

See People v. Walker, 440

N.E.2d 83 (111. 1982); People v. Szabo. 447 N.E.2d 193 (111. 1983).
It is well established that the imposition of a death
sentence must be "based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."
Gardner. 430 U.S. at 358.

Circumstances which are relevant to

sentence include the character, background and record of the
defendant and the circumstances surrounding the homicide.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-207; Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 304-5
(1976).

Mitigating evidence must be considered to insure that the

"uniqueness of the individual" plays a vital role in the
assessment.

Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 556, 605 (1978).

Speculation that an individual might be paroled if given
life does not fit within the statutory or eighth amendment
requirements for aggravating evidence.

Such an argument is likely

to invoke an arbitrary decision to impose death which is based on
emotion rather than reason.

See People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d at

134, 135 (111. 1984).
The trial judge's reliance on this improper aggravating

72. The prosecutor's argument that the average term for murderers
was twenty years was a gross misstatement of the evidence.
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where argument is not supported by
the evidence. See Holman, 469 N.E.2d at 134 ("Parties in closing
argument may not go beyond the scope of the evidence presented and
facts fairly inferable therefrom."). See also Emmett, 184 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 36.
- 177 -

factor requires a new trial since this Court cannot be cerain that
in the absence of concern that Appellant might be paroled, the trial
judge would have imposed the death penalty.
POINT XXXIV. THE LEGISLATIVE CHANGE IN THE DEATH
PENALTY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE IN
THIS CASE IS UNNECESSARILY RIGOROUS, IN VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE I. SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
As previously outlined in Point 33 supra, the prosecutor
improperly argued that Judge Uno should impose the death penalty
because otherwise the Board of Pardons might parole Appellant and
that the judge had a duty to protect the community from a Ralph
Menzies who "could be put back on the street."

T. 3211.

The trial judge relied on the possibility of parole in
imposing sentence.

T. 3254.

The recent legislative change which allows for life without
possibility of parole (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.5 (1992))
precludes a decision to impose death based on the possibility of
parole in all cases where the offender is sentenced on or after
April 27, 1992.

This change in the process by which the death

sentence is imposed emphasizes the "unnecessary rigor" with which
the death sentence is imposed where it is based on a fear that the
person will eventually be paroled.

See State v. Andrews, 191 Utah

Adv. Rep. 30, 39 (Utah 1992) (Durham, J., dissenting).
Imposition of a death sentence based on fear that the
individual will be paroled is unnecessarily rigorous because
"incapacitation . . . can be achieved through means less rigorous
than death," and imposing a death sentence because it is "the only

- 178 -

way to incapacitate a defendant" is therefore unnecessarily
rigorous.

Id.

In addition, the change in the law whereby the entire
process or "calculus" for imposing a death sentence has changed so
that no future capital defendant will be given a death sentence out
of fear that he will be paroled demonstrates the fundamental
unfairness and unnecessary rigor of allowing this sentence to stand
where the prosecutor's argument relied strongly on the threat to
society if Appellant were given a life sentence and the judge relied
on such basis in imposing sentence.
Finally, for the reasons outlined above, imposition of the
death penalty based on the possibility that the defendant will be
paroled violates the eighth amendment.

It is cruel and unusual to

punish a defendant with death where there are other means to
"incapacitate" him and where no future defendants will be put to
death for this reason.
POINT XXXV. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHERE THE
TRIAL JUDGE RELIED ON THE PROSECUTORS ARGUMENT
THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ESCAPE REQUIRED
IMPOSITION OF A DEATH SENTENCE.
During penalty phase closing, the prosecutor also argued
that the trial judge should impose the death penalty because
otherwise Appellant might escape.

T. 3211.

In reaching his

decision to impose a death sentence, Judge Uno relied on the
speculation that Appellant might escape if given a life sentence.
T. 3254.
The erroneous nature of this argument is similar to the
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erroneous nature of the possibility of parole—it is speculation
which appeals to the passions and emotions of the sentencer,
resulting in an arbitrary sentence based on emotion rather than
reason.

See discussion in Point 33, supra at 176.
In Holman. 469 N.E.2d at 133-5, the Court held that

reversible error occurred where the prosecutor argued that
imposition of the death penalty would preclude the defendant from
having an opportunity to escape.

The Court stated:

Unsupported predictions as to the kind of crimes
the defendant will commit if not executed are
even more to be condemned than references to the
possibility of parole, for they convey more
directly to jurors the vivid, but misleading,
message that the death penalty is the only way to
protect society from the defendant and forestall
his violence. (See People v. Murtishaw (1981),
29 Cal. 3d 733, 773, 631 P.2d 446, 470, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 738, 762, cert, denied (1982), 455 U.S.
922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 464). The
statements made here had no function other than
to appeal to the passions and fears of the jury
and increase the likelihood that the sentence it
would recommend would be based on emotion rather
than on reason.
Id. at 135; Collier v. State. 705 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Nev. 1985)
(remarks about possibility of escape improper.
In addition, because there are means short of death to
prevent an escape, as evidenced by the fact that Appellant and
several other capital defendants have been successfully incarcerated
at the Utah State Prison, imposition of death based on this
consideration is unduly rigorous and results in cruel and unusual
punishment.

See discussion supra at 178 regarding legislative

change.
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The prosecutor's argument in the instant case improperly
appealed to emotion and fear:
Secondly, I think the court has to consider
this question. How many people have to be
injured, maimed, tortured, or murdered before we
say this is enough.73
Number three. How many times do we let
someone escape from the Utah State Prison before
we say "no more."
T. 3194.

The prosecutor also argued that Mr. Menzies might be

released through parole or escape and that the judge had
a duty to this city, this community, this state,
and it is a duty to protect the citizens who live
here against people like Ralph Menzies.
T. 3211.

See generally Collier v. State, 705 P.2d at 1130. The

fact that Judge Uno relied on these appeals to emotion in sentencing
underscores the unfairness of the sentencing proceeding in this case.
POINT XXXVI. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT
IN PENALTY PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENT.
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct requires a

73. This argument appeals to the passions of the trial judge,
mischaracterizes the evidence, and relies on the implication created
by the repetitious material in the prison file and the evidence
unadjudicated bad acts presented, but not proven, in the penalty
phase that Mr. Menzies had been convicted of more than one escape.
Mr. Menzies has been convicted on one escape which involved a
walkaway from minimum security.
In addition, the State failed to present any evidence
suggesting that Mr. Menzies would be housed in a less secure area of
the prison if he were given life rather than death. The Utah State
Prison does not have a separate "Death Row" and persons serving life
sentences are housed in the maximum security Uintah II along with
Death Row inmates.
Furthermore, the State presented no evidence that any
inmate has ever escaped from Uintah II, the current maximum security
facility. The prosecutor's argument was wholly speculative,
appealing to passions and fear, and is not a reliable or appropriate
basis for imposition of the death sentence.
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new trial, a two-step test is applied.
335; Troy. 688 P.2d at 486.

State v. Span. 819 P.2d at

The first step requires a determination

of whether "the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters
which they would not be justified in considering in determining
their verdict."

Id.

The second step involves an assessment of

whether the remarks probably influenced the decision.

Id.

In the penalty phase, the prosecutor at least twice
referred to Mr. Menzies as a psychopath (T. 3242, 3212), told the
judge that he had "a duty to protect the citizens who live here
against people like Ralph Menzies and his conduct" (T. 3211), then
concluded by again labeling Mr. Menzies as a psychopath and reading
from and relying on a book about psychopaths which was not in
evidence (T. 3212-3).

The prosecutor stated:

ERNIE JONES: Your honor, in a book called "Over
the Edge" by Jonathan Kellerman, he gives a
description of a psychopath. That is the same
conclusion that Judge Larson reached about the
defendant in 1976, and I think Mr. Kellerman#s
description of a psychopath fits this case
perfectly.

"The course of the psychopaths is as
unpredictable as a flash fire in a windstorm.
The first things psychopaths often attempt after
being caught is to feign insanity. The Yorkshire
Ripper had tried it. as did Charles Manson, and
the Son of Sam. All had failed but not before
fooling several experts."
The author, Jonathan Kellerman, said this about
the psychopaths. "He is the beast who walks
upright. Meet him on the street and he seems
normal, even charming. But he roams those
streets parasitic and cold-eyed stocking his prey
behind the veneer of civility. The rules and
regulations that separate humans from savages
don't concern him. 'Do unto others as you damned
well please,' is his creed."
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(emphasis added).

T. 3213. The prosecutor quoted further from the

book, again labeled Appellant a psychopath, then concluded by
stating, "Your honor, there is no therapy for the evil inside Ralph
Menzies."

T. 3213.

The only "evidence" that Appellant is a psychopath is a
hearsay statement included in Exhibit 1-A made by Judge Larson as
part of the certification proceedings in 1976, twelve years before
the trial.

Judge Larson is not a psychological expert, and his

loose use of the term "psychopath" in a dated, hearsay report did
not demonstrate that Appellant is a psychopath.

None of the experts

testifying in this case nor the other psychological reports label
Appellant as a psychopath.

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where

the prosecutor's argument is not supported by the evidence.

See

Collier v. State. 705 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Nev. 1985); Emmett, 184 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 36.
In addition, the book was not in evidence, and dramatically
reading from it stepped over the line of proper prosecutorial
conduct.

While "it may be proper for counsel to go beyond the

evidence to discuss general theories of penology such as the merits
of punishment, deterrence and the death penalty," "[i]n general,
however, factual matters outside the record are irrelevant and not
proper subjects for argument."

Collier. 705 P.2d at 1129.

Comparing Mr. Menzies to three notorious killers was also
improper conduct.

It is well established that such comparison

serves to inflame and "divert the [fact finder's] attention from its
proper purpose, which is the determination of the proper sentence
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for the defendant before them, based upon his own past conduct."
Collier. 705 P.2d at 1129; see also Trov. 688 P.2d at 486
(prosecutorial misconduct to compare defendant to notorious
criminals).
By injecting his personal opinion that the description in
the book fit Appellant, the prosecutor committed misconduct.
Collier, 705 P.2d at 1130; Howard v. State. 800 P.2d 175, 178 (Nev.
1990) .
The improper argument was harmful and probably influenced
Judge Uno's decision to impose the death penalty.
P.2d at 486-7.

See Troy, 688

The judge indicated that his greatest concern was

for "the innocent victim or the victims in the future" (T. 3269) and
imposed the death penalty based in part on his desire to protect
society from Appellant.

T. 3269-70.

The improper argument most

certainly impacted on this concern.
POINT XXXVII. THE ADMISSION OF VICTIM IMPACT
EVIDENCE VIOLATED THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
During the guilt/innocence phase, the State introduced
victim impact evidence regarding the effect of Ms. Hunsaker's death
on her young children and unemployed husband.
988.

T. 975-6, 978-9, 982,

During the penalty phase, even though Mr. Menzies had not been

convicted of an aggravated assault on Valfua Lelaetafea, the State
introduced evidence regarding the extent of the taxi driver's
injuries and the resultant pain and suffering.

T. 2795-6.74

74. Over defense objection, Mr. Lelaetafea partially disrobed and
showed the court his injury. Because the shooting was not
(continued)
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The State argued that Appellant's impact on his victims
justified the death penalty.

T. 3199, 3210.75

Despite a finding

that the shooting of the taxi driver was unintentional, the trial
judge relied on the extent of the injury in assessing sentence.
T. 3265, 3254.

He also relied on the victim impact evidence

regarding Maureen Hunsaker and her family and the "scarring" of Carl
McBrayer.

T. 3254.

At the time this case was tried, the United States Supreme
Court decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529,
96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), that consideration of victim impact evidence
during the penalty phase violates the eighth amendment was in
place.

In Booth, the victim impact evidence consisted of

descriptions of "the personal characteristics of the victims and the
emotional impact of the crimes on the family . . . [and] set forth
the family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes and
the defendant."

Id. at 520.

The rationale for excluding victim impact evidence is that
in order to avoid arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty, the focus in capital sentencing must be on the facts of the
crime and the character of the defendant.

Id. at 502. The impact

of the crime on the victim or his or her family is irrelevant.

Id.

(footnote 74 continued)
intentional (T. 3265, 3251-2), this display was irrelevant. In
addition, it was highly inflammatory and constituted victim impact
evidence. The trial court erred in permitting this display.
75. Although the prosecutor argued that "there is no question that
[Mr. Menzies] has left his mark on Carl McBrayer" (T. 3210), there
was no impact evidence admitted in support of this statement.
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at 504.

In addition, victim impact evidence is inflammatory and

difficult to rebut.
After the trial in the instant case, the Court issued its
decision in South Carolina v. Gathers. 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207,
104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989).

Gathers upheld Booth and reversed a death

sentence because the prosecutor's comments on the victim's character
was "'unnecessary to an understanding of the circumstances of the
crime' . . . and 'conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a death
sentence because the victim was a religious man and registered
voter.'"

Id. at 882. The Court reiterated that "a sentence of

death must be related to the moral culpability of the defendant."
Id.
Despite the holding in Pavne v. Tennessee. 501 U.S.
111 S.Ct.

,

, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), reversing Booth and Gathers,

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court adhere to the
rationale expressed in Booth and Gathers and adopted in Gardner, 789
P.2d at 286, in deciding whether victim impact evidence offends
Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution.
The two dissents in Payne outline the problems with the
Pavne decision.

Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun)

pointed out that the Booth decision was consistent with historical
practices and that the introduction of victim impact evidence is "of
recent origin."

115 L.Ed.2d at 757.

Victim impact evidence, as used in this case, has
two flaws, both related to the Eighth Amendment's
command that the punishment of death may not be
meted out arbitrarily and capriciously. First,
aspects of the character of the victim
unforeseeable to the defendant at the time of his
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crime are irrelevant to the defendant's "personal
responsibility and moral guilt" and therefore
cannot justify a death sentence.

Second, the quantity and quality of victim impact
evidence sufficient to turn a verdict of life in
prison into death is not defined until after the
crime has been committed and therefore cannot
possibly be applied consistently in different
cases. The sentencer's unguided consideration of
victim impact evidence thus conflicts with the
principle central to our capital punishment
jurisprudence that, "where discretion is afforded
a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."
[citation omitted] Open-ended reliance by a
capital sentencer on victim impact evidence
simply does not provide a "principaled way to
distinguish [cases], in which the death penalty
[i]s imposed, from the many cases in which it
[i]s not." [citation omitted]
Id. at 759; see also Justice Marshall's dissent at 748; Defendant's
Wrongs and Victim's Rights:

Pavne v. Tennessee. Ill S.Ct. 2591

(1991), 27 Harvard L.R. 219, 231-41 (1992) (addressing flaws in
Payne decision).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 allows evidence regarding "the
nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character,
background, history, [and] mental and physical condition."

In

Gardner, 789 P.2d at 286, this Court relied on Booth to exclude
victim impact evidence which the defendant attempted to introduce in
mitigation.

This Court pointed out that "testimony offered

regarding the opposition of the victim's associates to the death
penalty was likewise properly excluded as irrelevant to the
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character of the accused or the nature of the crime" (emphasis
added).
Despite the holding in Payne, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 and
Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution preclude the use of the
victim impact evidence in this case.

This Court should adhere to

the rationale and holding in Booth, which was in place at the time
of this trial, and find that reversible error occurred.
POINT XXXVIII. THE ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF
DR. PATRICIA SMITH VIOLATED THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE, DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
Dr. Smith never interviewed or met Appellant; instead, she
reached her conclusions by reviewing portions of the prison file,
including several hearsay evaluations, presentence reports,
psychiatric evaluations, and Mr. Menzies' juvenile and adult
criminal history, including verbal reports of that history from the
prosecution.

T. 3144-5, 3148.

Her review left her with "no idea if

this patient is learning, disabled, organic, or anything of this
sort."

T. 3151.
Over Appellant's repeated objections, Dr. Smith testified

that Appellant is aggressive (T. 3157), an anti-social personality
(T. 3162-3), and not amenable to treatment.76

T. 3164.

She

reiterated portions of various reports, adopting the conclusions as
her own, and testified, again borrowing from a hearsay report, that

76. It is interesting to note that during cross-examination, when
asked to read aloud a report in which a psychologist indicated that
Mr. Menzies thought he needed to change and needed help doing so,
Dr. Smith twice misread the report to say Appellant thought he did
not need help. T. 3174.
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Appellant had feigned psychosis.

T. 3167, 3168. Although she had

never talked to Appellant, she relied on what she characterized as
Appellant's "noncommunicativeness.

That is lack of spontaneous

verbalization regarding why he committed certain acts . . . ."
T. 3155, 3169.
Utah law requires a determination of reliability before
expert testimony can be admitted.
(Utah 1989).

State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388

Unreliable foundation for expert testimony warrants

exclusion based on Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence and state and
federal due process grounds.
We remain wary of the potential of such evidence
to distort the fact-finding process by reason of
its superficial plausibility and its potential
for inducing fact finders to accept expert's
judgments on critical issues rather than making
their own.
Id. at 26.
Mr. Menzies has previously outlined the unreliability of
the reports relied upon by Dr. Smith and has claimed that the
admission of such reports violated his right to due process,
confrontation, and a reliable sentencing proceeding under the eighth
amendment.

See discussion supra at 120-35. Reiteration of these

reports by Dr. Smith, and reliance thereon as a basis for her own
opinion as to the lack of remorse by Mr. Menzies and his lack of
amenability to treatment, violates Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence
and further compounds the constitutional violations outlined above.
The need for reliability in a sentencing proceeding in a
capital case precludes admission of such unreliable testimony.
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Article I, § 9, Utah constitution; eighth amendment, United States
constitution; Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976);
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 359.
Unlike Barefoot v. Estelle. 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983), the
documents relied upon by Dr. Smith were wholly unreliable.
Dr. Smith's testimony reintroduced evidence, some of which had been
prepared by people who were not clinically trained, "with the
inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words."

Id. at

916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In closing, the prosecutor emphasized what he characterized
as Appellant's lack of ability to change (T. 3205-6) and relied on
Dr. Smith's testimony that Appellant had feigned psychosis.
T. 3207, 3208.

The lack of reliability in sentencing resulting from

this improper testimony requires a new penalty phase.
POINT XXXIX. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE REQUIRES A NEW
SENTENCING HEARING.
The doctrine of cumulative error allows a new hearing where
errors combine to deprive a defendant of a fair trial or penalty
hearing.

See State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987), citing

State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986), quoting State v.
McKenzie. 608 P.2d 428, 448, cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1501, 101 S.Ct.
626, 66 L.Ed.2d 507 (1980).
In the present case, even if this Court believes that the
errors standing alone do not require a new penalty phase, the
cumulative effect of the errors in both the penalty and
guilt/innocence phases was to create a penalty phase which was
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fundamentally unfair and which allowed for the arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
POINT XXXX. MR. MENZIES' SENTENCE SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY
APPLIED THE WOOD STANDARD,
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-4 (Utah 1981), established
the formula for determining the sentence during the penalty phase of
a capital homicide trial.
The first step is to determine whether the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The
second step is to determine whether the death
penalty is appropriate under all the
circumstances of the case and in light of the
defendant's background and life as a whole.
State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1027 (Utah 1989).
In reviewing a decision made in a criminal case by the
judge instead of a jury, this Court need not grant total deference
to the decision making process followed by the trial court.
Instead, the appellate court examines all of the evidence in the
record and can overturn the trial judge's findings if they are
clearly erroneous.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

A finding is clearly erroneous if it is "without adequate
evidentiary support, or induced by an erroneous view of the law."
Id.

Even with some evidentiary support, a finding is clearly

erroneous when the reviewing court looks at the whole record and "is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."

Id.

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION OUTWEIGHED EVIDENCE IN
MITIGATION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
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In addition to the errors at the penalty phase outlined
elsewhere in this brief, the trial judge improperly assessed whether
aggravation outweighed mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is not clear from the trial judge's transcribed oral
findings how he applied the evidence under the first prong of
Wood.77

T. 3248-68.

The trial judge did not make written findings

as required by Lafferty and made no determination that the prior bad
act evidence had occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.

While the

trial court recited a number of factors (including erroneous
aggravating circumstances and bad acts not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt), it does not appear that the trial court weighed
the substantiality or persuasiveness of the factors, as required by
Wood, 648 P.2d at 83.

Instead, it appears that the judge improperly

listed and counted the evidence.
Furthermore, Mr. Menzies' prior criminal record and the
facts of this case did not outweigh the mitigating factors of his
childhood, his conciliatory nature, his close relationship with his
sister, and his ability to work well while in prison.
The trial judge's determination that aggravation outweighed
mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt was clearly erroneous.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEATH
IS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY.
The second part of the Wood formula is
critical. It is not repetitious of the first

77. The penalty phase ruling is disjointed and appears not to be a
verbatim transcript of what was said. The court reporter gave the
notereader Judge Uno's handwritten notes to use in preparing this
portion of the transcript. T. 50-51.
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part, and it is not to be applied in a mechanical
or unthinking fashion. "The fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
gives rise to a special 'need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment' in any capital case." [citations
omitted] It is precisely this "special need for
reliability that the second part of the Wood test
is especially designed to serve.
Holland, 777 P.2d at 1027.
The trial judge inappropriately believed that "there is no
presumption that one sentence is better than the other."

T. 3270.

The State's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt both prongs
of the Wood/Holland test and the need for reliability in imposing a
death sentence establish a presumption for life.

The judge's

finding demonstrates that he improperly assessed the evidence.
The circumstances of this case, the lack of other
homicides, Appellant's background, intelligence, ability to be
treated, and a myriad of other factors demonstrate that death is not
an appropriate penalty in this case.
POINT XXXXI. IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
THIS CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE.
"[T]his Court has indicated that it will review death
sentences for proportionality."

Holland, 777 P.2d at 1025.

Holland, this Court pointed out:
In Wood, 648 P.2d at 77, we stated: "In the
penalty phase, it is our duty to determine
whether the sentence of death resulted from
error, prejudice or arbitrariness, or was
disproportionate."

Our statement in Wood means that this Court
will not allow sentencing authorities to impose
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In

the death penalty in an invidious fashion against
particular types of persons or groups of persons
or in a fashion disproportionate to the
culpability of a particular case. The statement
also means that over time, as this Court becomes
aware of a general pattern in the imposition of
the death penalty in this state, the Court may
set aside death sentences that fall outside the
general pattern and thus reflect an anomaly in
the imposition of the death penalty.
In Holland. 777 P.2d at 1026, this Court went on to
recognize a general pattern it has observed in death penalty cases
in this state:
With few exceptions, juries in this state have
not opted for death penalties when a defendant
has committed only a single murder; for the most
part death penalties have been imposed when the
defendant was involved in multiple murders,
either at the time of the particular homicide
charged or at some other time.
Mr. Menzies has not been involved in multiple murders.
In Gardner, 789 P.2d at 287, this Court stated:
Determining whether the penalty is proportionate
to the crime requires a careful and thoughtful
consideration of the individual defendant and the
circumstances surrounding the crime.
Most of the evidence in this case is circumstantial, and it
is impossible to ascertain the precise circumstances.

Although

Ms. Hunsaker disappeared from the Gas-A-Mat several hours before the
homicide, what occurred during that period is not clear, and it is
speculation to assume that she was treated in any particular way.
The homicide itself occurred quickly without any evidence of torture.
Mitigating evidence demonstrates that Mr. Menzies came from
a financially and psychologically impoverished background.
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T. 2907-11. He suffered extensive long-term abuse as a child,
T. 2910-12. Nevertheless, he has a close relationship with his
sister and other family members.

T. 2948-9. His family loves him

and was able to articulate the good in him.

Notations in his prison

file suggest that he can work well within the prison and is
considered a hard worker, e.g.. E8:135-7. He was incident free for
twenty-two months while in prison, an accomplishment that a prison
social worker testified was rare.

T. 3009.

He suffers from three

personality disorders but is susceptible to treatment.
The circumstances surrounding the crime, a careful
consideration of Mr. Menzies' background and the nonexistence of
other homicides demonstrate that the death sentence is
disproportionate and diverges from a general pattern of imposition
of the death penalty which this Court has recognized, in violation
of the eighth amendment.
MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENT
POINT XXXXII. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7 AND 12 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHEN IT "DEATH QUALIFIED" THE JURY.
Mr. Menzies filed a pretrial motion to preclude death
qualification of his jury venire and supporting memorandum.
R. 274-5, 276-95; see Addendum N.

Despite the holding in

Lockhart v. McCree. 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137
(1986), that the federal constitution does not preclude death
qualification, Mr. Menzies maintains that the Utah constitution,
Article I, §§ 7, 9, 10, 12, and 24, precludes such procedure because
death qualified juries are more conviction-prone and are not a fair
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representation of the community at large.

See State v. Larocco, 794

P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (this Court is free to independently interpret
State constitution); Hovey v. SUP. Ct., 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-6 (Cal.
1980); Lockhart v. McCree. 476 U.S. at 156-7 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 363 (1979).
In State v. David Young. Case No. 890424, currently under
advisement on direct appeal in this Court, the defendant/appellant
raised this identical issue.

Due to the page limitations imposed by

this Court in the instant case, Mr. Menzies refers this Court to the
death qualification issue in Case No. 890424, Point XXII at pages
158-66, and hereby incorporates that argument by this reference
thereto.
POINT XXXXIII. THE UTAH STATUTORY DEATH PENALTY
SCHEME FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CHANNEL THE CASES IN
WHICH THE DEATH PENALTY IS APPLIED, IN VIOLATION
OF BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
Mr. Menzies maintains that the Utah death penalty scheme
violates the eighth amendment to the United States constitution and
Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution because (1) the lengthy list
of aggravating factors in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 allows almost
any homicide to result in a death penalty, thereby failing to narrow
the class, (2) the unlimited aggravation language of § 76-3-207
fails to channel the discretion of the sentencer, (3) the statute
impermissibly creates a presumption of death in the penalty phase,
(4) the Utah death penalty scheme unacceptably reduces evidentiary
burdens in the penalty phase, and (5) the Utah death penalty scheme
fails to provide for automatic review of federal constitutional
issues.

These same arguments were raised by the appellant in
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State v. Young. Case No. 890424, appellant's opening brief at
179-88.

Due to page limitations imposed by this Court, Mr. Menzies

adopts and incorporates such arguments and makes the following
additions to the analysis contained in appellant's opening brief,
State v. Young, Case No. 890424, at 179-88.
In the instant case, the State argued and/or the judge
relied on the following items which were not part of "the nature and
circumstances of the crime" or "the defendant's character,
background, history, [or] mental and physical condition."

If

relevant at all, such items fit only as "other facts in
aggravation."

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2).

1. Victim impact testimony and evidence of fear
and harm done to Carl McBrayer and Valfoa Suaniae
Lelaetafea. T. 3196, 2785-2800, 2730-2759, 3199,
3210, 3254.
2. Claims that the death penalty was appropriate
because the Utah State Prison could not
effectively incarcerate Mr. Menzies and might
parole him. T. 3194, 3200, 3210-11, 3254.
3. The State's reliance on quotes from a book
about psychopaths and comparison of Appellant to
Charles Manson and Son of Sam, where there is no
evidence that Appellant is a psychopath.
T. 3212-3.
Hence, the unlimited aggravation provision was applied in
this case, unlike Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 572 (Utah 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that where a
state utilizes the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors,
special emphasis is given "to the requirement that aggravating
factors be defined with some degree of precision."
Black, 112 S.Ct. at 1136.

Stringer v.

The "unlimited aggravation" section of
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the Utah statute fails to define aggravating circumstances with
precision, in violation of the eighth amendment.
This Court has acknowledged that the additional
"unnecessary rigor" language in Article I, § 9 might provide for
greater protection than the eighth amendment.

State v. Bishop. 717

P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986); State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 190-1
(Utah 1990); State v. Andrews. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39 (Durham, J.,
dissenting).
In addition, this Court has acknowledged that the due
process guarantees contained in Article I, § 7 of the Utah
constitution provide greater protection for capital defendants.

See

Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774; Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991).
Both the federal and Utah constitutions require that the
class of murderers eligible for the death penalty be significantly
narrowed.

The current statutory scheme, with its seventeen

statutory aggravating circumstances and allowance for almost
unlimited aggravating evidence in the penalty phase, violates both
constitutions.
POINT XXXXIV. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO
ORALLY PRONOUNCE SENTENCE ON THE AGGRAVATING
KIDNAPPING REQUIRES THAT SUCH SENTENCE BE
STRICKEN.
The trial judge orally pronounced only a sentence of death
and did not otherwise sentence Appellant for the Aggravated
Kidnapping conviction.

T. 3270, 3248-9.

The written Judgment

contains a sentence of five years to life for the Aggravated
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Kidnapping conviction.

R. 1106. The trial judge's failure to

orally pronounce sentence to Appellant violates the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and due process and requires that this sentence
be stricken.

See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;

State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980); State v. Janis.
597 P.2d 873, 874 (Utah 1979); Benboe v. Alaska, 738 P.2d 356, 362
(Alaska 1987).
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial or, alternatively,
for a new penalty phase.
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